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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880161 
Priority No. 1 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (1953 as amended). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
See Addendum A for text of statutes, rules and 
constitutional provisions. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE8 AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was the inaccurate transcript prepared by a nonlicensed 
reporter adequate for appellate review of this capital homicide case? 
This issue involves a question of law. 
2. Did the trial judge commit reversible error in failing 
to remove five jurors for cause? 
A decision on a challenge for cause is 
reversed where the judge abused his discretion. 
State v. Gotschall. 782 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 
1989). The exercise of such discretion is 
viewed, however, "in light of the fact that it is 
a simple matter to obviate any problem of bias 
simply by excusing the prospective juror and 
selecting another." Jenkins v. Parrish. 627 P.2d 
533, 536 (Utah 1981). Despite the traditional 
abuse of discretion review, as a matter of law, 
jurors who will impose the death penalty without 
weighing the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances or who are otherwise tainted must 
be excused. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 
, 112 S.Ct. 222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). 
3. Did the State violate due process and discovery rules 
in failing to inform defense counsel that its key witness, who had 
identified someone other than Appellant at the lineup, made a 
post-lineup query to prosecutors that implicated Appellant? 
Whether a discovery violation occurred is a 
mixed question of law and fact. The trial 
judge's underlying factual findings are reviewed 
under a clearly erroneous standard whereas the 
conclusion is reviewed for correctness. See 
State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 789 (Utah 1991). 
4. Did the State violate due process and discovery rules 
in failing to inform defense counsel prior to trial that its key 
witness had initially been unable to select Menzies from a photo 
spread? 
The standard of review set forth in 3 above 
applies to this issue. 
5. Did the trial judge commit reversible error in 
admitting the preliminary hearing testimony of jail informant 
Britton? 
This issue involves a question of law and is 
reviewed for correctness. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
781. 
6. Did the trial court commit reversible error in quashing 
Appellant's subpoena of the prosecutor? 
Although the trial court has discretion to 
refuse to allow a defendant to call a prosecutor 
to testify, "a weather[ed] eye must be kept on 
the constitutional rights of the defendant." 
State v. Stiltner, 377 P.2d 252 (Wash. 1962). 
Where "the result would be to prejudice the 
defendant's case," quashing the subpoena is 
improper. See State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 
453 (Utah 1982). 
- 2 -
7. Is a new trial required as the result of the State's 
lead investigator testifying that Menzies said he had gone to his 
parole office the day Ms. Hunsaker disappeared? 
This issue involves a mixed question of law 
and fact and is reviewed for correctness. See 
generally Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 781. 
8. Was Mr. Menzies' right to a fair trial by an impartial 
jury violated where unusual and prejudicial incidents, including the 
fainting of a juror, occurred? 
The standard of review set forth in 7 above 
applies. 
9. Did the erroneous reasonable doubt instruction violate 
due process and require a new trial? 
This Court reviews conclusions of law for 
correctness. Scharf v. B.M.G. Corp.. 700 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). "An appeal challenging 
the refusal to give jury instruction presents a 
question of law only. Therefore, [this Court] 
grant[s] no particular deference to the trial 
court's rulings." State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 
1328, 1330 (Utah App. 1990). 
10. Did the trial court err in denying Appellants motion 
to suppress evidence seized from Appellant's home? 
This Court reviews "the findings of fact 
supporting a trial court's decision on a motion 
to suppress under a clearly erroneous standard." 
State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Utah App. 
1990); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Legal conclusions 
are reviewed for correctness. State v. Buford. 
820 P.2d 1381, 1382 (Utah App. 1991). 
11. Did the trial court commit reversible error in 
admitting an enlarged smiling photograph of the deceased taken 
several years before the homicide? 
- 3 -
This issue involves a question of law and is 
reviewed for correctness. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
781. 
12. Did the trial court commit reversible error in 
admitting several items of real evidence? 
This issue involves a question of law and is 
reviewed for correctness. Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 
781. 
13. Did the trial judge commit reversible error in 
admitting an unsigned, unauthenticated Social Security card? 
This issue involves a question of law which 
is reviewed for correctness. Id. 
14. Did the trial judge err in admitting hearsay 
statements of Maureen Hunsaker? 
This issue involves a question of law which 
is reviewed for correctness. Id. 
15. Does cumulative error require a new trial? 
This is a question of law which is reviewed 
for correctness. Scharf v. B.M.G. Corp., 700 
P.2d at 1070. 
16. Was there sufficient evidence to support a conviction 
for capital homicide? 
This Court reviews the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the verdict and reverses a 
conviction where "the evidence and its inferences 
are so inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted." State v. 
Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
17. Did the admission of Mr. Menzies' entire prison file 
during the penalty phase violate the rules of evidence and 
Mr. Menzies' rights to confrontation and due process? 
- 4 
Whether this evidence was properly admitted 
is a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness, Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. 
18. Did the State's failure to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt unadjudicated criminal acts contained in hearsay reports in 
the prison file violate due process and the eighth amendment? 
This issue involves a question of law and is 
subject to a correction of error standard of 
review. See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 
1259-60 (Utah 1988); Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. 
19. Did the State's failure to provide Appellant with a 
copy of the prison file which contained, among other things, police 
reports, psychological evaluations, prison disciplinary information 
and Board of Pardons actions violate discovery rules and due process? 
The trial judge's underlying factual 
determinations are given deference while the 
ultimate conclusion is a question of law which is 
reviewed for correctness. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
at 871. 
20. Were Mr. Menzies' fifth amendment rights against 
self-incrimination violated by the inclusion in the prison file of 
numerous statements attributed to Menzies, which were made while 
Menzies was in custody, without being informed that they would be 
used in criminal proceedings? 
Any underlying factual determinations are 
subject to a clearly erroneous standard whereas 
the ultimate conclusion is a question of law 
which is reviewed for correctness. See generally 
State v. Miller. 829 P.2d 132 (Utah App. 1992); 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. 
21. Was due process violated by the inclusion of 
unadjudicated acts in the prison file for which the statute of 
limitations had run where the State relied on hearsay reports of the 
- 5 -
acts as its only evidence? 
This issue raises a question of law which is 
reviewed for correctness. Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 
781. 
22. Did the admission of Exhibit 1-D, 1976 and 1973 
psychological evaluations which contained hearsay statements 
referring to unadjudicated criminal conduct, violate Mr. Menzies' 
right to confrontation, due process and the eighth amendment? 
This issue involves a question of law which 
is reviewed for correctness. Id. 
23. Did the State violate due process and discovery rules 
by changing its penalty phase witness list at the last minute to 
include officers and others that it had been aware of as potential 
witnesses throughout the proceedings? 
This is a mixed question of law and fact 
which is reviewed for correctness. Id. 
24. Were Appellant's due process and eighth amendment 
rights violated by the State's failure to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that unadjudicated criminal conduct other than that which was 
referred to in the prison file actually occurred? 
This is a question of law which is reviewed 
for correctness. Id. 
25. Should this Court reconsider its holding in Lafferty 
that the State can attempt to prove unadjudicated crimes during the 
penalty phase? 
The standard in issue 24 applies. 
26. Did the excessive repetition in the prison file and 
exhibits of evidence of Appellant's five prior convictions violate 
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due process and the eighth amendment? 
The standard of review in issue 24 applies. 
27. Did application of the heinousness aggravating 
circumstance (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(q)) violate due process 
and the eighth amendment? 
This is a question of law which is reviewed 
for correctness. Id. 
28. Did application of the "preventing a witness from 
testifying" aggravating circumstance (Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-202(1)(i)) violate due process and the eighth amendment? 
This is a question of law which is reviewed 
for correctness. Id. 
29. Did application of the pecuniary gain aggravating 
circumstance violate due process and the eighth amendment? 
This is a question of law which is reviewed 
for correctness. Id. 
30. Did the Stated argument during the penalty phase that 
two uncharged aggravating circumstances applied and the trial 
court's reliance on those two uncharged aggravating circumstances 
and sua sponte reliance on a third uncharged aggravating 
circumstance violate due process and the eighth amendment? 
This issue involves a question of law. Id. 
31. Did the admission of juvenile and adult rap sheets 
which contained unadjudicated criminal conduct which the State did 
not prove beyond a reasonable doubt violate due process and the 
eighth amendment? 
This issue involves a mixed question of law 
and fact. See generally Id.; State v. Taylor. 
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818 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1991), cert, denied, 112 
S.Ct. 1576. 
32. Did the trial court's erroneous admission of gruesome 
photographs of the deceased require a new penalty phase? 
This issue involves a mixed question of fact 
and law which is reviewed for correctness. See 
generally State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 
1988); Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. 
33. Did the State's argument and the trial judge's 
reliance on the possibility that Menzies would be paroled as a basis 
for imposing the death penalty require a new penalty hearing? 
This issue involves a question of law. Id. 
34. Did imposition of the death penalty to prevent Menzies 
from being paroled violate Article I, § 9 of the Utah constitution 
in light of the recent legislative change in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-207? 
This issue involves a question of law. Id. 
35. Did imposition of the death penalty based on the 
possibility of escape violate Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207, due process 
and the eighth amendment? 
This issue involves a question of law. Id. 
36. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct requiring a new 
penalty phase where, among other things, he argued that Appellant 
was a psychopath and compared him to three notorious killers? 
Prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal 
where "the actions or remarks of [prosecuting] 
counsel call to the attention of the jury a 
matter it would not be justified in considering 
in determining its verdict and, if so, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, whether the 
error is substantial and prejudicial such that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its 
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absence, there would have been a more favorable 
result . . . ." State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 
712 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting State v. Gardner. 
789 P.2d 273, 287 (Utah 1989), cert, denied. 494 
U.S. 1090, 110 S.Ct. 1837 (1990)). 
37. Did the introduction of victim impact evidence violate 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 and Article I, § 9 of the Utah 
constitution? 
This issue involves a question of law. Id. 
38. Did introduction of expert testimony regarding 
characteristics of Appellant based on the reading of hearsay reports 
violate due process and the eighth amendment? 
This is a mixed question of law and fact 
which is reviewed for correctness. Id. 
39. Does cumulative error in the two phases require a new 
penalty hearing? 
This issue involves a question of law. Id. 
40. Did the trial judge improperly apply the two prongs of 
the Wood/Holland standard? 
This issue involves a question of law. Id.; 
see generally State v. Wood. 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 
1981); State v. Holland. 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah 
1989) . 
41. Is the death sentence disproportionate in this case? 
This issue involves a question of law. Id. 
42. Does death qualification of the jury violate the Utah 
constitution? 
This issue involves a question of law. See 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 781. 
43. Is Utah's death penalty scheme unconstitutional? 
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This issue involves a question of law. Id. 
44. Did the trial judge's failure to orally pronounce 
sentence on the Aggravated Kidnapping charge require that such 
sentence be stricken? 
This issue involves a question of law. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
A jury convicted Appellant of Capital Homicide, Murder in 
the First Degree, with aggravating circumstances that the homicide 
was committed in connection with a robbery and an aggravated 
kidnapping; Robbery, a first degree felony; and Aggravated 
Kidnapping, a first degree felony. R. 898. The trial judge imposed 
the death penalty. T. 3270. 
This is the direct appeal of Appellant's conviction and 
death sentence. This Court has previously remanded the case to the 
trial court for an evidentiary hearing on Appellant's Motion for New 
Trial based on the inadequacy of the transcript. The transcript 
issue has been briefed, and this Court issued its opinion on the 
transcript issue in State v. Menzies, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 
1992). See Addendum B for copy of opinion. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 23, 1986, Maureen Hunsaker disappeared from the 
Gas-A-Mat station where she worked which is located on a busy 
intersection at 3995 West 4700 South in Kearns, Utah. T. 976, 
978-9. She was last seen at the station between 8:30 p.m. and 
9:45 p.m. T. 2188, 2190, 2192. When police arrived at 
approximately 9:55 p.m. (after receiving a call about a minute 
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earlier), the booth at the gas station was empty (T. 1030-1); 
several customers were waiting to pay for gas they had pumped, but 
there was no way of ascertaining how many customers had pumped gas 
and left without paying. T. 1030-1. 
Police found no signs of a struggle in the booth, nor did 
they find fingerprints or any evidence that the booth had been wiped 
clean of fingerprints. T. 1041, 1159-64, 1887. The cash register 
contained no bills; however, Ms. Hunsaker had emptied the cash 
drawer into the more secure "drop safe" at 8:35 p.m. T. 1032, 1138. 
Gas-A-Mat employees stated various figures as to the amount 
of cash missing~$70.00 (T. 1137), $106.65 or $116.65 (T. 1141-2), 
or $114.15 (T. 1184). The variance depended on which employee was 
reviewing which report. In addition, the station reported several 
different figures for the number of packs of cigarettes which were 
missing but later indicated no cigarettes were missing. T. 1178, 
1186. 
Officers found several items in the booth—Ms. Hunsaker's 
reading glasses which she used infrequently (T. 1016-7), a radio 
(T. 983), cigarettes of unknown brand and style (T. 983), a 
cigarette lighter of unknown color and type (T. 985), a cigarette of 
unknown brand which was left to burn to a nub (T. 983, 2626), and 
Ms. Hunsaker's coat (T. 1013-14). 
A few days prior to her disappearance, Ms. Hunsaker had 
indicated she was unhappy, that her husband was prohibiting her from 
pursuing certain activities, that her marriage was a mistake, and 
that she was "grasping" for something to make her happier. 
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T. 2228-31. 
At approximately 11:05 p.m. that night, Ms. Hunsaker phoned 
her husband at home. T. 1022, 1046. The officer who was present at 
the Hunsaker home testified that Mr. Hunsaker initially asked her 
whether she had been robbed. T. 1047. Mr. Hunsaker testified that 
she told him she had been robbed but that she was fine and they 
would let her go that night. T. 986, 1023, 1025. The officer then 
took the phone and Ms. Hunsaker, in response to his leading 
question, indicated that she had been robbed but was "okay." 
T. 1056-7. The officer asked her twice, in "clear" and "simple" 
terms, whether she was being held against her will. T. 1057-1059. 
First, Ms. Hunsaker said she did not know what the officer meant. 
1. 1058. Her second answer ("no") was such that the officer 
conceded that she could have been saying either (1) she was not 
being detained or (2) she was not free to leave. T. 1059. 
Mr. Menzies filed a Motion to Suppress the statements based on their 
hearsay nature and unfair prejudice. R. 364-6; R. 1163 at 129, 
134. The trial court denied the motion. R. 1163 at 142-5. 
A woman positively identified a photograph of Maureen 
Hunsaker as the woman she had seen in Denny's restaurant, sitting, 
drinking coffee and conversing normally with a male companion 
between 11:30 p.m. and midnight on February 23, 1986. T. 2246-7. 
The woman was unable to identify Mr. Menzies as Ms. Hunsaker's male 
companion when shown his photograph as part of a photo array. 
T. 2288. 
Between 11:30 p.m. and midnight that same night, 
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Mr. Menzies went to the home of Janet Franks looking for his 
girlfriend, Nicole Arnold.1 T. 1478, 1481. He arrived alone, calm, 
unhurried, without any cuts, scrapes or bruises on his hands or 
face. T. 1490, 1492. 
Mr. Menzies had left the motor running, and Ms. Franks did 
not hear the horn honk. T. 1491. After discovering that Nicole was 
not there, Menzies used the restroom, "checked in on" Nicole's baby 
from a previous relationship, and left. T. 1481, 1493. Shortly 
after midnight, Mr. Menzies telephoned his sister and Nicole's 
grandmother, still looking for Nicole. T. 2195, 2211. 
The following morning, Monday, February 24, 1986, Tim 
Larabee and Elizabeth Brown, two high school students, skipped 
school and went to Storm Mountain picnic area. T. 1193, 1213. 
While at Storm Mountain, the students noted the presence of another 
man and a woman. Tim stated the couple appeared normal (T. 1221); 
were not in any way physically linked to each other (T. 1222) ; were 
not struggling (T. 1224); and were, in fact, engaged in normal 
conversation (T. 1250-1251). 
Tim never saw more than a profile of the man, and he was 
never closer to him than ninety feet. T. 1229. On May 16, 1986, 
during a lineup, Mr. Larabee positively identified a man other than 
Menzies as the man he had seen at Storm Mountain. T. 1274, 
1277-1278. At the preliminary hearing held the day after the 
1. In November, 1986, Ms. Arnold married Jim Duffy and took her 
husband's last name. Throughout this brief, she will be referred to 
as Nicole Arnold. 
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lineup, Tim was not asked to identify anybody in the courtroom as 
the person he observed at Storm Mountain on February 24, 1986 
(T. 1279), nor did Tim identify anyone in the courtroom as the 
person he had seen at storm Mountain. T. 1192-1296. 
During trial, on redirect examination, prosecutor Ernie 
Jones elicited testimony from Tim indicating that after the lineup, 
on the way back to the prosecutor's office, Tim had asked Ernie 
Jones whether number 6 was actually the person. T. 1285. Despite 
the fact that the lineup occurred the day before the preliminary 
hearing and many months before trial (T. 1285) and despite the 
statutory procedures governing lineups as well as the constitutional 
and statutory rules regarding discovery, the State did not divulge 
this "post lineup query" from one of its key witnesses to the 
defense and instead used it to surprise the defense in front of the 
jury. T. 1296. 
In addition to his inability or difficulty in identifying 
Mr. Menzies in a courtroom or in a lineup, Tim had difficulty 
selecting Mr. Menzies' photo from a group of six photos. On 
February 28, 1986, Detective Judd showed Tim the photo array. 
T. 1684, 1709. When Tim could not make a selection, Detective Judd 
took him to a parking lot to see whether there was a car similar to 
the one he had seen at Storm Mountain. After they returned to the 
ninth floor administration office, Detective Judd left and Detective 
Thompson showed Tim the photo array again. At that time, Tim 
apparently pointed to Menzies' photograph as looking most like the 
man at Storm Mountain. T. 1374, 1714, 1332. 
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The State did not inform defense counsel of Tim's initial 
inability to select a photo (T. 1714); defense counsel learned this 
for the first time during the trial. T. 1284, 1295-6. 
Ms. Hunsaker's body was found at Storm Mountain on 
February 25, 1986. T. 1315. The cause of death was either 
strangulation or stab wounds to the throat, both of which occurred 
at about the same time. T. 2080. 
On February 24, 1986, Mr. Menzies was arrested on an 
unrelated theft charge. T. 1519. Various cards belonging to 
Maureen Hunsaker were found in a laundry basket near the booking 
area of the jail. T. 1561. Although the officer who had arrested 
Menzies initially reported that the booking was without incident and 
Menzies was cooperative, after the cards were found, he changed his 
story and claimed Menzies, who was cuffed at the time, had run down 
the hall and disappeared into the room where the cards were found. 
T. 1524-1526. 
Defense counsel filed a motion in limine, which the trial 
court granted, to suppress all evidence of Mr. Menzies' prior 
convictions and parole status during the guilt or innocence phase of 
the trial. R. 780.2 
Despite the trial court's order that Mr. Menzies' prior 
criminal history be kept from the jury, Detective Thompson, one of 
the State's lead detectives on this case, testified in violation of 
2. The trial court also found subsection (h) of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-202 unconstitutional because of its prejudicial effect to a 
defendant and dismissed that aggravating circumstance. R. 542. 
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a pretrial order that Mr. Menzies told him that the morning after 
Ms. Hunsaker disappeared, he had gone to the parole office. 
T. 1877; see footnote 27 supra at 71. Defense counsel immediately 
objected (T. 1877) and made several motions for mistrial (T. 1878, 
1904, 2133). 
Officers searched Mr. Menzies' apartment on February 28, 
1986. On October 24, 1986, Mr. Menzies filed a motion and 
accompanying memorandum asking the court to suppress the evidence 
taken in the search. R. 335-59. The trial court held an 
evidentiary hearing on the motion on November 7, 1986. R. 452-54; 
see transcript of proceedings, R. 1163. Mr. Menzies filed an 
amended motion on November 18, 1986. R. 465-501. Objections were 
made therein to the initial search done after Nicole allegedly 
consented and follow-up search pursuant to the warrant. R. 340-46 
and 471-83. On November 21, 1986, the trial court heard argument on 
the motion (see transcript dated November 21, 1986). The trial 
court denied the motion on February 12, 1987. R. 538. At trial, 
defense counsel made continuing objection to the admission of any of 
the evidence seized by detectives during the search. T. 1680. 
Walter Britton was an inmate on the same tier of the Salt 
Lake County Jail as Menzies during the week of February 23, 1986. 
T. 2080. Britton was awaiting trial and/or sentencing on federal 
bank robbery charges in several jurisdictions. Britton testified at 
the preliminary hearing that on Friday, February 28, and Saturday, 
February 29, 1986, Menzies sought Britton out in order to discuss 
Menzies' involvement in the Hunsaker homicide. T. 2081-2083. 
- 16 -
Britton did not report this conversation to jail personnel until a 
month later, approximately March 28, 1986. The bulk of Britton's 
preliminary hearing testimony was available from news reports and he 
had no specific information that could have been attributable only 
to Menzies. T. 2110. 
After Britton testified at the preliminary hearing, a 
prosecutor in this case appeared in federal court on his behalf to 
testify at a Rule 35 hearing for reduction of sentence. T. 2316. 
As part of his federal charges in Utah, the court had ordered, just 
three months prior to this incident, that Britton undergo a 
competency evaluation and sent him to Springfield, Missouri for 
thirty days to undergo a battery of psychiatric examinations. 
T. 2052-2053. 
Although the preliminary hearing on this case occurred 
before Britton had been convicted of all pending charges and when he 
could still pursue Rule 35 hearings or lesser sentences, the trial 
occurred after all of Britton's sentences had been imposed and when 
he could no longer benefit at sentencing. Britton changed his mind 
several times as to whether he would testify at this trial. 
T. 2293, 2301-3, 2294-5, 958. 
The jury convicted Mr. Menzies of Capital Homicide with 
Robbery and Aggravated Kidnapping as aggravated circumstances, 
Aggravated Kidnapping (T. 2613), and not guilty of Aggravated 
Robbery (R. 900).3 
3. According to transcript, the jury convicted him of this charge 
as well. T. 2693. The parties have agreed this was erroneous 
transcription. 
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Mr. Menzies waived the jury for the penalty phase of his 
trial. T. 2697. The trial court had ordered the State to file its 
list of penalty phase witnesses no later than January 28, 1988 at 
5:00 p.m. R. 755. On February 2, 1988, Defendant filed a 
supplemental motion to obtain the witness list. R. 772-3. The 
State filed its list the next day. R. 774. On March 24, 1988, the 
Friday before the penalty phase began on a Tuesday, the State filcid 
a substantially revised witness list which contained a number of 
witnesses not previously disclosed. R. 1013-4. These witnesses 
included a police officer who had worked on the 1976 robberies in 
which Mr. Menzies was implicated, and two jailers who came in 
contact with Mr. Menzies while he awaited trial on this case. The 
State did not supply Defendant with the officer's police report or 
statements attributed to Mr. Menzies to which the officer testified 
over Defendant's objections. T. 2758. 
During the penalty phase, the State introduced Mr. Menzies' 
entire prison file, over Defendant's objections. T. 2839-40, 2843, 
2885, 2886, 3135, 3132-4, 2892-3. The file contained numerous 
hearsay reports, presentence investigations, rap sheets, 
psychological evaluations, "C" notes, statements, and other 
information which was undocumented, came from unidentified sources, 
and was unreliable. See Index to Prison File contained in 
Addendum L. The file contained many references to unadjudicated 
criminal conduct which the State made no effort to prove. The State 
had not given Defendant a copy of the file nor stated that it 
intended to introduce the file; nor did it call as witnesses any of 
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the persons to which statements in the file had been attributed. 
During the penalty phase, the State also introduced 
Defendant's adult and juvenile rap sheets, both of which contained 
unadjudicated conduct which the State made no effort to prove. 
T. 2850, 2865, Exhibit 1-C. The State also introduced as State's 
Exhibit 1-D three psychological reports on Mr. Menzies done more 
than ten years earlier, victim impact testimony (T. 975-82, 2795-6) 
and testimony from Dr. Pat Smith (T. 3144-68), who had not 
interviewed Mr. Menzies and who relied on material which Mr. Menzies 
had previously objected to and which was otherwise unreliable in 
forming her opinion. 
The State, while acknowledging that two photographs would 
not be appropriate for a jury, introduced gruesome autopsy 
photographs of Ms. Hunsaker during the penalty phase. T. 2833-8, 
2882. The State argued, among other things, that the death penalty 
should be imposed because of the heinousness or brutality of the 
homicide and because otherwise Mr. Menzies might escape or be 
paroled. The State relied on various hearsay documents throughout 
its argument, claimed Mr. Menzies was a psychopath, and implied that 
he was similar to "Son of Sam" and Charles Manson. 
The trial judge, in a lengthy ruling in which he relied on 
improper and uncharged aggravating factors and evidence, sentenced 
Mr. Menzies to death. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I. TRANSCRIPT 
Appellant incorporates arguments raised in transcript issue 
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brief and argument, 
POINT II. CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE 
The trial judge committed reversible error in failing to 
remove five jurors who were challenged for cause, thereby requiring 
Appellant to use his peremptory challenges to remove the jurors. 
Two of the jurors indicated they would always impose death on 
someone convicted of an intentional or "premeditated" murder, one 
juror indicated she would execute a defendant based solely on a 
failure to show remorse, one juror had difficulty applying the 
presumption of innocence, and the fifth juror would impose death to 
prevent parole and thought the victim and defendant should suffer 
equally. 
POINT III. POST-LINEUP QUERY 
Reversible error occurred where the State failed to inform 
the defense that the State's key witness, who had selected someone 
other than Appellant at the lineup, had made a post-lineup query to 
the prosecutor which implicated Appellant. Defense counsel learned 
this information for the first time during the redirect examination 
of the State's key witness. 
POINT IV. INABILITY TO SELECT PHOTOGRAPH 
The State's failure to inform defense counsel that the same 
key witness was initially unable to make a selection from a photo 
array requires a new trial. 
POINT V. PRELIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY OF BRITTON 
The trial judge erroneously concluded that jailhouse 
informant Britton was unavailable for confrontation purposes where 
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Britton was present and, although he claimed he would not testify, 
actually answered every question asked of him. The trial judge also 
erroneously concluded that the former testimony was reliable where 
Britton was a jailhouse informant who had access to the information 
through the news media, and defense counsel did not have an 
opportunity to cross-examine him on all relevant issues, especially 
those affecting Britton's credibility, during the preliminary 
hearing. 
POINT VI. QUASHING SUBPOENA OF PROSECUTOR 
The trial judge committed reversible error in quashing 
defendant's subpoena of the prosecutor where the prosecutor was a 
witness who could provide important information which related to 
Britton's expectations of benefit for testifying. 
POINT VII. PAROLE STATEMENT TO JURY 
Reversible error occurred where an experienced lead 
investigator for the State testified, in violation of a court order, 
that Menzies had stated that he went to his parole office the day 
after Ms. Hunsaker's disappearance. 
POINT VIII. TAINTED JURY 
A number of irregular and prejudicial occurrences, 
including the fainting of a juror, the emotional breakdown of 
another juror, and the removal of a third juror who received a phone 
call informing him of crimes Appellant had allegedly committed, 
followed by sequestration of the jury, unduly prejudiced this jury, 
precluding it from being fair. 
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POINT IX. REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION 
The erroneous reasonable doubt instruction which 
incorrectly defined the concept, requires a new trial. 
POINT X. SEARCH OF APPELLANTS HOME 
The trial judge erroneously admitted evidence seized from 
Appellant's home, in violation of the fourth amendment to the United 
States constitution. 
POINT XI. ENLARGED SMILING PHOTOGRAPH OF DECEASED 
The trial judge committed reversible error in admitting an 
enlarged photograph of Ms. Hunsaker taken several years before the 
homicide, which depicted a smiling young woman with long hair. 
POINT XII. REAL EVIDENCE 
The trial court committed reversible error in admitting 
several items of evidence which had little or no probative value and 
were prejudicial. 
POINT XIII. SOCIAL SECURITY CARD 
The trial judge committed reversible error in admitting an 
unsigned and unauthenticated Social Security card which Nicole 
Arnold's husband claimed to have found among belongings which had 
been searched and accessible to numerous people during the 
intervening months. 
POINT XIV. HEARSAY STATEMENTS 
The trial judge committed error in admitting the hearsay 
statements of Maureen Hunsaker. 
POINT XV. CUMULATIVE ERROR 
Cumulative error requires a new trial. 
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POINT XVI. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
There was insufficient evidence to establish each of the 
two statutory aggravating circumstances, and insufficient evidence 
to connect Appellant to the homicide. 
POINT XVII. PRISON FILE—HEARSAY, CONFRONTATION. DUE PROCESS 
The prison file is replete with hearsay. The statements 
were not admissible under any hearsay exception. The State made no 
showing that the witnesses were unavailable or that the information 
was reliable, in violation of Mr. Menzies' right to confront the 
witnesses against him. Furthermore, due process was violated by the 
inclusion of disciplinary results from prison hearings where lesser 
standards of due process apply and where Mr. Menzies had been 
informed in writing that the results and statements made by him 
would not be used in criminal proceedings. 
POINT XVIII. PRISON FILE—UNADJUDICATED ACTS NOT PROVEN BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT 
Notations and reports in the prison file refer to numerous 
incidents of unadjudicated criminal conduct. The State made no 
effort to prove that these incidents had in fact occurred. Instead, 
it relied only on the hearsay, double hearsay statements in the 
file. The introduction of these unsubstantiated statements, many of 
which did not have an identified declarant, violated Mr. Menzies' 
right to due process and the eighth amendment. 
POINT XIX. PRISON FILE—DISCOVERY VIOLATION 
The State's failure to provide defense counsel with the 
prison file prior to the penalty hearing deprived Appellant of due 
process and his rights under the eighth amendment, and violated Rule 
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16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
POINT XX. PRISON FILE—SELF-INCRIMINATION 
Admission of the prison file violated Appellant's fifth 
amendment rights against self-incrimination. The file contained 
many statements made by Menzies while being questioned in custody 
without being informed of his rights. Some of the information 
contained in the file had express statements attached to it 
informing Menzies that his statements would not be used against him 
in criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, the trial judge admitted 
this information and relied on it in sentencing. 
POINT XXI. PRISON FILE - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Admission of the prison file violated due process and the 
statute of limitations since the file contained unadjudicated 
conduct which dated back ten to fifteen years, and the State 
introduced only the hearsay in the file to support such allegations; 
the State did not call witnesses in an attempt to prove that such 
conduct had occurred. 
POINT XXII. EXHIBIT 1-D--1976 AND 1973 PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATIONS 
Exhibit 1-D was inadmissible for many of the same reasons 
that the prison file was inadmissible. The exhibit consisted of 
three very old hearsay examinations which themselves contained 
multiple hearsay. Unadjudicated acts referred to in the evaluations 
were not proven by the State, and Appellant's rights to 
confrontation and due process were violated by the admission of this 
exhibit. 
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POINT XXIII. PENALTY PHASE DISCOVERY 
The State failed to provide defense counsel with police 
reports, and changed its penalty phase witness list at the last 
minute to include police officers and others previously available, 
despite a court order requiring the State to provide defense counsel 
with the penalty phase witness list well before the guilt/innocence 
phase began. This last-minute change precluded defense counsel from 
adequately preparing for the penalty phase, in violation of due 
process and the eighth amendment. 
POINT XXIV. UNADJUDICATED ACTS NOT PROVEN 
The State's exhibits, witnesses and cross-examination of 
Appellant's sister referred to several unadjudicated acts which the 
State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of due 
process and the eighth amendment. 
POINT XXV. RECONSIDER ALLOWING UNADJUDICATED ACTS 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reconsider 
its holding in Lafferty. 749 P.2d at 1258-60, that the State can 
introduce unadjudicated criminal acts during the penalty phase. 
POINT XXVI. EXCESSIVE REPETITION OF PAST CRIMES EVIDENCE 
The State's introduction of at least four copies of the 
judgments for the crimes of which Appellant has been convicted, 
coupled with multiple references to such crimes throughout the 
prison file, created the incorrect impression that Appellant's 
criminal history was greater than it is, in violation of due process 
and the eighth amendment. 
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POINT XXVII. HEINOUSNESS 
The State and trial judge failed to apply the heinousness 
aggravating circumstance in a narrow fashion as required by this 
Court and the United States Supreme Court; the facts of this case do 
not fall within that aggravating circumstance. 
POINT XXVIII. PREVENTING A WITNESS FROM TESTIFYING 
This aggravating circumstance requires that the decedent be 
a witness in a separate official proceeding or investigation. There 
was no separate proceeding in this case; the State merely speculated 
that the homicide was committed to prevent the deceased from 
testifying about the alleged robbery which was part of the capital 
homicide charge. 
POINT XXIX. PECUNIARY GAIN 
The trial judge improperly sua sponte applied this 
aggravating circumstance where the only suggestion of pecuniary gain 
was the robbery aggravating circumstance. Application of pecuniary 
gain duplicates an already existing aggravating circumstance, in 
violation of due process and the eighth amendment. 
POINT XXX. UNCHARGED AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
The trial judge's reliance on three uncharged aggravating 
circumstances, one of which the judge sua sponte brought up for the 
first time while pronouncing sentence, violated due process and the* 
eighth amendment. 
POINT XXXI. RAP SHEETS 
Admission of juvenile and adult rap sheets which contained 
unadjudicated crimes during the penalty phase where the State made 
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no effort to prove that Appellant actually committed the crimes 
violated due process and the eighth amendment. 
POINT XXXII. GRUESOME PHOTOGRAPHS 
The trial court erroneously admitted gruesome photographs 
of the corpse. 
POINT XXXIII. POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE ARGUMENT 
The prosecutor argued and the trial judge erroneously 
decided that the possibility of parole required imposition of the 
death penalty. Such an argument violated due process and the eighth 
amendment and is not an aggravating circumstance under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-207. 
POINT XXXIV. LEGISLATIVE CHANGE 
The recent legislative change in Utah's capital homicide 
scheme precludes the possibility of parole argument from again being 
used as a basis for imposition of the death penalty, and 
demonstrates that the death penalty was imposed in this case in 
violation of the Utah and United States constitutions. 
POINT XXXV. POSSIBILITY OF ESCAPE 
The State argued and the trial improperly relied on the 
possibility that Appellant would escape if given a life sentence as 
a basis for imposing death. 
POINT XXXVI. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
The prosecutor's argument that Appellant was a psychopath 
without adequate evidentiary foundation, his reading from a book 
about psychopaths during closing, and his comparison of Appellant to 
three notorious killers requires a new penalty hearing. 
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POINT XXXVII. VICTIM IMPACT 
The admission of victim impact evidence violated the Utah 
statute and Article 1, § 9 of the Utah constitution. 
POINT XXXVIII. DR. SMITH'S TESTIMONY 
The expert testimony of Dr. Smith, which was based on old 
hearsay reports about Appellant and drew conclusions about him 
without having interviewed him, was erroneously admitted. 
POINT XXXIX. CUMULATIVE ERROR 
The cumulative impact of errors during the guilt and 
penalty phases requires new penalty phase. 
POINT XXXX. WOOD STANDARD 
The trial judge erroneously applied both prongs of the 
Wood/Holland standard. 
POINT XXXXI. DISPROPORTIONATE 
Imposition of the death penalty was disproportionate in 
this case where Appellant has not been involved in other murders, 
and under the circumstances of the case. 
POINT XXXXII. DEATH QUALIFICATION 
Death qualification of the jury violates the Utah 
constitution. 
POINT XXXXIII. UTAH DEATH PENALTY SCHEME UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
The Utah death penalty scheme is unconstitutional. 
POINT XXXXIV. AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING SENTENCE 
The trial judge's failure to orally pronounce sentence on 
the Aggravated Kidnapping charge requires that such sentence be 
stricken. 
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GUILT/INNOCENCE PHASE ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRANSCRIPT IS INADEQUATE FOR 
APPELLATE REVIEW OF THIS CAPITAL HOMICIDE CASE, 
Although this Court has held that the transcript in this 
case is adequate for appellate review (see Menzies, 182 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 3, contained in Addendum B), Appellant continues to maintain 
that use of this transcript violates various constitutional 
provisions and statutes, and incorporates by this reference thereto 
all arguments raised in his opening and reply briefs on the 
transcript issue.4 
POINT II. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN FAILING TO REMOVE JURORS FOR CAUSE. 
The sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States 
constitution and Article I, §§ 7, 10 and 12 of the Utah constitution 
guarantee an accused a fair trial by an impartial jury. State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 n.l (Utah 1988); State v. Brooks. 563 P.2d 
799, 801 (Utah 1977) ("Brooks I"); State v. Bailev. 605 P.2d 765 
(Utah 1980) ; see also Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
former § 77-35-18 (1982).5 
A party is entitled to use his or her peremptory challenges 
4. Although it is unclear from the opinion whether the original or 
"California" version is the official transcript, Appellant suggests 
using the California version when reviewing issues raised in this 
brief so that the inaccuracies of the transcript and their impact 
are apparent. 
5. Utah appellate courts have recognized the importance of a fair 
trial by an impartial jury in contexts other than that which is 
currently before the Court. See, e.g., State v. Woolleyr 810 P.2d 
440 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 279-81 (Utah 
1988); State v. Cantu. 778 P.2d 517 (Utah 1989). 
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on impartial jurors. Brooks I. 563 P.2d at 802-3; Crawford v. 
Manning. 542 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975); State v. Brooks. 631 P.2d 
878, 883 (Utah 1981) ("Brooks II"). Prejudicial error occurs where 
a party is required to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a juror 
who should have been excused for cause. State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 
473, 474 (Utah 1987); State v. Cobb. 774 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1989).* 
Juror impartiality is an attitude of appropriate 
indifference. Brooks I. 563 P.2d at 802. Once there is a showing 
of partiality or bias, the trial judge must either investigate 
further to determine whether the bias exists or excuse the juror. 
Woolley. 810 P.2d at 443; Bailey* 605 P.2d at 768. Once a juror 
expresses bias, the showing cannot be overcome by a mere expression 
by the juror that he or she can be fair and impartial. Jones, 734 
P.2d at 475; Brooks II at 883-4; Jenkins, 627 P.2d at 536. 
In determining whether a trial judge erred in failing to 
excuse a juror for cause, "some deference must be accorded the 
decision of the trial court." Jenkins. 627 P.2d at 536 (citations 
omitted). However, the discretion given the trial court must be 
viewed "in light of the fact that it is a simple matter to obviate 
any problem of bias simply by excusing the prospective juror and 
selecting another." Id. 
In a capital case, a prospective juror must be excused if 
that "juror's views about capital punishment would prevent or 
substantially impair him or her from conscientiously taking the 
juror's oath and performing his or her duties as a juror by 
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following the Court's instructions on capital punishment . . . ." 
State v, Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 589 (Utah 1983). 
Morgan, 119 L.Ed.2d at 508, held that a capital defendant 
is entitled to challenge for cause a juror who would automatically 
impose the death penalty. The Court pointed out that ,f[a]ny juror 
who states that he or she will automatically vote for the death 
penalty without regard to mitigating evidence is announcing an 
intention not to follow the instructions . . . ." 
In the present case, the trial judge failed to excuse for 
cause five jurors challenged by defense counsel. Reversible error 
occurred where defense counsel was required to use his peremptories 
to remove those jurors. 
A. JUROR CANNON6 
Juror Cannon expressed her deeply held belief that an 
individual convicted of murder should receive the death penalty by 
stating, among other things: 
JUROR: Well, if they took a life and are guilty, 
I guess I would go along with that [the death 
penalty]. 
THE COURT: Okay and why? 
JUROR: I don't think it's right for them to kill 
somebody and get away with it. 
T. 350. 
Following these responses, the trial judge asked: 
6. Juror Cannon's individual voir dire is found at T. 348-60 and 
contained in Addendum C. It should be noted that Juror Cannon's 
individual voir dire, pp. 338-70, is missing from the original 
transcript but can be found in the California version. 
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THE COURT: Now, are you at this point in a 
position where you will not change your mind of 
what penalty the punishment that a person 
convicted of first degree murder should receive 
that you won't change your mind as to that? 
JUROR: No. If he was convicted, I think I would 
go along with it [the death penalty], I mean, I 
wouldn't change my mind on it. 
T. 351. 
The trial judge outlined the Wood/Holland standard for the 
juror, then asked: 
THE COURT: Now, if the Court instructs you in 
that respect, do you feel that you can follow the 
Court's instructions? 
JUROR: I think I could, yes. 
THE COURT: Do you believe all persons convicted 
of first degree murder should be put to death? 
JUROR: Well, that is a hard decision, I guess. 
If they just right out and killed somebody, 
I think that thev should, yes. 
THE COURT: If the jury should convict 
Mr. Menzies of first degree murder, would you be 
able to consider voting for a sentence less than 
death? 
JUROR: I don't think so. 
T. 353 (emphasis added). 
Despite three explanations by the court that either death 
or a life sentence is an appropriate penalty for first degree murder 
(T. 350, 351-2), Juror Cannon continued to express her deep belief 
that persons guilty of murder should be sentenced to death (T. 353, 
357-8). Although she stated that she thought she could follow the 
court's instructions, her statements that she would automatically 
- 32 -
impose the death penalty indicate otherwise. See Morgan, 119 
L.Ed.2d at 498-9. Her deep belief is evidenced by the following 
dialogue: 
MS. WELLS: Miss Cannon, I believe what you have 
just said, and I am maybe rephrasing this and 
perhaps you need to agree with me or disagree 
with me if I have stated it wrong, that if 
Mr. Menzies were to be found guilty of the first 
degree murder, then you would impose the death 
penalty; is that what you were saying? 
A JUROR: Well, if he murdered someone, I would 
say, yes. 
MS. WELLS: If you were a part of a jury that, 
let's say, was considering a life sentence, I 
believe you stated it would still be your 
position that he should receive the death 
penalty; is that right? 
A JUROR: Uh-huh. 
MS. WELLS: Even though others might have a 
different opinion? I thought I heard you say you 
would go along with the death penalty, and that 
you would also feel that that should be imposed. 
A JUROR: I do have feelings that way, yes. 
Defense counsel challenged Juror Cannon for cause. 
T. 360. The trial judge denied the challenge (T. 361) and Appellant 
used a peremptory challenge to remove her. T. 944. 
The trial judge's failure to remove Juror Cannon for cause 
requires a new trial. 
B. JUROR TAYLOR7 
Juror Taylor indicated that she believed that "any person 
7. The voir dire of Juror Taylor is found at T. 272-281 and 
contained in Addendum D. 
- 33 -
who causes the death of another should suffer the death penalty." 
She also indicated that she believed that the death penalty is 
ordinarily the proper punishment for a first degree murder and a 
defendant who is convicted of capital homicide must sustain the 
burden of proving that the death penalty should not be imposed. She 
believed that under a life term, an individual "can get out on 
parole" and that such a term might be "10, 15 years," and indicated 
that she would impose the death penalty to assure that no release 
ever occurred. She pointed out that she was "one of the 
old-fashioned people that believed an eye for an eye, a tooth for a 
tooth." T. 272-5, 276, 277. 
Although Ms. Taylor responded affirmatively to general 
rehabilitating questions as to whether she would follow the court's 
instructions and properly weigh and consider the penalty phase 
evidence (T. 275), such general responses failed to negate her 
strong feelings that death is the proper sentence in intentional 
murders. T. 279. See Morgan, 119 L.Ed.2d at 498-9. Nor did her 
response to the prosecutor's leading question that the death penalty 
was appropriate in some murder cases but not all obviate her abiding 
belief that the death penalty should be imposed for intentional 
murders. 
Following the trial court's rehabilitative question as to 
whether Ms. Taylor would follow the court's instructions as to how 
to assess penalty phase evidence and also after the prosecutor's 
leading rehabilitative question, the following telling colloquoy 
occurred: 
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MS. WELLS: I think I have one question. 
Miss Taylor, do—you indicated that you would 
feel that the death penalty was appropriate in 
those instances where a homicide was premeditated 
or intentional. Would you in all the 
circumstances if the facts were to show that a 
killing was intentional, impose the death penalty 
or follow what you have just stated? Would you 
feel that in those instances that is when the 
death penalty would be imposed? 
A JUROR: I believe that is what I would have to 
do. 
T. 279. 
Ms. Taylor/s responses evidence an intent to automatically 
impose the death penalty despite the court's instructions. See 
Morgan. 119 L.Ed.2d 492. Her overall responses indicated a deep 
belief that any intentional "premeditated" murder required the death 
penalty. Nowhere in her responses did she indicate a willingness to 
impose any penalty other than death on a person convicted of what 
she termed premeditated murder. 
Defense counsel challenged Juror Taylor for cause. T. 282, 
289. The trial judge refused to remove Juror Taylor (T. 285, 289), 
and Appellant was forced to use a peremptory challenge to remove 
Juror Taylor. R. 944. 
Rather than investigating further or simply obviating the 
problem caused by the juror's deeply held belief in "an eye for an 
eye, a tooth for a tooth," the trial judge abused his discretion, 
committing prejudicial error by requiring Appellant to use a 
peremptory challenge to remove her. 
C. JUROR PETERSON8 
8. Juror Peterson's voir dire is found at T. 755-64. 
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Juror Peterson repeatedly stated that she would vote to 
execute a defendant who failed to show remorse. T. 757, 758, 760, 
762. 
Defense counsel moved to excuse the juror for cause. 
T. 764. The trial court denied the motion. T. 765. The defense 
was forced to perempt the juror. R. 944. 
The juror expressed a deep bias against a defendant who did 
not meet a burden, either through his or someone else's testimony, 
of presenting evidence of remorse. Her statements suggested that 
where a defendant was not remorseful, she would not weigh the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances but would impose death. 
Such automatic imposition of the death penalty required that she be 
removed. See Morgan, 119 L.Ed.2d at 508. 
The court failed to either excuse the juror for cause or 
investigate her bias. Further, even if it had, the record shows her 
belief to be so deeply held that it could not be dismissed as either 
a lightly held belief or a misinterpretation of the law. The trial 
court committed prejudicial error in forcing Appellant to perempt an 
obviously biased juror. 
D. JUROR MORGAN9 
The record showed Juror Morgan to be a thoughtful, educated 
man who expressed a deep and abiding inability to presume the 
accused innocent until proven guilty. Despite his education as a 
social worker (T. 542) and extensive instruction as to burdens and 
9. Mr. Morgan's individual voir dire is found at T. 535-48. 
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presumptions by the trial court (T. 537-538), Mr. Morgan's bias 
remained apparent. T. 544, 546-7. Although he understood the 
importance of the presumption of innocence, he was unsure whether he 
could apply such a presumption. T. 546-7. 
The court attempted to rehabilitate the juror by asking two 
lengthy and leading questions that were suggestive of the correct 
answer; the juror provided the expected one-word responses. 
T. 547-48. Defense counsel moved to excuse the juror for cause. 
T. 548. The trial court denied the motion. T. 549. Appellant was 
forced to perempt the juror. R. 945. 
The cornerstone of criminal justice is that the accused is 
presumed innocent until proven guilty. All other burdens and 
presumptions flow logically therefrom. Despite his claimed ability 
to follow the trial court's instructions regarding the secondary 
burdens and presumptions, Juror Morgan never stated with any 
certainty that he could apply the primary presumption of innocence. 
The trial court committed prejudicial error in forcing Appellant to 
perempt the biased juror. 
E. JUROR HARSH10 
Juror Harsh believed the death penalty should be imposed 
for planned murders (T. 745, 747) and indicated that he would impose 
the death penalty in order to keep a convicted murderer from ever 
being released from prison. T. 746-8. He thought a person who 
killed should suffer equally with what the deceased suffered. 
10. Juror Harsh's voir dire is found at T. 742-50 and is contained 
in Addendum E. 
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T. 474.1]- Defense counsel moved to exclude Juror Harsh for cause. 
T. 750. The trial court denied the motion. T. 751. Appellant was 
forced to perempt the juror. R. 946. 
A jury that has found a defendant guilty of capital murder 
must then determine whether the penalty is life imprisonment or 
execution. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2). Only the Board of 
Pardons is empowered to determine the length of incarceration for a 
person sentenced to life. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(1)(a). 
Mr. Harsh desired to go beyond a juror's responsibility and intrude 
upon the Board of Pardons' responsibility. His desire was borne 
from his bias towards capital punishment and away from either life 
imprisonment or parole. See discussion in Points 33 and 34 infra at 
176-9 regarding impropriety of arguing that Appellant might be 
released on parole as basis for imposition of death penalty. The 
trial court failed to investigate the facial bias or exclude the 
juror for cause. This forced appellant to spend a peremptory 
challenge on a presumptively biased juror. In doing so, the trial 
court committed prejudicial error. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANTS MOTION FOR MISTRIAL 
AFTER THE STATE FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO THE DEFENSE 
THE POST-LINEUP QUERY OF ITS KEY WITNESS. 
The Stated key witness, Tim Larabee, was at Storm Mountain 
with his girlfriend on the morning of February 24, 1986. Tim twice 
saw a man and woman more than ninety feet away, walking away with 
11. There are serious transcription discrepancies in this juror's 
voir dire. See Addendum E. 
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their backs to Tim and Beth. T. 1229, 1193, 1198-9, 1200, 1208. 
Tim heard a scream, which he thought occurred when rocks fell or the 
woman slipped, and later saw the man walking alone toward a bridge. 
T. 1201-3, 1209-10. The man never looked towards Tim and Beth. 
T. 1203. 
The State conducted a lineup in which neither Tim nor Beth 
selected Mr. Menzies as the man they had seen on Storm Mountain. 
T. 2257, 1274, 1277-8. Tim selected someone else in the lineup 
(T. 1274, 1277-8) and did not indicate any uncertainty in that 
selection while at the lineup proceeding, despite explicit 
instructions as to how to proceed in the event he had any 
uncertainty as to his selection. Transcript Lineup Proceeding 6, 
12-13; T. 1276-7. 
During direct examination, the prosecutor did not ask Tim 
to identify Mr. Menzies as the man he had seen at Storm Mountain and 
did not ask Tim any questions about the lineup in which he had 
positively identified someone other than Mr. Menzies. T. 1191-1214. 
On cross-examination, as any competent attorney would do 
under the circumstances, defense counsel asked Tim about his 
positive identification of someone other than Mr. Menzies at the 
lineup and about Tim's failure to indicate any hesitation or inform 
the prosecutors that he had been mistaken. T. 1278. 
On redirect examination, in response to questions from 
prosecutor Ernie Jones, Tim testified that while walking back to the 
prosecutor's office, he asked prosecutor Ernie Jones if the person 
was Number 6. T. 1285. Number 6 was Mr. Menzies. T. 1285. The 
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impact of this testimony was to "identify" Mr. Menzies as the person 
at Storm Mountain, without the usual controls and foundational 
requirements necessary to allow the jurors to hear identification 
testimony. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-8-1 (1953 as amended). 
Despite the fact that the preliminary hearing was the day 
after the lineup and Appellant made discovery requests to which the 
State complied, the State did not convey this information to defense 
counsel. T. 1296-7; see discovery motions in Addendum G. 
The trial judge granted defense counsel's motion to strike 
the testimony.12 T. 1299, 1300, 1301-2. 
The court then made a confusing admonishment to the jurors, 
which defense counsel attempted to clarify. T. 1304; see Addendum F 
containing relevant testimony and judge's admonishment. Thereafter, 
defense counsel made a motion for mistrial based on the failure of 
the State to provide as part of discovery the query allegedly made 
by Mr. Larabee following the lineup. The trial court denied that 
motion. T. 1313-4. 
A. THE STATE VIOLATED RULE 16, UTAH RULES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN FAILING TO INFORM APPELLANT 
OF THIS INFORMATION. 
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states in 
pertinent part: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the 
prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon 
request the following material or information of 
which he has knowledge: 
12. The State argued that the evidence was not exculpatory and that 
defense counsel had opened the door by asking Tim whether he had 
equivocated in his lineup identification, even though defense 
counsel was unaware of this information. T. 1297-8. 
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(1) Relevant written or recorded 
statements of the defendant or co-defendants; 
(2) The criminal record of the 
defendant; 
(3) Physical evidence seized from the 
defendant or co-defendant; 
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor 
that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the 
defendant, or mitigate the degree of the 
offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) Any other item of evidence which 
the court determines on good cause shown 
should be made available to the defendant in 
order for the defendant to adequately 
prepare his defense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-16 (1982 ed.). 
In State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 916 (Utah 1987), this Court 
determined that where the state voluntarily provides discovery of 
material which fits within subsection (a)(5) of Rule 16 without 
requiring a court order, "considerations of fairness require that 
the prosecution respond to the request in a manner that will not be 
misleading." Id. at 916. This Court set forth two duties of the 
State where it voluntarily responded to a request for discovery. 
First, the prosecution must either produce all of 
the material requested or must identify 
explicitly those portions of the request with 
respect to which no responsible material will be 
provided. Second, when the prosecution agrees to 
produce any of the material requested, it must 
continue to disclose such material on an ongoing 
basis to the defense. Therefore, if the 
prosecution agrees to produce certain specified 
material and it later comes into possession of 
additional material that falls within the same 
specification, it has to produce the 
later-acquired material. [footnote omitted] 
Id. at 917. 
In explaining the rationale for the first requirement, this 
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Court relied on United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 
S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), which noted that a "prosecutor's 
failure to respond fully to a Brady request may impair the adversary 
process" by causing defense counsel to rely on the misleading 
representation that such evidence does not exist and plan the 
defense based on such incorrect reliance. See Knight, 734 P.2d at 
917, citing Baglev, 473 U.S. 682. 
In explaining the rationale for the second prosecutorial 
duty set forth in Knight, this Court relied on its prior decision in 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985). 
To meet basic standards of fairness and to insure 
that a trial is a real quest for truth and not 
simply a contest between the parties to win, a 
defendant's request for information which has 
been voluntarily complied with, or a court order 
of discovery must be deemed to be a continuing 
request. And even though there is no 
court-ordered disclosure, a prosecutor's failure 
to disclose newly discovered inculpatory 
information which falls with[in] the ambit of 
§ 77-35-16(a), after the prosecution has made a 
voluntary disclosure of evidence might so mislead 
defendant as to cause prejudicial error. 
Knight, 734 P.2d at 917 (quoting Carter, 707 P.2d at 662) (emphasis 
added) . 
In Knight, this Court held that the State had violated its 
discovery duties in failing to provide the defendant with 
inculpatory evidence regarding the location and testimony of two 
government witnesses. The Court reversed Knight's conviction, 
determining that there was "a reasonable likelihood that the outcome 
of Knight's trial would have been more favorable to him had the 
prosecution revealed the requested material." Knight, 734 P.2d at 
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920. This Court pointed out that while such a determination is 
usually based on a review of the record, 
When, as here, the error consists of the 
prosecution's failure to provide a defendant with 
inculpatory evidence, the record does not provide 
much assistance in discovering the nature or 
magnitude of the resulting prejudice to the 
defense. The record cannot reveal how knowledge 
of this evidence would have affected the actions 
of defense counsel, either in preparing for trial 
or in presenting the case to the jury. To a 
large extent, this leaves the reviewing court to 
speculate whether, absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the defense would have 
adduced other evidence which, when considered in 
light of the evidence actually presented, would 
have produced a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt. 
Id. at 920-1. In light of this difficulty, this Court determined 
that where "the defendant can make a credible argument that the 
prosecutor's error impaired the defense" (Id. at 921), the State has 
the burden of proving that absent the error, there is no reasonable 
likelihood the outcome would have been different. 
In Carter, 707 P.2d at 662, this Court emphasized that "a 
trial is a real quest for truth and not simply a contest between the 
parties to win." To facilitate this quest for truth and "meet basic 
standards of fairness," a request is considered a continuing request 
and 
a prosecutor's failure to disclose newly 
discovered inculpatory information which falls 
within the ambit of § 77-35-16(a), after the 
prosecution has made a voluntary disclosure of 
evidence might so mislead the defendant as to 
cause prejudicial error. 
In the present case, the undisclosed evidence fell within 
the provision of subsection (a)(5) of Rule 16 as well as the State's 
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continuing obligation to provide evidence under subsection (a)(4).13 
Under subsection (a)(5), Appellant had requested all police 
reports and investigations regarding the case. R. 27; see 
Addendum G. The State had voluntarily complied with this request, 
supplying defense counsel with numerous police reports# including 
information regarding Tim Larabee's testimony and the attempts by 
the officer to obtain an identification of Appellant from him. At 
the time of the preliminary hearing, all parties were aware that 
Mr. Larabee was having difficulty identifying Mr. Menzies as the 
person he had seen at Storm Mountain. The lineup had been held the 
day before the preliminary hearing, and Mr. Larabee had positively 
identified a person other than Appellant; he made no in-court 
identification at the preliminary hearing. 
Hence, the State had voluntarily provided defense counsel 
with (a)(5) material regarding Mr. Larabee's testimony and his 
inability to identify Mr. Menzies.14 
This information also fell within subsection (a)(4). 
Where, as here, the State has previously disclosed exculpatory 
evidence, it is misleading not to disclose later acquired evidence 
which lessens the exculpatory nature of that evidence. In reliance 
13. Although Knight dealt specifically with subsection (a)(5), the 
continuing obligation to inform defense counsel so as not to be 
misleading is equally applicable to subsection (a)(4). 
14. Admission of Tim's query also violates Utah Code Ann. § 77-8-1 
et seq. (1982 ed), which outlines the proper procedure for 
conducting a lineup. This procedure is designed to ensure that lack 
of suggestibility in the procedure and other due process concerns 
are met. The implication from the provisions is that where the 
statutes are violated, identification evidence is not admissible. 
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on apparently exculpatory evidence, defense counsel investigates the 
case and prepares his or her defense and strategy. Information that 
the exculpatory evidence is not as strong as initially indicated is 
critical to the investigation and preparation of a case. Both due 
process and Rule 16 require the State to have a continuing 
obligation to disclose evidence relating to previously disclosed 
exculpatory evidence. 
In his ruling(s) granting Appellant's motion to strike, the 
trial judge agreed that the prosecution had an obligation to convey 
this information and that the information would have affected the 
way in which counsel conducted her case. T. 1300, 1301. This 
ruling was correct, and the failure to disclose this information 
requires a new trial. 
B. THE STATE'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THIS EVIDENCE 
VIOLATED FEDERAL DUE PROCESS. 
In Bradv v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 
1194 (1963), the United States Supreme Court held that 
the suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates due 
process [fourteenth amendment] where the evidence 
is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of 
the prosecution. 
Id. at 87. 
Since Brady, the United States Supreme Court has found a 
federal due process violation in a number of contexts where the 
prosecution failed to disclose evidence to the defendant. See 
Gialio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (nondisclosure of 
evidence affecting the co-conspirator's credibility violated due 
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process regardless of whether the attorney who actually tried the 
case was aware immunity had been granted); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 
U.S. 470, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973) (due process precludes 
enforcement of state statute requiring defendant to give notice of 
intent to rely on alibi but not requiring reciprocal discovery from 
the government); United States v. Acrurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 
49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (Court elaborated on limits on due process in 
this context); United States v. Baaley. 473 U.S. at 676 (due process 
requires disclosure of evidence which would impeach government 
witnesses). 
In State v. Knight, 734 P.2d at 917, this Court favorably 
quoted language in Bagley regarding the effect an incomplete 
discovery response has on trial strategies: 
The government notes that an incomplete response 
to a specific request not only deprives the 
defense of certain evidence but has the effect of 
representing to the defense that the evidence 
does not exist. In reliance on this misleading 
representation, the defense might abandon lines 
of independent investigation, defenses or trial 
strategies that it otherwise would have pursued. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. 
Defense counsel develops his or her strategy based on the 
evidence known. If disclosed evidence is exculpatory in nature, 
competent defense counsel will use it. Allowing a prosecutor to set 
up defense counsel to use the exculpatory evidence, then lie in wait 
with inculpatory evidence which not only takes away the impact of 
the previously disclosed exculpatory evidence but has the end result 
of conveying extremely damaging evidence to the jury, would be 
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fundamentally unfair.15 
Although a prosecutor need not disclose to the defense 
"every investigative move," a prosecutor nevertheless " . . . has a 
high duty to act fairly in conducting a criminal prosecution." 
State v. Worthen. 765 P.2d 839, 850 (Utah 1988).16 See also 
State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1306 (Utah 1986) ("the prosecution 
in a criminal case is bound by law and professional ethics to assure 
that the defendant receives a fair trial [citation omitted]."); 
State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477, 479 (Utah 1975) (acknowledging that 
a deliberate suppression of evidence by the prosecution "constitutes 
a denial of due process if the evidence is material to the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant . . . . " ) . 
Various courts have found error where the prosecutor 
employed misleading discovery tactics. See State v. Dickerson, 584 
P.2d 787, 790 (Or. App. 1978) ("Criminal discovery statutes were 
intended to minimize surprise and eliminate 'trial by ambush.'")17; 
15. In Smith v. Estelle. 602 F.2d 694, 699 (5th Cir. 1979), the 
Court outlined the often devastating impact of surprise in a 
criminal trial. 
16. In Worthen, the absence of an adequate record precluded this 
Court from determining whether a discovery violation had occurred. 
17. In reaching its decision, the Dickerson Court quoted the 
commentary to § 1.1. of the ABA Standards Relating to Discovery and 
Procedures Before Trial, Approved Draft 31 (1970): 
Generally, an attorney can be effective in a 
trial only to the extent he has the information 
necessary to plan effectively. Quick wits may be 
the mark of the trial lawyer, but they are not 
always sufficient for the orderly exposition and 
testing of evidence, which is the purpose of a 
trial. Where planning is foreclosed by lack of 
(continued) 
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Long v. State, 431 N.E.2d 875, 877 (Ind. App. 1982) (State's 
misconduct in not disclosing defendant's statement then using for 
impeachment requires new trial). 
In the present case, although it is not definite how 
defense counsel would have proceeded had she been provided the 
information before trial, the trial judge was correct in determining 
that this material information would have affected the conduct of 
the defense. While defense counsel certainly did not want to 
explore for the first time in front of the jury in a capital 
homicide case whether other persons were present for the 
conversation, the prosecutor's behavior toward Tim after he selected 
someone other than Menzies at the lineup, and what indications, if 
any, the prosecutors had given Tim about the location of 
Mr. Menzies, such information was critical to defense counsel in 
planning her case and determining how to approach the post-lineup 
evidence. 
It is also reasonable to assume that defense counsel would 
(footnote 17 continued) 
information, as has long been the custom in much 
of criminal litigation, surprise and gamesmanship 
usually govern the conduct of the proceedings. 
The result is too often a general obfuscation of 
the issues. In spite of its obvious 
entertainment qualities, trial gamesmanship by 
way of obfuscatory tactics is generally offensive 
to the dignity of the court as an institution and 
destructive of respect for legal processes. 
Where life, liberty and protection of communities 
from crime are the stakes, gamesmanship is out of 
place. This does not mean that the adversary 
system is to be in any way discarded, except 
perhaps in its excesses. 
Id. at 790. 
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have moved to suppress the testimony as a violation of the statutory 
lineup procedure outlined in Utah Code Ann. § 77-8-1 et seq. 
Finally, the importance of Tim's query to the State's 
circumstantial case precludes the State from establishing that the 
outcome would not have been more favorable to Appellant absent the 
statement. Tim Larabee's post-lineup query was critical to the 
State's case since it was the only "identification" of Appellant in 
the company of Ms. Hunsaker. Tim had not made an in-court 
identification, had selected someone other than Mr. Menzies at the 
lineup, and had evidenced considerable hesitation in selecting a 
photo from the photospread. Tying Mr. Menzies to the body at Storm 
Mountain was critical to the State's case and was accomplished, 
primarily, by this undisclosed information. 
The trial judge's admonishment did not take away the 
damaging nature of this testimony. The confusing nature of 
admonishment may well have led the jury to believe it could not 
consider Tim's lineup identification of someone other than 
Mr. Menzies. See Addendum F. 
The State's failure to provide the defense with pretrial 
discovery of Tim's query requires a new trial. 
POINT IV. THE STATE VIOLATED MR. MENZIES' DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS AND DISCOVERY RULES IN FAILING TO 
INFORM DEFENSE COUNSEL THAT ITS KEY WITNESS WAS 
INITIALLY UNABLE TO SELECT APPELLANT FROM A PHOTO 
ARRAY. 
Prior to trial, defense counsel was aware that Tim Larabee 
had indicated that a photo of Mr. Menzies looked most like the man 
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at Storm Mountain of the photos in a photo array, but Tim had 
selected someone else, without hesitation, from the lineup. Defense 
counsel learned for the first time during trial that Detective Judd 
had initially shown the photospread to Tim, and Tim had been unable 
to make a selection. T. 1685, 1686-7. Detective Judd then took Tim 
to the parking lot to look at cars. T. 1686-7. After looking at 
cars, Detective Judd left Tim with Detective Thompson. T. 1688. 
Apparently, at this point, Tim again looked at the array and said 
Menzies appeared to be most like the man he had seen. T. 1332, 1213. 
The way in which the State presented the photo array 
evidence precluded defense counsel from becoming aware of Tim's 
difficulty in selecting Menzies until the last of the three 
witnesses involved in the array testified. 
Tim testified first and made no mention of his initial 
inability to select a photo. T. 1213. 
Detective Thompson testified next and did not mention Tim's 
initial inability to make a selection. T. 1332. 
Detective Judd finally testified much later in the State's 
case that he had put together a photospread and shown it to Tim, and 
that Tim was unable to make any type of identification at first. 
T. 1685. 
The State failed to inform defense counsel of Mr. Larabee's 
inability to identify anyone during the initial viewing of the 
photospread. T. 1332-5. Defense counsel immediately objected 
(T. 1332) and argued outside the presence of the jury that she had 
not been provided with discovery as to Larabee's inability to 
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initially identify Menzies. T. 1332-6.18 The trial court overruled 
the objection. T. 1337-8. 
Larabee's inability to initially identify Menzies was 
material exculpatory evidence. See discovery discussion supra at 
39-49; Addendum G. The State was required to provide this 
information to defense counsel prior to trial, and its failure to do 
so violates Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and due 
process. See Norris v. Slayton. 540 F.2d 1241 (4th Cir. 1976) 
(failure to disclose witness7 hesitation in identifying defendant in 
showup violated due process); Mc Powell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th 
Cir. 1988) (due process violated where State withheld information 
that witness first claimed assailant was white, then changed to 
claim he was black). 
Had defense counsel been aware of the information before 
trial, she could have used the information to develop her strategy 
and impeach Tim's testimony. Failure to provide this information to 
Appellant and springing it on defense counsel during trial after the 
relevant witness had testified violated due process and the 
discovery procedure mandated under Rule 16. See Knight, 734 P.2d at 
917; Baaley. 473 U.S. at 682. 
Furthermore, the prosecution's failure to disclose this 
information coupled with the State's failure to inform defense 
18. The State seems to argue that since Appellant knew about the 
selection Tim made in the presence of Detective Thompson, the State 
had complied with discovery requirements. T. 1334-5. The court 
appears to have based its ruling on the fact that Appellant knew 
about the ultimate selection and missed Appellant's argument 
regarding the lack of discovery on the initial inability. T. 1335, 
1337. 
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counsel of Tim's post-lineup query severely hampered Appellant's 
ability to prepare his case, in particular, his attack on Tim's 
"identification" of Menzies, 
POINT V. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN ALLOWING THE PRELIMINARY HEARING 
TESTIMONY OF WALTER BRITTON TO BE READ TO THE 
JURY. 
Over the objections of defense counsel, the trial judge 
allowed the preliminary hearing testimony of Walter Britton, a 
federal inmate housed at the Salt Lake County Jail in February, 
1986, to be read to the jury. T. 1104-1113, 1119-22, 1125-26; 
testimony read at 2079-2127. Britton had first contacted 
authorities on March 28, 1986, a full month after the conversation 
he claimed occurred in which Ralph Menzies confessed to the crime in 
this case. T. 2080-4, 2100. After testifying at the preliminary 
hearing, Britton vacillated several times as to whether he would 
testify at trial. T. 2293-4, 2300-2; R. 562. 
A. ADMISSION OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING 
TESTIMONY VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO 
CONFRONTATION. 
The right to confrontation as guaranteed by the sixth 
amendment is one of "the core elements of the right to due process 
of law.11 State v. Webb. 779 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1989). 
In order to introduce Britton's preliminary hearing 
testimony at trial without violating the confrontation clause, the 
State had the burden of establishing that (1) the witness was 
unavailable and (2) "the testimony [bore] sufficient indicia of 
reliability." State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981); Ohio v. 
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Roberts. 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980); 
State v. Barela. 779 P.2d 1140, 1142 (Utah App. 1989). 
1. Britton Was Not Unavailable. 
In Webb, 779 P.2d at 1113 (Utah 1989), this Court 
recognized that its decisions and the decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court have given a strict construction to the unavailability 
requirement. 
Our reading of Roberts and other United States 
Supreme Court cases leads us to conclude that in 
order for a witness to be constitutionally 
unavailable, it must be practically impossible to 
produce the witness in court. It is not enough 
to show that the witness would be uncomfortable 
on the stand or that testifying would be 
stressful. 
Our own precedent reflects this strict view of 
the unavailability precondition. See State v. 
White, 671 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1983) (the fact 
that declarant's attorney had told defendant's 
attorney that declarant would assert fifth 
amendment privilege did not render declarant 
unavailable as a witness, as declarant must claim 
the privilege personally); State v. Chapman, 655 
P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1982) (out-of-state witness 
was not "unavailable" where prosecutor made no 
effort to secure his attendance by use of Uniform 
Act . . . because he knew witness would be 
unwilling to testify); State v. Case. 752 P.2d 
356, 358 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (out-of-state 
declarant was not "unavailable" within meaning of 
a hearsay exception where prosecutor made no 
effort to secure her attendance . . . ) . 
Webb. 779 P.2d at 1113; see also Barber v. Page. 390 U.S. 719, 88 
S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968) (right to confrontation precludes 
use of preliminary hearing transcript where witness incarcerated and 
state made no attempt to secure attendance at trial). 
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Rule 804(a), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) defines 
unavailability for hearsay purposes. It provides in relevant part: 
(a) Definition of unavailability. 
"Unavailability of a witness" includes situations 
in which the declarant: 
(2) persists in refusing to testify 
concerning the subject matter of his 
statement despite an order of the court to 
do so. 
In State v. Barela. 779 P.2d 1140, the Utah Court of 
Appeals analyzed the meaning of unavailability under Rule 
804(a)(2). It determined that "the operative term in Rule 804(a)(2) 
is ,persists,H and concluded that the evidence did not establish 
that the witness had persisted in refusing to answer where, in 
response to a single question, the witness stated, "do I have to 
answer these stupid-?" Id. at 1144. 
Rule 804(a)(2) also requires that the witness "persist" in 
refusing to answer after the court has ordered him to do so. On 
February 18 and 19, 1988, Britton appeared pursuant to court order 
and testified outside the presence of the jury. At the end of 
Britton's first day of testimony, the trial judge ordered him to 
testify and he refused. T. 965.19 On the second day, Britton 
appeared, despite his general refusal to testify the day before. He 
19. The trial judge found Britton in contempt and sentenced him to 
serve thirty days concurrently with his federal sentence. T. 967. 
Although defense counsel asked the judge to impose a sentence with 
some impact by imprisoning Britton until he testified, as permitted 
by Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-12, the trial judge instead imposed this 
unenforceable and meaningless sentence, without written findings or 
any "teeth" which might compel performance. See Salzeth v. Backman. 
638 P.2d 543 (Utah 1981); State v. Barlow, 771 P.2d 662, 664 (Utah 
1989) . 
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answered defense counsel's questions and did not appear reluctant to 
testify until asked: 
[MS. WELLS]: Britton, did you undergo a court 
ordered psychological evaluation? 
T. 1080. At that point, Britton refused to answer. However, when 
the court ordered him to answer the specific question, he elaborated 
on his decision not to testify—then answered the question 
affirmatively. T. 1081. On redirect examination and 
recross-examination, Britton answered all specific questions asked 
including the prosecutor's question as to whether his prior 
testimony had been truthful. T. 1083-90. This question was in 
essence a question about the subject matter of Britton's testimony 
and further demonstrated that he was not unavailable. 
Furthermore, the statements of the prosecutor demonstrate 
that the State was not making a good faith effort to encourage 
Britton to testify at trial. 
After Britton's general statement that he would not 
testify, the State informed the court that it would use the 
preliminary hearing transcript if Britton refused to testify. 
T. 961. Also, before the court ordered Britton to testify, the 
prosecutor interjected, "I would like to point out that we would 
like to get Mr. Britton on his way back to Ashland as soon as 
possible." T. 964. The prosecutor also pointed out, in reference 
to the authorities at Ashland, "They want to get him back as soon as 
they can get him back." T. 1090. 
In addition, prior to the court's imposition of sentence, 
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the prosecutor pointed out, again in front of the witness, that the 
sentence would not have much impact and asked the court either to 
find Britton not guilty of contempt or to not impose any penalty for 
the contempt. T. 966-7. 
Finally, while arguing, over Appellant's objections, that 
Britton should be released to Kentucky as soon as possible, the 
prosecutor stated: 
My suspicion is Mr. Britton is not going to be 
willing to talk to anybody after this hearing is 
concluded. 
T. 1092. As defense counsel pointed out, ,f[t]hat certainly is 
suggesting to him that he shouldn't . . . ." T. 1094. Despite 
Britton's vacillation as to whether he would testify (see 
footnote 20) and his cooperation in answering specific questions 
when propounded, the State did nothing to encourage him to testify; 
in fact, the statements by the prosecutor encouraged Britton not to 
testify. 
The State has the burden of establishing that the witness 
is unavailable to testify and that the prosecution made a good faith 
effort to procure that testimony. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 
75-6. See also State v. Herrera. 594 P.2d 823, 827 (Or. 1979) (the 
burden is on the prosecutor to produce evidence to show the trial 
court what circumstances exist which make use of the prior recorded 
testimony genuinely necessary). Barber v. Page. 390 U.S. at 774-5 
(witness is unavailable for confrontation purposes only if state 
makes good faith effort to obtain his presence); see also State v. 
Ryan, 691 P.2d 197, 202 (Wash. 1984). 
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Unavailability is usually based on the physical absence of 
the witness. See Ryan, 691 P.2d at 197. Where unavailability is 
based on a persistent refusal to answer questions regarding the 
subject matter of a statement, the trial court must take special 
care in ascertaining that the witness was truly unavailable and 
require the State to act in good faith. 
In light of Britton7s repeated vacillation prior to trial 
as to whether he would testify at trial,20 his willingness to answer 
specific questions, his willingness to answer after the trial court 
ordered that he answer a specific question, and the fact that the 
State essentially discouraged Britton7s testimony and acted to 
protect him from any repercussions of not testifying, the State 
failed to sustain its burden of establishing that Britton was 
unavailable. 
2. The Former Testimony Was Not Reliable. 
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court disagrees and 
determines that Britton was unavailable, the second requirement for 
20. In April 1987, defense counsel and an associate visited Britton 
at the federal penitentiary in Ashland, Kentucky. T. 2300. During 
their conversation, Britton indicated that he would testify in the 
present case. T. 2301. The only threats Britton mentioned at that 
time had occurred prior to the preliminary hearing. T. 2302. A 
minute entry dated April 3, 1987 indicates that, at that time, 
Britton was planning to testify. R. 562. An investigator for the 
Salt Lake County Attorney's office had contact with prison 
authorities or Britton on four separate occasions regarding whether 
Britton would testify in the present case. T. 2293-4. First, 
Britton was willing to testify. T. 2283. Britton was unwilling to 
testify at the time of the second contact, which was made several 
months after the first. T. 2294. About two weeks after indicating 
his unwillingness, Britton again changed his mind and agreed to 
testify. T. 2294. During the final contact, Britton again 
expressed unwillingness to testify. T. 2294. 
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admissibility of prior testimony "operates once a witness is shown 
to be unavailable." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 607. In setting forth 
this second requirement, the Roberts Court favorably quoted its 
earlier decision in Mancusi v. Stubbs. 408 U.S. 204, 213, 92 S.Ct. 
2308 (1972), 33 L.Ed.2d 293: 
The focus of the Court's concern has been to 
insure that there "are indicia of reliability 
which have been widely viewed as determinative of 
whether a statement may be placed before the jury 
though there is not confrontation of the 
declarant" [citation omitted] and to "afford the 
trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating 
the truth of the prior statement." [citation 
omitted] 
Id. at 65-6 (emphasis added). 
In Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, this Court held that preliminary 
hearing testimony had certain indicia of reliability which usually 
made it admissible at trial, and that the defendants had an adequate 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing 
so that the defendants' right to confrontation was not violated. 
Id. at 542. 
This Court acknowledged, however, that lack of opportunity 
to cross-examine on a specific topic at the preliminary hearing may 
preclude a defendant from adequate exercise of his right to 
confrontation. See Brooks, 638 P.2d at 542. Where there has been 
"no cross-examination or a superficial or perfunctory 
cross-examination," admission of a preliminary hearing transcript 
might violate a defendant's right to confrontation. Id. 
The implication from Brooks and Roberts is that while, in 
some cases, the preliminary hearing testimony will have sufficient 
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indicia of reliability to make it admissible where the witness is 
unavailable without any further showing, in others, where unusual 
circumstances exist, the reliability of the preliminary hearing 
testimony may be questioned. In other words, while reliability may 
be inferred from the fact that the testimony is admissible under the 
"firmly rooted hearsay exception" for former testimony, such 
inference does not necessarily make the evidence admissible for 
confrontation purposes where unusual circumstances exist. 
In State v. Bauer. 325 N.W.2d 857 (1982), the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court acknowledged that the Roberts Court held that 
"[r]reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the 
evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception." Bauer, 
325 N.W.2d at 862, citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. The Bauer Court 
pointed out, however, that 
[w]hile this inference of reliability is strong, 
evidence falling within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception is not admissible per se." 
Id. at 862 (emphasis added). The Bauer Court required that even if 
the evidence fits within a hearsay exception, the trial court must 
still examine the case for unusual circumstances and determine 
whether "the trier of fact has a reasonable basis for evaluating the 
truthfulness of the prior statement." Id. 
The important role of the demeanor of a witness to the 
right to confrontation also supports the position that the Court 
must look beyond the inference of reliability raised by the fact 
that the testimony was obtained at the preliminary hearing to 
determine whether the circumstances of the case preclude a finding 
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that the former testimony is reliable. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 
U.S. at 211; Barber v. Page. 390 U.S. at 722; Herrera, 594 P.2d at 
826; People v. Middleton. 611 P.2d 698, 701 n.4 (Or. App. 1980). 
Several unusual circumstances existed in this case which 
outweighed the inference of reliability and which show that the 
State did not bear its burden of establishing the reliability of 
Britton's testimony. Those circumstances are (a) Britton was a 
jailhouse informant whose testimony was inherently suspect since he 
stood to benefit from the testimony, the source of his information 
is questionable, and defense counsel did not have an opportunity to 
examine him on these issues at the preliminary hearing; 
(b) Britton's mental competence was at issue, and Appellant had no 
access to this information regarding Britton's mental health prior 
to the preliminary hearing; and (c) defense counsel did not have the 
opportunity to examine Britton at the preliminary hearing regarding 
his subsequent convictions and sentences or Britton's understanding 
of the State's promise to file a favorable affidavit on his behalf. 
a. Jailhouse Informant 
The testimony of jail-house informants, or 
"snitches," is becoming an increasing problem in 
this state, as well as throughout the American 
criminal justice system. The present case is one 
of many across the nation where the truthfulness 
of the informant has been called into question. 
Informants . . . are offering evidence against 
fellow inmates in exchange for reduced 
sentences. In the process of reaping their 
benefit, they are manipulating the system by 
helping to convict innocent citizens. 
McNeal v. State, 551 So.2d 151, 157 (Miss. 1989), citing Curriden, 
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"No Honor Among Thieves," ABA Journal, June 1989, at 51 (see 
Addendum H). 
The expectation or receipt of benefits in exchange for 
testimony, coupled with the often questionable background of 
jailhouse informants, makes the testimony of such informants 
suspect. See Curriden at 52-6. Just as a co-defendant's statements 
are presumptively unreliable (see Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 106 
S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986)), the reliability of the testimony 
of a jailhouse informant who has the possibility or expectation of a 
plea bargain, better sentence, better treatment, or a myriad of 
other "favors" is inherently suspect. 
In light of the recent Leslie White "snitch" controversy,21 
the Los Angeles District Attorney's office is reviewing 200 murder 
cases and has instituted a checklist which it uses before deciding 
whether to use the informant's testimony. The checklist includes 
exploring the following "red flag" questions: 
How is it that the informant could have learned 
this information without actually talking to the 
person he says he talked to? Was the informant 
ever housed in the county jail with the 
defendant? Was he ever transported on a bus with 
the defendant? Is it possible the informant 
could have gotten police reports and got the 
information from that? Is there any other way he 
could have gotten that information? 
Curriden at 52-6. 
21. Los Angeles has recently experienced a highly publicized 
"snitch" controversy involving Leslie White, an inmate who compiled 
information by telephoning the district attorney's office and other 
sources, then testified for the State in numerous cases, using the 
gathered information to create a "confession." See Curriden at 52-6. 
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In the present case, Britton had seen news reports 
regarding the Hunsaker homicide both before and after he claimed to 
have talked to Menzies. R. 1150:166.22 His testimony contained no 
details that were not on the news.23 The fact that Britton's 
statement could have been concocted from news reports undermines it 
reliability. 
Although Britton made statements at the preliminary hearing 
which were not consistent with his two statements to police, defense 
22. The transcript of the preliminary hearing contained the 
following: 
Q. You may have already known on February the 
28th that the person had been found, is that 
correct? 
A: Correct. 
R. 1150 at 166. When Britton's statement was read to the jury over 
defense counsel's objections, it was transcribed as follows: 
Q: You may have heard none on February the 28th 
that the person had been found, is that correct? 
A: Correct. 
T. 2097. In context, this suggests that Britton had not heard news 
reports. This "slip" is critical to the jury's perception of 
Britton's testimony since the impact of having or not having seen 
news reports may have affected their assessment of Britton's 
statement. 
23. Written reports were made of two early police interviews of 
Britton dated March 28, 1986 and April 7, 1986. Although these 
reports were not entered into evidence, they show that Britton's 
statement changed over time. For instance, the first statement does 
not include a claim that Britton asked Menzies why he shot her. 
That claim first arose in the second interview, after the officer 
asked whether Menzies mentioned a gun. At the preliminary hearing, 
this query became part of Britton's testimony. T. 2083. In both 
statements, Britton claimed Menzies made comments indicating he had 
sex with the decedent. There is no evidence of sexual intercourse 
in this case, and Britton's statements regarding sex disappeared by 
the time of the preliminary hearing. Britton also initially claimed 
that he asked Menzies why he would kill someone for a few dollars 
and a few packs of cigarettes. The reference to cigarettes was 
generated by news reports which initially indicated cigarettes were 
stolen. This later proved untrue. T. 1178, 1186. 
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counsel did not emphasize these statements in cross-examination at 
the preliminary hearing. 
While in some cases, the motives and opportunity to 
cross-examine at the preliminary hearing are similar to those at 
trial (see Brooks), in circumstances where an informant has made a 
series of inconsistent and conflicting statements, the concerns and 
strategies of an astute lawyer would be different at the preliminary 
hearing than at trial. At trial, defense counsel would have 
immediately hammered Britton with his prior inconsistent statements 
and let the jury view his composure as he attempted to explain. 
However, emerging from the preliminary hearing with inconsistent 
statements to use at trial is a better tactic than backing the 
witness into a corner at the preliminary hearing without the 
opportunity for the jurors to view the witness. Cf. Barber v. Page, 
390 U.S. at 725-6 ("A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less 
searching exploration into the merits of the case . . . . " ) . 
Although the State emphasized that it had not promised 
anything to Britton, a firm promise is not necessary to undermine 
the reliability of an informant's testimony. An expectation of 
better treatment, change in housing location, lesser sentence or any 
other of a myriad of benefits which might occur in exchange for 
testimony are sufficient to undermine the reliability of the 
testimony and heighten the need for face-to-face confrontation. See 
generally McNeal. 551 So.2d at 151; D'Agostino v. State. 823 P.2d 
283, 285 (Nev. 1992). 
The facts in this case demonstrate that at the time of the 
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preliminary hearing, Britton knew the State would file a favorable 
affidavit for him. T. 2038-9. For a man who has just been 
sentenced on a federal bank robbery and was awaiting the outcome of 
two other armed bank robbery charges, such help from the State is 
certainly a benefit which would not exist without the testimony.24 
Finally, Britton's testimony was misleading in that it 
suggested that he did not expect to benefit and might in fact be 
hurt by his testimony. T. 2102-3, 2119. Although Britton stood to 
benefit from his testimony in a myriad of ways and appears to have 
had an expectation of benefit at the time of the preliminary 
hearing, jurors who are not sophisticated about the way in which 
prisons and the criminal justice system work may well have believed 
that Britton's testimony was not spawned by an expectation of 
benefit. See generally DIAqostino, 823 P.2d at 284. Nor is putting 
on evidence of the Rule 35 hearing any substitute for face-to-face 
confrontation, where the jury could watch Britton's demeanor as he 
answered questions regarding his expectations and actual benefit 
resulting from his testimony. 
b. Mental Incompetency 
The record raises serious concerns about Britton's mental 
health. These concerns further undermine the reliability of his 
24. Britton was sentenced to ten-year concurrent terms on the bank 
robberies. T. 1085. His surprise at being sentenced to only ten 
years on the Utah robbery (T. 2101) suggests that this slap on the 
hand for the two succeeding robberies was a light sentence. 
Although there is no way of knowing from the record in this case 
whether Britton's testimony in the instant case affected his 
sentence on the Nevada and Idaho cases, this information at least 
raises a suggestion that Britton benefitted from his testimony. 
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testimony. 
In October 1985, six months before Britton testified at the 
preliminary hearing, Britton's attorney filed an affidavit 
reflecting his concerns and opinions regarding Britton's competency 
to stand trial. T. 2043. The parties entered into a stipulation 
that Britton be psychologically examined as part of the pending 
federal armed robbery case. T. 2208.25 
Dr. Breck Lebegue interviewed Britton and apparently 
determined either that Britton was mentally ill or that he was 
feigning illness, and raised a question as to whether Britton was 
manipulating the system. T. 2009.26 Britton refused to speak to 
Dr. Lebegue for more than half an hour, so the psychiatrist was 
unable to reach an opinion about Britton's mental state. Id. 
However, Britton did report blackouts, seizures, a history of head 
injuries, and hearing voices of spirits which were fallen Samurai 
Warriors. Id. 
After talking with Dr. Lebegue, Britton was transferred to 
a federal facility where further psychological evaluations were 
conducted. T. 2043, 2050. Defense counsel did not have access to 
the report of these evaluations. T. 2054. 
Britton's vacillation as to whether he would testify 
coupled with his questionable mental state raise grave concerns as 
25. Apparently, Britton had also asked for and received counseling 
and evaluation and had been housed for a while in the mental health 
tier of the jail. T. 2056, 1079. 
26. The trial judge refused to admit Dr. Lebegue's report. T. 2324. 
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to the reliability of his testimony. The inability of defense 
counsel to cross-examine Britton at the preliminary hearing about 
his mental health undermines the reliability of the preliminary 
hearing transcript, in violation of Appellant/s right to 
confrontation• 
c. Inability to Cross-examine 
Defense counsel was unable to fully cross-examine Britton 
at the preliminary hearing regarding his expectations of benefits 
and his mental health because Appellant did not have access to 
information regarding these issues. See discussion in (a) and (b) 
above. In addition, some of the events, including the Rule 35 
hearing and the receipt of surprisingly light ten-year concurrent 
sentences on two additional bank robbery charges (T. 1085), had not 
yet occurred at the time of the preliminary hearing. Nor did 
defense counsel know of Britton's desire to be housed in Florida at 
the time of the preliminary hearing. T. 1100-1, 1116. Housing 
condition is a possible benefit for testifying. 
Although some information was placed into evidence 
regarding the Rule 35 hearing (see Addendum I) and Britton's 
subsequent convictions, placing that information into evidence is no 
substitute for cross-examining Britton on the issue of his 
expectation of benefit. 
The inability to cross-examine Britton at the preliminary 
hearing regarding his expectation of benefits undermines the 
reliability of his former testimony, in violation of Menzies' right 
to confrontation. 
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3. The Erroneous Admission of Britton's 
Testimony Was Reversible Error. 
Because Britton was not unavailable or, alternatively, the 
preliminary hearing testimony was not sufficiently reliable, 
Menzies' right to confrontation under the sixth amendment to the 
federal constitution and Article I, § 12 of the Utah constitution 
were violated. The appropriate standard for determining whether 
these constitutional violations require reversal of the conviction 
is whether the State can establish that the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 
(Utah 1987). 
The prosecutor emphasized Britton's testimony in closing, 
claiming that it was "very significant direct evidence" and that 
Britton indicated that while he was incarcerated at the Salt Lake 
County Jail in the cell next to the cell of Menzies, Menzies stated 
to him that he was being charged with a murder, the murder of a 
woman who had been abducted from the service station. He admitted 
to Britton that he cut her throat, stating that it was one of the 
biggest thrills that he, the defendant, had ever had. T. 2616-7. 
As previously outlined in Point XVI at 113, the case 
against Menzies was built on bits and pieces of circumstantial 
evidence. Without the alleged confession directly linking Menzies 
to the homicide and implying that a robbery and aggravated 
kidnapping occurred, the jury may well have determined that there 
was not enough evidence to convict Menzies of capital homicide. 
B. ADMISSION OF MR. BRITTON'S TESTIMONY ALSO 
VIOLATED RULE 403, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
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In State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981 (Utah 1989), this Court 
held that portions of a letter from the defendant to the victim/s 
father in which the defendant "display[ed] callousness toward the 
killing . . . in profane and vulgar language" and which 
"manifest[ed] his complete insensitivity to this tragedy" (Id. at 
983) was so prejudicial that it was inadmissible under Rule 403. 
This Court defined unfair prejudice as "an undue tendency to suggest 
decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an 
emotional one [citation omitted]." Id. at 984. 
In the present case, the statement allegedly made by 
Menzies that killing Maureen Hunsaker was the greatest thrill of his 
life (T. 2084) along with Britton's testimony that Menzies laughed 
about the homicide (T. 2117) had an overwhelming prejudicial 
impact. The callousness of such a statement, coupled with the lack 
of remorse and lack of respect for human life, parallels the 
callousness of the letter in Mauer. The trial judge erred in 
admitting the statement. The nature of the statement itself, along 
with the prosecutor's emphasis on such statement in closing 
(T. 2616-7), makes the error reversible. 
POINT VI. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN QUASHING DEFENDANTS SUBPOENA OF THE 
PROSECUTOR. 
Despite Britton's indication in his preliminary hearing 
testimony that he did not stand to benefit from his testimony (see 
discussion supra at 61-4), shortly after the preliminary hearing, 
one of the prosecutors in the present case testified on behalf of 
Britton at a Rule 35 hearing in federal court. T. 2316. Counsel 
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for Britton informed defense counsel in the instant case that this 
had occurred. T. 2051, 2037-8. 
Defendant subpoenaed Rick McDougal as to the details of his 
understanding with Britton and Britton's attorney as well as the 
nature of his testimony in federal court. T. 2277. The trial court 
quashed the subpoena and did not allow prosecutor McDougal to 
testify. T. 2278. In so doing, the trial judge violated 
Mr. Menzies' right to compulsory process as guaranteed by the sixth 
and fourteenth amendments. See generally Washington v. Texas, 388 
U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). 
In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 19, the Court stated: 
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, 
and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is 
in plain terms the right to present a defense, 
the right to present the defendant's version of 
the facts as well as the prosecution's to the 
jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just 
as an accused has the right to confront the 
prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of 
challenging their testimony, he has the right to 
present his own witnesses to establish a 
defense. This right is a fundamental element of 
due process of law. 
Various courts have limited the defendant's ability to call 
the prosecutor as a witness to a situation where there is a 
"compelling need" for the testimony. See, e.g., United States v. 
Robinson, 897 F.2d 1092, 1098 (11th Cir. 1990). This limitation 
appears to be based on the concern that a lawyer who appears as a 
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material witness must withdraw from the case. See Rule 3.7, Utah 
Rules of Professional Conduct; State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 653 
(Utah 1985). 
In determining whether a sixth amendment violation occurred 
as the result of the trial judge quashing a defendant's subpoena of 
the prosecutor, the focus is on "whether testimonial evidence to be 
presented by the witness 'was relevant, material, and vital to the 
defense, and whether the exclusion of that evidence was 
arbitrary.'" U.S. ex rel Ashford v. Dir. 111. Dept. of Corr., 871 
F.2d 680, 687 (7th Cir. 1989). 
Although the trial court has discretion to refuse to allow 
a defendant to call a prosecutor to testify, "a weatherfed] eye must 
be kept on the constitutional rights of the defendant." Stiltner, 
377 P.2d 252. Where "the result would be to prejudice the 
defendant's case," quashing the subpoena is improper. See State v. 
Williams. 656 P.2d at 453. 
In Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, this Court pointed out: 
. . . a defendant's constitutional right to 
compel witnesses to testify for him may not be 
dispensed with because of some comparatively 
minor inconvenience to the State or because of 
defense counsel's truly inadvertent failure to 
give prompt notice, when an attorney's testimony 
may be important. 
Id. at 849. 
At the time of the preliminary hearing in the present case, 
Defendant believed that the State was doing nothing to help 
Britton. Defendant later learned that this was not true—that prior 
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to the preliminary hearing, the prosecutors had agreed to appear on 
behalf of Britton, and that after the preliminary hearing, 
prosecutor McDougal had appeared on Britton's behalf. 
Prosecutor McDougal's testimony as to the details of the 
understanding prior to the preliminary hearing, any statements or 
information conveyed directly to Britton, and the specifics of the 
testimony in federal court were critical for the Defendant's attack 
on Britton's testimony. The defense was prejudiced in its ability 
to attack Britton's testimony; under these circumstances, 
Defendant's right to compel witnesses as guaranteed by the sixth 
amendment to the United States constitution was violated. 
POINT VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
DECLARE A MISTRIAL WHEN EVIDENCE OF MR. MENZIES' 
PAROLE 
WITNESS 
STATUS 
IN 
REACHED 
VIOLATION 
THE 
OF AN 
JURY THROUGH 
EXPRESS 
A 
COURT 
STATE 
ORDER. 
Despite pretrial orders precluding the State from 
introducing evidence of Mr. Menzies' criminal history,27 during 
27. Before trial, the court ruled that evidence of Mr. Menzies' 
unrelated past criminal history would unfairly prejudice him and 
taint the jury. The trial court found subsection (h) of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(h) (1953 as amended) unconstitutional because 
subsection (h) evidence would require exposing the jury to evidence 
of prior unrelated crimes. R. 540, 541-2. The trial court also 
ordered that all previously argued motions in limine regarding 
Mr. Menzies' prior criminal history and record be granted in 
Mr. Menzies' favor (R. 780) and sanctioned the stipulation to 
Appellant's motion to exclude all evidence of Appellant's 
incarceration and parole status (R. 1803). During trial, the court 
granted Appellant's motion to exclude the testimony of an officer 
because any relevance of his testimony would be outweighed by 
prejudice flowing from evidence of prior convictions and parole 
status. T. 1589-90. Finally, the court admonished counsel to 
sanitize the preliminary hearing transcript of any reference to 
Mr. Menzies' prior criminal history before the transcript was read 
to the jury. T. 2114 (see also Utah R. Evid. 403, 404.) 
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direct examination by the State, veteran Detective Jerry Thompson 
stated that Mr. Menzies had gone to his parole office the day after 
Ms. Hunsaker disappeared. T. 1877.28 
Defense counsel immediately objected and several motions 
for mistrial based on this testimony were heard throughout the 
remainder of the guilt/innocence phase. T. 1877, 1878, 1904, 2133. 
During the course of argument, the prosecutor acknowledged the 
prejudicial nature of the testimony at least twice. T. 1922. 
The trial judge's rulings and statements demonstrate that 
he was concerned about the prejudice caused by this statement. 
T. 1946-1948, 1956, 2142. 
A. THE TESTIMONY VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND THE 
RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
This Court has repeatedly acknowledged that evidence of a 
defendant's prior bad acts or criminal history can be unduly 
prejudicial because of "the tendency of the fact finder to convict 
the accused because of bad character rather than because he is shown 
to be guilty of the offenses charged." State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 
738, 741 (Utah 1985); Bishop. 753 P.2d at 496 (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring) (tracing history of this Court's "hostility to bad 
character evidence"); State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 495 (Utah 1986) 
(acknowledging the "unwarranted prejudice in informing the jury that 
a defendant is a convicted felon"); State v. Gotfrey. 598 P.2d 1325, 
1328 (Utah 1979) (fair trial denied where charges of rape and sodomy 
28. The transcript incorrectly indicates that Detective Thompson 
said "patrol" office. T. 1877. The parties have stipulated and the 
California version states "parole" office. T. 1877. 
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arising at different times tried together); State v. McCumber, 622 
P.2d 353, 356 (Utah 1980) (joint trial on sex charges arising out of 
separate criminal episodes violates due process); State v. Tarafa, 
720 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah 1986) (joint trial for theft charges 
arising out of separate criminal episodes violates due process). 
In State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210, 1218 (Utah 1984), this 
Court acknowledged the impropriety of the question, "Mr. Reid, are 
you [the defendant's] parole officer?" 
In State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1989), this Court 
held that information regarding the defendant's parole status did 
not require a new trial because (1) the juror who had seen a 
newspaper report on the case claimed not to have seen the word 
"parole," and (2) the trial judge found that testimony that a 
document was notarized and taken to the parole officer was "lost on 
the jury" and did not necessarily refer to the defendant. 
By contrast, in the present case, both parties and the 
judge acknowledged the intelligence of the jury, their awareness of 
the parole system and the meaning of "parole", and their attention 
to details by taking notes. T. 1945, 1912, 1932. In addition, the 
statement was directly linked to Mr. Menzies. 
The testimony violated Rules 401, 403 and 404(b), Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1983). In addition, the overwhelming prejudicial 
effect of this testimony deprived Mr. Menzies of due process and a 
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fair trial.29 
In his concurrence in State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d at 747, 
Justice Zimmerman pointed out: 
Language in some of our cases, such as State v. 
Saunders and State v. Tarafa. plainly states that 
permitting the jury to consider otherwise 
inadmissible bad character evidence for the sole 
purpose of determining guilt denies a defendant 
due process in violation of the state and federal 
constitutions. See, e.g.. Tarafa, 720 P.2d at 
1370; Saunders. 699 P.2d at 741-2; State v. 
McCumber. 622 P.2d at 356. 
Federal courts have also held that impugning an accused's character 
with evidence of past unrelated bad acts can deprive an accused of 
his right to a fair trial. See, e.g.. Michelson v. United States. 
335 U.S. 469, 475-476, 69 S.Ct. 213, 168 L.Ed. 168 (1948); United 
States v. Daniels. 770 F.2d 1111, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Foskev. 636 F.2d 517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting United 
States v. Mevers. 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977)).30 
B. THE PROSECUTION TEAM COMMITTED MISCONDUCT. 
29. The introduction of this testimony following pretrial rulings 
which limited its introduction precluded Appellant from fully 
cross-examining the detective, in violation of his right to 
confrontation. The detective's mention of parole occurred at a 
crucial time in the proceedings, while the detective was reciting 
Mr. Menzies' statements regarding his whereabouts shortly after 
Ms. Hunsaker disappeared. Appellant was prevented from 
cross-examining the detective on this aspect of his statement due to 
pretrial orders as well as a fear of opening the door to other 
irrelevant evidence regarding his criminal past. 
30. Although various members of this Court have clarified their 
positions as to whether a due process violation occurs in other 
contexts where evidence of other crimes reaches the jury (see 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d at 497-500, 489-90; State v. Gardner. 789 
P.2d 273 at 289-90 (Utah 1989)), this Court has not dealt directly 
with the issue of whether a due process violation occurs in the 
present context. 
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This Court has set forth a two-prong test for determining 
whether prosecutorial misconduct has occurred: 
The test of whether remarks made by counsel are 
so objectionable as to merit a mistrial in a 
criminal case is, did the remarks call to the 
attention of the jurors matters which they would 
not be justified in considering in determining 
the verdict, and were they, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, probably 
influenced by those remarks. 
State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984) fquoting State v. 
Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973)). 
Although a police officer, not the prosecutor, injected the 
improper testimony, the State should be accountable for the 
misconduct of its lead investigator. In various contexts, this 
Court has charged the State with responsibility for the actions of 
the persons who make up the prosecution team. See State v. Shabata, 
678 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1984) (prosecutor charged with knowledge of 
police officers working on case); State v. Shaffer. 725 P.2d 1301, 
1304-5 (Utah 1986) (medical examiner's actions in destroying body 
attributed to State); State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d at 479 (Utah 1975) 
(as members of the prosecution team, police officers' actions in 
destroying evidence can violate due process). 
Requiring the prosecution team, especially lead 
investigators on a case, to follow the trial court's rulings makes 
sense since without such a requirement, pretrial rulings would have 
little force. In State v. Nettleton, 400 P.2d 301, 303 n.4, the 
Washington Supreme Court stated: 
If we are persuaded that a prosecuting attorney 
or a witness for the state is deliberately trying 
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, we will 
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assume that he succeeded in his purpose and grant 
a new trial. It would seem that our frequent 
discussions of this subject could, within the 
near future, serve to prevent the reference to a 
defendant as being on parole by all except the 
willful or the congenitally ignorant. 
Id. at 303 n.4 (emphasis added). 
Detective Thompson had been a police officer for 
twenty-three years at the time of this trial. T. 1315. He had been 
admonished not to discuss Mr. Menzies' parole status or criminal 
history and undoubtedly knew the potential effect of such 
information without such an admonishment. T. 1932. 
Although the State argued that the statement was 
"unsolicited and inadvertary," the detective's background and 
experience and a review of his testimony in this case indicate 
otherwise.31 
The first prong of Troy was met where this inadmissible 
31. The detective exaggerated the gruesomeness of injuries and the 
scene and repeatedly disparaged Appellant's statement to officers, 
despite admonishments from the court, by saying Appellant "claimed" 
certain things. T. 1876-81. Detective Thompson testified, over 
defense counsel's objections, that the victim's throat was cut "from 
ear to ear. Her head was almost decapitated . . . She had a 
ligature mark around the back of her neck, what was left of it." 
T. 1320 (emphasis added). Dr. Sweeney, the medical examiner who 
conducted the autopsy (which Detective Thompson attended), provided 
a starkly contrasting and less graphic description of the victim's 
injuries. He stated that she had two distinct knife wounds in the 
neck, one of which started approximately four inches to the left of 
midline and the other of which extended only one inch to the right. 
T. 1612. He would not characterize the wounds as "cutting from ear 
to ear." T. 1656). Detective Thompson also testified that the body 
had a heavy amount of blood underneath it and that he found "a large 
amount of [the victim's] hair in a nearby tree limb." T. 1321. He 
later admitted that there was only a small amount of blood 
splattered under the body and that just a few strands of hair may 
have been on the tree limb. T. 1358, 1359. 
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testimony which the trial judge had ordered suppressed reached the 
jury. 
The second prong of Troy requires a determination as to 
whether the jury was "probably influenced by those remarks." In 
analyzing whether the jurors were probably influenced, this Court 
noted: 
If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their 
weighing conflicting evidence or evidence 
susceptible of differing interpretations, there 
is a greater likelihood that they will be 
improperly influenced through remarks of 
counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may 
be searching for guidance in weighing and 
interpreting the evidence. They may be 
especially susceptible to influencer and a small 
degree of influence may be sufficient to affect 
the verdict. 
Id. at 486. See also State v. Bartlett. 631 P.2d 321, 325 (N.M. 
App. 1981). 
The nature of the testimony in that it dealt with 
Mr. Menzies' criminal history and was therefore presumptively 
prejudicial along with the confusing and circumstantial nature of 
the evidence in this case establish that the jurors were probably 
influenced. Although no witness could directly link Mr. Menzies to 
Ms. Hunsaker, the fact that he was a parolee almost certainly 
influenced the jury in its decision that the circumstantial evidence 
was enough to convict him of first degree murder. 
C. THE INTRODUCTION OF THE TESTIMONY AND LACK OF 
CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT 
TO A FAIR TRIAL AND IMPARTIAL JURY. 
The sixth amendment to the United States constitution as 
applied to the states by the fourteenth amendment guarantees the 
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accused an impartial jury. 
The Utah constitution evidences even stronger intent to 
afford a person accused of a capital crime a fair jury. This Court 
has held that a trial by a jury exposed to evidence potentially more 
persuasive than reliable without a cautionary instruction may 
violate an accused's due process rights under Article I, § 7 of the 
Utah constitution. Long, 721 P.2d at 492. The clear words in 
history of Article I, § 10 evidenced the framers' conviction that a 
man facing capital charges deserves nothing less than a unanimous 
twelve-person jury to decide his fate. See amendment. Article I, 
§ 7 of the Utah constitution, when coupled with Article I, § 9, 
should afford the greatest possible guarantees of a fair trial to an 
accused facing the most severe punishment of death. 
The trial court's decision not to issue a jury instruction 
warning the jury not to consider the evidence violated Mr. Menzies' 
right to a fair trial. See generally Long, 721 P.2d at 487-92. 
POINT VIII. OCCURRENCES DURING THE COURSE OF THE 
TRIAL TAINTED THE JURY, DEPRIVING APPELLANT OF A 
FAIR TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY. 
A number of irregular and prejudicial incidents occurred 
during the course of the trial which tainted the jurors and 
precluded them from being fair and impartial. On February 25, 1988, 
juror number 12, Lillian Eaton, fainted in front of the other 
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jurors32 during the testimony of the medical examiner. T. 1621-2, 
R. 814-5. 
At about the same time, Tauni Lee, the court reporter, 
became distraught. T. 1633-4. Although Ms. Lee later claimed that 
she started crying in her office, her obvious cessation in 
transcription coupled with the awareness of both lawyers that she 
had been crying would suggest that the jury may also have witnessed 
the court reporter's emotional reaction to the testimony. 
T. 1633-4, 1621-2. 
On March 4, 1988, Juror Nathan Adams sent a note to the 
trial judge which stated, 
Last night an anonymous caller telephoned me 
about Ralph Menzies' criminal record. 
T. 2367.33 The trial judge denied Appellant's motion for mistrial, 
then took a significant amount of time before reaching his ultimate 
decision to sequester the jury. T. 2369, 2387, 2392, 2394-5. 
During the lengthy recess, Juror Helene Gass suffered an 
32. Because of omissions in the transcript, it is impossible to 
ascertain precisely what occurred or to fully explore the impact of 
the incident or its immediate aftermath on the jurors. This Court 
acknowledged in its opinion, State v. Menzies. 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 
13, that portions of the proceedings were not transcribed at this 
point. Although the participants remember the bailiff running 
across the room and possibly saying something, the transcript 
reflects only that the judge took a recess. T. 1622. Nothing 
further regarding this incident is on the record until much later 
when other events involving the jurors occur. However, a 
nonsequitur appears two pages after this extraordinary incident when 
the judge says, "Rick may be much more subtle or sophisicated." 
T. 1624. 
33. The caller had indicated that Appellant had killed and robbed a 
taxicab driver. This information was incorrect; Mr. Menzies has no 
other homicides. 
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emotional breakdown in front of the jury* T. 2398. Both parties 
and the judge acknowledged that Juror Gass was extremely upset 
(T. 2395, 2398), with the prosecutor pointing out that if Ms. Gass 
continued to serve, she might taint the other jurors. T. 2398. 
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the 
cumulative effect in tainting the jury caused by excusing 
Juror Adams followed immediately by the breakdown of Juror Gass. 
T. 2398-9. Although the trial judge denied the motion, he 
acknowledged, "[b]ut I am real concerned with the effect on the 
other jurors." T. 2399. 
The trial court excused Juror Gass. T. 2402. The trial 
judge again expressed concern about the effect of Juror Gass7 
breakdown on the rest of the jury. T. 2403.34 
After further discussion, the trial judge summoned the jury 
to the courtroom and informed them: 
But I think you are aware of some problems we 
have had. We have decided at this time that we 
are going to have you take an early lunch, and 
you'll be escorted by jailers, and we are going 
to designate a place for you to eat . . . ." 
T. 2408. 
Following the lunch break, the trial judge denied defense 
counsel's motion for mistrial based on the cumulative effect of 
events and that the jury could no longer be fair. T. 2409-10.35 
34. The transcription of the trial judge's statement at 2403 
represents an example of possible transcription error. 
35. Defense counsel pointed out various events, including 
Detective. Thompson's "parole testimony," the unexplained removal of 
(continued) 
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The trial judge then individually voir dired each of the 
remaining jurors. T. 2428-73. Defense counsel renewed her motion 
for mistrial, which was denied. T. 2473, 2475. 
The right to a fair trial by an impartial jury is 
guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States and Article I, §§ 7, 10 and 12 of 
the Constitution of Utah. See Pike, 712 P.2d 277. In Pike, this 
Court noted that it has "long taken a strict approach in assuring 
that the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial not be compromised 
by improper contacts between jurors and witnesses, attorneys, or 
court personnel." Id. at 279. This Court noted that a jury may be 
prejudiced by improper contact "even though [prejudice] is not 
provable and even though a person who has been tainted may not, 
himself, be able to recognize that fact." Id. at 280. In 
recognition of this, the Pike Court established a rebuttable 
presumption of prejudice whenever improper juror contact occurs. 
The stringent approach to preserving the right to an 
impartial jury taken in Pike is equally applicable in the 
circumstances of this capital homicide case. In addition to the 
state constitutional language which gave rise to the Pike rule, the 
provision of Article I, § 10 of the Utah constitution which requires 
that a jury trial remain inviolate in a capital case requires that a 
(footnote 35 continued) 
Juror Adams, the breakdown of Juror Gass followed immediately by 
sequestration, an abrupt change in lunch location, and increased 
security. T. 2411. 
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stringent approach be taken in assessing claims that the right to an 
impartial jury was violated in a death penalty case. 
In Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d 45 (Miss. 1985), a capital 
homicide case, the victim's daughter sat throughout trial inside the 
rail behind the prosecutor's table. The court concluded that her 
presence constituted "an inflammatory and prejudicial element" and 
pointed out 
There can be no graver proceeding than when a 
human being is put on trial for his or her life. 
The right to a fair trial includes the right to a 
verdict based on the evidence and not extraneous 
prejudicial happenings in and around the 
courtroom. 
Id. at 53. See also Collum v. State, 107 So. 35 (Ala. App. 1926) 
(reversal where mistrial not granted after victim witness fainted in 
front of jury and victim's mother removed her from courtroom crying 
and muttering). 
As the court noted in State v. Reynolds, 466 P.2d 405# 408 
(Ariz. App. 1970), 
. . . both the State and the defendant are 
entitled to a fair and impartial jury. When 
events occur that cast an irrevocable cloud over 
the jury's fairness and impartiality, it is 
better to grant the motion for mistrial and start 
over again. 
In Canton Oil v. District Court, 731 P.2d 687, 696 (Colo. 
1987), the court quoted its earlier decision in Butters v. DeWann, 
363 P.2d 494 (Colo. 1961), outlining the appropriate standard in 
Colorado for determining whether juror misconduct or irregular 
influences require a new trial: 
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It is well settled that the test for determining 
whether a new trial will be granted because of 
the misconduct of jurors or the intrusion of 
irregular influences is whether such matters 
could have a tendency to influence the jury in 
arriving at its verdict in a manner inconsistent 
with the legal proofs and the court's charge. If 
the irregular matter has that tendency on the 
face of it, a new trial should be granted without 
further inquiry as to its actual effect. The 
test if not whether the irregular matter actually 
influenced the result, but whether it had the 
capacity of doing so. [citations omitted]. 
In the present case, the sequence of events affecting the 
jury resulted in a jury guided by emotions and fear. Witnessing two 
jurors break down—either by fainting or by becoming agitated and 
weeping—raised passion for the victim and her family, thereby 
prejudicing Mr. Menzies. The added element of fear caused by the 
removal of Juror Adams followed by information that the juror had 
been contacted and problems involving the trial had occurred, 
heightened jury security, sequestration, and clearing the courtroom 
of spectators further prejudiced Mr. Menzies since, in all 
likelihood, the jurors attributed these measures to something 
Mr. Menzies had done. 
The passion and emotions felt for Ms. Hunsaker, coupled 
with the fear, irrevocably tainted this jury, thereby violating 
Mr. Menzies7 right to an impartial jury. The failure of the trial 
court to grant Mr. Menzies7 motion for a mistrial violated his 
rights to due process and a fair trial. 
POINT IX. THE ERRONEOUS REASONABLE DOUBT 
INSTRUCTION REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
The definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt contained 
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in Instruction No. 12 in this case is substantially similar to the 
reasonable doubt instruction which a majority of this Court 
determined was erroneous in State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 
(Utah 1989) (Justice Stewart concurring in resultf joined by 
Justices Durham and Zimmerman); see also State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 
1375 (Utah 1989). 
The reasonable doubt instruction, a copy of which is 
contained in Addendum J, has two aspects which a majority of this 
Court has concluded are improper. Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1147. 
First, the instruction indicates that a reasonable doubt must be 
real and substantial, and not a mere "possibility." Second, it 
instructs the jury that "if after such impartial consideration and 
comparison of all the evidence vou can truthfully say that vou have 
an abiding conviction of the defendants guilt such as you will be 
willing to act upon in the more weighty and important matters 
relating to vour own affairs, vou have no reasonable doubt" 
(emphasis added). R. 857. 
It is inappropriate to instruct that a reasonable doubt is 
not merely a possibility. 
An instruction that a reasonable doubt must 
be a "real, substantial doubt, and not one that 
is merely possible or imaginary" has been held to 
be erroneous because, in practical effect, it 
tends to diminish the prosecution's burden of 
proof by implying that the prosecution need not 
obviate a real or substantial doubt. See, e.g., 
Dunn v. Perrin, [570 F.2d 21 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 437 U.S. 910, 98 S.Ct. 3102, 57 L.Ed.2d 
1141 (1978)]; United States v. Flannerv, 451 F.2d 
880, 882-3 (1st Cir. 1971). 
Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1149. 
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Furthermore, defining reasonable doubt in terms of the 
weighty affairs in one's life "tends to diminish and trivialize the 
constitutionally required burden-of-proof standard." Id. at 1148. 
In Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. , 111 S.Ct. , 112 
L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that an 
erroneous reasonable doubt instruction which defined the concept as 
requiring grave or substantial uncertainty as to guilt, and not just 
a "mere possibility," but an "actual substantial doubt" and a "moral 
certainty" violated due process. 
The Court determined that a "reasonable juror" reading the 
instruction as a whole could have interpreted it "to allow a finding 
of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due 
Process Clause," and reversed the case. Cage, 112 L.Ed.2d at 342. 
In the present case, the erroneous reasonable doubt 
instruction allowed the jury to convict "based on a degree of proof 
below that required by the Due Process Clause." Accordingly, this 
Court should reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new 
trial. 
POINT X. THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM 
MENZIES' HOME VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND 
ARTICLE I. SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
At the request of Detective Couch, Nicole Arnold and Troy 
Denter went from the jail, where they had picked up some of Menzie's 
property, to the ninth floor jail administration offices. 
R. 1163:11. Couch told Nicole that Menzies was the prime suspect in 
a murder. R. 1163:12, 16-7. 
Nicole was legally blind and educationally handicapped. 
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R. 1163:13, 59. At the detective's request, Nicole signed an 
unwitnessed consent form. R. 1163:18, 185. 
Nicole, Troy, Couch and Detective Beckstead then went to 
Menzies' residence. R. 1163:19. Couch testified that on the way to 
the apartment, the officers decided that they needed a search 
warrant or Menzies' consent since the apartment was in Menzies' name 
and he apparently paid the bills. R. 1163:21. Despite this 
determination that Nicole's consent "was no good," the officers 
entered the house without obtaining Menzies' consent or a search 
warrant. R. 1163:21, 68, 69. 
When they arrived at the apartment, Troy took Beckstead to 
Menzies' carport, which was located at the rear of the Menzies 
duplex in the parking area. R. 1163:63-5. Troy pointed to a box of 
trash which was near the carport. R. 1163:40, 65. The detective 
took the box inside the Menzies residence and Couch began looking 
through it. R. 1163:67. 
After Couch found a handcuff box, Nicole's mother, Janet 
Franks, took Beckstead to a back bedroom and showed him a two-tone 
parka and a pair of handcuffs. R. 1163:23, 49, 50, 60, 69-70, 72, 
75. After the officers mentioned a knife, Janet Franks also showed 
the detectives Menzies' knife. R. 1163:23, 25, 72, 76. 
The search started sometime after 6:00 p.m. R. 1163:43. 
At 6:30 p.m., Detective Thompson interrogated Menzies, who was being 
held in the Salt Lake County Jail. R. 1157:1875, 1163:78. During 
the interrogation, Menzies was asked to consent to a search of his 
home. R. 1163:79. At 7:15 p.m., Menzies signed a consent form 
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(R. 487); however, he wrote "forced to sign under duress" next to 
his signature and crossed out the authorization to take evidence 
seized during the search. R. 487, 1163:80. 
At 7:30 p.m., after Menzies spoke with Nicole and had 
indicated that he would consent to a search only if the officers 
promised that Nicole and her mother would leave during the search, 
Menzies signed a new consent form. R. 1163:82, 489. 
In the meantime, Couch left the house to get a warrant, 
while Beckstead and another officer remained at the house. 
R. 1163:70. A little later, Nicole and Janet Franks left, leaving 
the officers alone in the house. R. 1163:71. The second consent 
was delivered much later, sometime after the warrant was obtained. 
R. 1163:83. 
At around 10:30 p.m., Couch obtained a search warrant. 
R. 1163:9, 43. In the affidavit supporting the request for a search 
warrant, the officers failed to inform the magistrate that officers 
were already inside the home, and that the coat and handcuffs 
specified in the list of items sought had already been seen by 
police officers inside the house. R. 1163:32-4, 56. 
On October 24, 1986, Menzies filed a motion to suppress the 
items seized from his home and accompanying memorandum. R. 335-59. 
Following argument36 and the filing of supplemental memoranda, the 
trial judge denied the motion. Menzies made a continuing objection 
36. The Third District Court file does not contain a minute entry 
for the hearing held on November 21, 1986, in which the motion was 
argued. 
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to the admission of evidence seized from the home. R. 787-8.37 
A. CONSENT FROM NICOLE DID NOT VALIDATE THE 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH. 
"[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against 
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed," and 
warrantless searches are "per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment" unless they fall within a few specifically established 
and well-delineated exceptions." See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 
740, 748, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984); Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 929 (1967).38 
Consent is a valid exception to the warrant requirement. See 
State v. Griffin. 626 P.2d 478, 482 (Utah 1981); Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 
(1973). 
Where the State relies on consent to validate a warrantless 
search, it has the burden of proving that a person with power to do 
so voluntarily consented to the search. State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 
880 (Utah App. 1990). Consent must "not be coerced, by explicit or 
37. Items seized from the home include, among other things, the 
sheath knife (T. 1681, 1747), handcuffs (T. 1680, 1747), parka 
(T. 1743), "ten-code" (T. 1744-5), handcuff box (T. 1734), gym shoes 
(T. 1745), and purse (T. 989-90, 1744). 
38. Although private parties helped the officers conduct the 
initial search, the protections of the Fourth Amendment still 
apply. See State v. Watts. 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988) (search 
which is joint endeavor by private citizen and police officer is 
protected by the fourth amendment); State v. Abdouch. 434 N.W.2d 
317, 325 (Neb. 1989). 
Mr. Denter helped and encouraged Janet Franks to rummage 
through Menzies' things. These actions by police were "advancement 
or inducement of the search" sufficient "to make out a joint 
endeavor." State v. Sardison. 437 N.W.2d 473, 483 (Neb. 1989). 
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implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.ff Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 228. 
The State had the burden of proving that the area searched 
was jointly controlled and that Nicole Arnold was a "joint occupant" 
with equal access over the premises, and that she voluntarily 
consented to the search. May v. State, 780 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1989). 
"Common authority" over the premises is based "on mutual 
use of the property by persons generally having joint access or 
control for most purposes." United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 
94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). 
In addition, the State had the burden of proving that 
Menzies was unavailable. See Silva v. State, 344 So.2d 559, 562-3 
(Fla. 1977). 
Though a joint occupant should have authority to 
consent to a search of jointly held premises if 
the other party is unavailable, a present, 
objecting party should not have his 
constitutional rights ignored because of a 
leasehold or other property interest shared by 
another. This is particularly true where the 
police are aware that the person objecting is the 
one whose constitutional rights are at stake. 
Menzies was not unavailable; he was in jail and was 
available to the detectives, who could have initially asked for his 
consent. See Smith v. State. 465 So.2d 603, 604 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1985), citing Silva, 344 So.2d at 562-3. The fact that 
detectives sought consent from Menzies after they had begun the 
search demonstrates that he was available. 
Furthermore, "where consent is refused by the party against 
whom the search is directed, any subsequent consent by the other 
- 89 -
joint occupant is invalid. [citation omitted].11 Smith v. State. 
465 So.2d at 604. 
In the present case, the officers acknowledged that they 
believed Nicole's "consent" "was no good." R. 1163:68-9. In 
addition, Menzies was available and initially refused consent, as 
evidenced by his comments on the first consent form. Menzies' 
subsequent consent, given an hour or two after Nicole's consent, 
regardless of whether valid, does not validate the earlier search. 
See People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 201 (Colo. 1984) ("subsequent 
execution of a written consent . . . [does not] serve to validate 
the seizure preced[ing] the written consent"). 
Menzies was the focus of the investigation and in police 
custody. His valid consent, not that of Nicole, was necessary to 
search through his possessions in the duplex. Furthermore, Nicole 
was undereducated and legally blind; the State made no showing that 
she voluntarily consented under such circumstances. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Nicole validly consented to a 
search of the duplex, the search of the carport area exceeded the 
scope of her consent, and the handcuff box seized from a box of 
"trash" must therefore be suppressed. See generally Thiret, 685 
P.2d at 201. A consent to look around the house is not permission 
to go through a box placed near the carport. See State v. Pinder. 
489 A.2d 653, 656 (N.M. 1985). 
Although the United States Supreme Court has held that 
there is no fourth amendment protection against warrantless searches 
and seizures of garbage left at curbside for collection (see 
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California v. Greenwood. 486 U.S. 35, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1002 Ed.2d 30 
(1988)), the garbage in this case had not been placed at curbside 
for collection; instead, it was boxed and placed next to a carport 
in a private parking area. 
Furthermore, the greater protection provided by Article I, 
§ 14 of the Utah constitution (see State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 
(Utah 1990)) requires that this Court recognize an expectation of 
privacy in boxed garbage kept on private property. See State v. 
Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274 (Ha. 1985) (expectation of privacy in one's 
trash under Hawaiian constitution). The handcuff box and any other 
items taken from the boxed trash were seized in violation of 
Article I, § 14 and the fourth amendment. 
B. THE PREVIOUS SEARCH CANNOT BE VALIDATED BY 
CONSENT OF MR. MENZIES. 
Any subsequent "consent" by Menzies cannot validate the 
earlier search. 
An allegedly consensual seizure must stand or 
fall on the basis of the consent pre-existing the 
seizure. 
Thiret, 685 P.2d at 201. 
Furthermore, the State did not establish that under the 
totality of circumstances, Menzies voluntarily consented to a search 
of his home. See Marshall, 791 P.2d at 887; Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 228 (consent must "not be coerced by . . . 
implied threat or covert force."). Officers were already in the 
home, and Menzies was concerned for Nicole. He signed the first 
form, then wrote on it that he had signed under duress and wanted to 
limit the search. Menzies signed the second form only after 
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indicating that he did so only if certain conditions were met, 
R. 1163:82. Menzies' signing of the second form under such 
circumstances was not a voluntary consent to search. 
C. THE SEARCH WARRANT DID NOT VALIDATE THE 
SEARCH. 
1. The Affidavit Did Not Establish Probable 
Cause. 
"The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a 
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a 'fair 
probability7 that the evidence sought actually exists and can be 
found where the informant states." Illinois v Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); State v. Dronebura, 781 
P.2d 1303, 1303 (Utah App. 1989). 
In the present case, the magistrate issued the warrant 
based on the fact that the place to be searched was the home of a 
murder suspect. See Affidavit contained in Addendum K. The 
affidavit did not offer any basis for believing items would be found 
in the home and was based on a "hunch" that items implicating 
Appellant would be found, rather than probable cause. A review of 
case law suggests that the fact that the place to be searched is the 
home of a murder suspect is not enough in the absence of other 
factors suggesting evidence will be found to establish probable 
cause. See State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1984) (suggesting 
search warrant appropriately issued only when a reliable observation 
of the items in a particular place has been made or other evidence 
indicates items probably will be found); State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 
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715 (Utah 1983) (approving search warrant setting forth "sufficient 
personal observations"); State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 
1983) (approving warrant issued where reliable informant stated he 
was positive of location of drug paraphernalia). 
"Suspicion and mere personal belief that evidence of a 
crime will be found on the premises to be searched" is insufficient 
to establish probable cause. State v. Rancritsch, 700 P.2d 382, 388 
(Wash. App. 1985); accord State v. Anderson, 678 P.2d 1310 (Wash. 
App. 1984) (mere suspicion, belief and guess that evidence of a 
burglary was in defendants home not enough to justify issuing a 
search warrant). 
The affidavit did not establish probable cause to search 
Menzies' home. The affidavit does not suggest that Maureen Hunsaker 
was ever in the Menzies residence or that anyone had seen Menzies at 
his home on February 24, 1986. Detective Couch testified that when 
he first went to the apartment, he had no reason to believe 
Ms. Hunsaker's possessions were in the house. R. 1163:27. The 
police offered no information in the affidavit as to the basis for 
their belief that the items would be found in the home. 
The lack of probable cause requires that the items seized 
be suppressed. 
2. Material Omissions and Misstatements 
Invalidated the Warrant. 
A warrant is fatally jeopardized where the affidavit 
supporting issuance contains a material misrepresentation or 
omission. State v. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), cert, deniedf 
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107 S.Ct. 1565; Franks v. Delaware. 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 
L.Ed.2d 667 (1978); People v. Kurland. 618 P.2d 213, 217-18 (Cal. 
1980); People v. Cook. 583 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1978). 
In Nielsen, the officer swore in the affidavit that a 
confidential informant (C.I.) had given him certain information. 
After the preliminary hearing, the State revealed that the affiant 
did not know or have contact with the C.I. and had received the 
information from another officer who had worked with the C.I. 
Although material misrepresentation occurred in the affidavit, this 
Court upheld the search warrant because the falsehood "was not 
material to the magistrate's finding of probable cause." Nielsen. 
727 P.2d at 191. This Court cautioned, however, that: 
A law enforcement officer must be aware not only 
of the need for accuracy in the information 
provided to the magistrate in support of an 
application for a search warrant, but also of the 
absolute truthfulness of any statements made 
under oath. 
Id. 
The affidavit in the present case fails to state that the 
officers had already entered and gone through the duplex, sorted 
through the trash, and observed the handcuffs and other items. 
R. 1163:32. Nor did the officers inform the magistrate that they 
had attempted to obtain consent from Nicole. R. 1163:33. It also 
misrepresents that Larabee and Brown had positively identified the 
car when they had actually only noted that it was similar 
(R. 1163:30), had earlier described two types of vehicles which were 
different from the make of Denter's car, and based the selection on 
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the fact that the car was dirty and beatup. R. 1163:31. 
The need for accuracy and the information known to the 
officers demonstrates that the omissions/misrepresentations were 
made intentionally, or at the very least, with a reckless disregard 
for the truth. Without the observation of the handcuffs or the 
positive identification of the car, the affidavit failed to 
establish probable cause. 
Furthermore, Article I, § 14 of the Utah constitution 
requires that where a material omission or misrepresentation is 
intentionally or recklessly included in or omitted from the 
affidavit, the search warrant is invalidated regardless of whether 
probable cause exists given the remaining information. See United 
States v. Hunt. 496 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1974); State v. Malkin. 722 
P.2d 943 (Alaska 1986); Moreau v. State, 588 P.2d 275 (Alaska 1978); 
State v. Caldwell. 384 So.2d 431 (La. 1980); People v. Cook, 583 
P.2d at 140-1. In some contexts, Article I, § 14 of the Utah 
constitution provides greater protection against searches and 
seizures than does the fourth amendment. See Larocco, 794 P.2d at 
465-70; State v. Sims. 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991). The 
historical perspective in which Article I, § 14 was adopted 
indicates that the drafters would have greatly valued a lack of 
interference in their homes from federal or other officials. See Id. 
The rationale for invalidating the warrant is that where 
the officer misrepresents or omits material information, a question 
as to the overall reliability and veracity of the information is 
raised. Article I, § 14 and the fourth amendment require that the 
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warrant be invalidated. 
3. The Prior Confirmatory Search Invalidates the 
Warrant. 
The initial search of the duplex violated the fourth 
amendment and turned up information which was included in the 
affidavit in an attempt to establish probable cause. The "fruit of 
the poisonous tree" doctrine precludes use of this information to 
establish probable cause. See Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 
471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); United States v. Paroutian, 
299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1986); People v. Cook. 583 P.2d at 148-9. 
If the officers were permitted to do an initial search and 
use the evidence to establish probable cause, an officer could 
achieve "certain cause by conducting an unlawful 
confirmatory search, thus saving himself the time 
and trouble of obtaining and executing a warrant 
if he does not find the evidence . . . [T]his 
prospect thus gives him strong incentive to 
proceed with the warrantless entry . . . The 
second "search" is therefore constitutionally 
unreasonable because it significantly contributes 
to increasing the risk of such invasions of 
privacy. 
Id. 
D. THE ADMISSION OF THE ILLEGALLY SEIZED 
EVIDENCE WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT. 
In order to find a constitutional error harmless, the State 
must establish that such error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 
L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); State v. Hackford. 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 
1987); State v. Parmar, 437 N.W.2d 503, 511 (Neb. 1989). 
The knife, parka, handcuffs, and handcuff box were 
discovered during the initial search. The State used the parka to 
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bolster Tim Larabee's weak testimony regarding the man he had seen 
at Storm Mountain and to attempt to establish that Menzies was that 
man. In the absence of direct evidence that Menzies was the killer, 
the State used the knife, handcuffs and handcuff box in an attempt 
to link Menzies to the homicide. The tennis shoes, ten-code and 
purse seized pursuant to the warrant were also used in an attempt to 
link Menzies. The admission of this evidence was not harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
POINT XI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING A 
PHOTOGRAPH OF MS. HUNSAKER TAKEN SEVERAL YEARS 
BEFORE THE HOMICIDE. 
Over defense objection (T. 978, 1317), the trial court 
admitted39 and permitted the demonstrative use of an enlarged 8x10 
photograph of a smiling Maureen Hunsaker taken three or four years 
before the homicide. T. 975, 978, 1317; State's Exhibit l.40 
39. Although the trial judge had previously admitted the photograph 
and allowed the prosecutor to publish it to the jury (T. 978), he 
later took the issue under advisement. T. 1073. He subsequently 
allowed the use of the photograph during questioning of a police 
officer, stating, "I believe that the identification has been 
connected to that." 
40. The prosecutor in the present case argued that in State v. 
Bishop. 753 P.2d at 475, this Court upheld the admission of 
photographs of the five victims which were taken before the 
homicides because it held that "those photographs had no prejudicial 
effect whatsoever to the defendant, that there was nothing improper 
about the trial for allowing the photographs in." T. 1071. 
Contrary to the argument of the prosecutor, in Bishop, this Court 
did not deal directly with the issue of whether the photographs 
depicting the victims' appearance before the crime was committed 
were relevant or whether the prejudicial effect of such photographs 
substantially outweighed the probative value. Instead, the Court 
discussed generally whether the defendants stipulation to the 
identity of the victims could be used to preclude the admission of 
certain evidence, including the pre-homicide photographs. Id. at 
475. 
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Evidence must be relevant in order to be admissible, and, 
even if relevant, evidence is not admissible if the probative value 
of such evidence "is substantially outweighed by" is prejudicial 
effect. Rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
In Lafferty. 749 P.2d at 1257-8, the defendant challenged 
the admission of a family photograph of the two victims. This Court 
did not directly address the issue of whether admission of the 
photograph was error, but noted that 
several courts have recognized that the probative 
value of a photograph showing a homicide victim7s 
appearance before the crime was committed is 
often weak. See, e.g., Ritchie v. State, 632 
P.2d 1244, 1246 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981); 
People v. Ramos. 30 Cal. 3d 553, 577-78, 639 P.2d 
908, 921-22, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266, 279-80 (1982), 
rev'd on other grounds. 463 U.S. 992, 103 S.Ct. 
3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983). 
In Ritchie v. State. 632 P.2d at 1246, and People v. Ramos. 
639 P.2d 908, both of which were cited by this Court in Lafferty, 
the courts held that the trial court erred in admitting a photograph 
of the deceased while alive. The Ritchie Court stated: 
The probative value of the enlarged photo is 
questionable and could be highly prejudicial. In 
a close case, on appeal, such a photograph may 
well tip the scales in appellant's favor. 
Ritchie. 632 P.2d at 1246. See also Smith v. State. 650 P.2d 904, 
909-10 (Okla. Cr. 1982) (discussing prejudicial nature of 3 x 5-inch 
photograph of victim while alive and acknowledging that such a 
photograph may inflame passions of jurors and require a new trial in 
a close case). 
In the present case, although Appellant had stipulated to 
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the identification of Maureen Hunsaker as the person whose body was 
found at Storm Mountain (T. 1071), the State introduced the 
photograph for the sole purpose of establishing identification. 
T. 1070. The State had no need for this evidence, and the enlarged 
smiling and pretty depiction of Ms. Hunsaker was certain to inflame 
the passions of the jury. 
Because this was a circumstantial case, erroneous admission 
of this photograph may well have "tipped the scales," requiring a 
new trial. 
POINT XII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTED 
SEVERAL ITEMS OF "REAL" EVIDENCE. 
What is called "real evidence"—mostly bullets, 
bad florins, and old boots—is of much value for 
securing attention. This is true even when these 
exhibits prove nothing,—as is generally the 
case. They look so solid and important that they 
give stability to the rest of the story. The 
mind in doubt ever turns to tangible objects. 
They who first carved for themselves a Jupiter 
from a log of wood knew very well that the idol 
could do nothing for them; but it enabled them 
easily to realize a power who could. A rusty 
knife is now to an English juryman just what a 
"scareabaeus" was to an Egyptian of old. I have 
seen a crooked nail and a broken charity-box 
treated with all the reverence due to relics of 
the holiest martyrs [footnote omitted]. 
Dean v. Hocker. 409 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1969), citing Wigmore on 
Evidence, § 1157, at 253 (3d ed. 1942). As the Dean v. Hocker court 
noted, "there still lurks in the cupboard of judicial thought the 
idea that physical objects do have an impact on jurors and that the 
judge, as a preliminary matter, should avoid the impact where the 
real evidence has little or no relevance." Id. 
Rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) preclude 
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the admission of irrelevant evidence, or relevant evidence where the 
probative value evidence is substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect. See generally Maurer, 770 P.2d 981. 
In the present case, the State introduced numerous items in 
violation of Rules 402, 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.41 
A. TROY DENTER'S GUN 
Over Appellant's objection (T. 1412-3), the trial judge 
admitted Troy Denter's gun as State's Exhibit 35. T. 1416, 1417. 
Mr. Denter testified that he kept the gun and shells in his car and 
that Appellant had asked him to purchase it. T. 1411-2, 1417. 
There is no evidence that a gun was used in this case. The 
exhibit was irrelevant and highly prejudicial. Its admission 
violated Rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983). 
B. THE THREE KNIVES 
The State introduced and the trial judge admitted three 
knives as State's Exhibits 43, 44 and 45. R. 787. State's 
Exhibit 45 was a pocketknife which Troy Denter had seen Appellant 
wearing about a week before the homicide; Denter could not recall 
whether Menzies wore the knife when he borrowed the car. T. 1408. 
Dr. Sweeney testified that the knife was "consistent" with the 
wounds. T. 1635. Martha Kerr tested this knife and did not find 
blood on it. T. 1978. 
Exhibit 43 was Troy Denter's deer hunting knife. T. 1410, 
41. Some of these items were seized in violation of the fourth 
amendment. See discussion supra at 85-97. 
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1680. Although Dr. Sweeney testified that the knife was consistent 
with the wounds, Martha Kerr tested it and did not find blood, hair 
or fibers. T. 1638, 1978-9. 
Exhibit 44 was a third knife. T. 2002. Dr. Sweeney did 
not testify that this knife was consistent with the wounds, and 
although Martha Kerr found human blood on this knife, it was not the 
blood of Appellant or Ms. Hunsaker. T. 1997. 
These three knives were irrelevant evidence and their 
admission was prejudicial. Exhibit 44, which was not connected in 
any way to the homicide, contained human blood which may well have 
gotten on the knife when someone cut his or her finger using it. 
Nevertheless, the knife created the prejudicial inference that the 
knife had been used on someone else. Although the other two knives 
were consistent with the wounds, so are all other knives of similar 
size. Allowing this testimony of consistency without otherwise 
linking the knives to the homicide was highly prejudicial. Showing 
that Menzies had access to knives is meaningless but nevertheless 
implies that he is violent or dangerous where the evidence is not 
otherwise connected to this case. 
The trial judge erred in admitting this evidence. See 
Rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983). 
C. TENNIS SHOES 
A further example of the State's bombardment of the jury 
with irrelevant evidence was the introduction of State's Exhibit 75, 
the tennis shoes seized from the Menzies apartment. R. 788, 
T. 1745; see Rules 401, 402, 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. The 
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officers found the shoes in the same area as the purse and Nicole's 
purple coat, which the State also attempted to introduce despite its 
complete lack of relevance. T. 1745, 1747. This evidence served no 
evidentiary purpose. 
D. TEN-CODE 
A ten-code is a card that identifies the short numerical 
code that stands for various messages; some of the messages are used 
in police work. See T. 1744. Officers seized a ten-code from the 
Menzies apartment, and the State introduced it at trial over 
Defendant's objections. T. 2129. 
Although the ten-code had no probative value, the jury may 
well have concluded that other than police officers, the only people 
who possess such items are criminals. 
E. JOGGING JACKET 
The State introduced Ms. Hunsaker's blood-covered and cut 
jogging jacket. T. 990-1, R. 787, Exhibit 53. 
The jacket was of no probative value; yet, the large 
amounts of dried blood against a light blue background had a highly 
inflammatory and prejudicial effect. Cf. State v. Johnson. 784 P.2d 
1135 (Utah 1989) (admission of blood-covered shirt harmless because 
shirt and blood similar in color). 
The only conceivable purpose for introduction of the jacket 
was to show the jury the obvious blood on it. The prosecutor 
emphasized this in questioning Jim Hunsaker. T. 990. Introduction 
of this piece of evidence violated Rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1983). See, e.g., Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1257. 
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F. MENZIES' JACKET 
Both Tim Larabee and Beth Brown initially described the ski 
parka worn or carried by the man at Storm Mountain as different from 
the appearance of Appellant's jacket. T. 2260, 1204. Each was 
later shown only the jacket found at Appellant's apartment. 
T. 2260, 1264, 1273. Both said the jacket was "similar" to the one 
they had seen despite their earlier inconsistent descriptions. 
T. 1204, 2260. 
Where procedures utilized by officers in obtaining an 
identification of a criminal defendant by a witness are so 
suggestive that they make the identification unreliable, a 
defendant's due process rights under the federal and state 
constitutions may be violated by the use of such an identification 
at trial. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); 
State v. Perrv. 492 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1972); Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
777-785. The concern in suggestive eyewitness identification cases 
is that the procedure utilized might be "so unnecessarily suggestive 
and so conducive to mistaken identification as to result in a denial 
of due process." State v. Marsh. 652 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Utah 1982) 
(citing Foster v. California. 394 U.S. 440 (1969), and Stovall v. 
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)); State v. Thamer. 777 P.2d 432 (Utah 
1989) (suggesting that showing a single photograph may result in an 
unduly suggestive procedure). 
Although identification of a jacket is distinguishable from 
identification of a person, the procedures utilized for identifying 
an important piece of evidence which links the defendant to the 
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victim should be subject to the same concerns regarding reliability 
and the same protections against admitting highly inflammatory and 
prejudicial evidence which is unreliable. 
In the present case, the State argued the jacket was "the 
jacket everybody identified as [Menzies'l jacket" (T. 2688) and used 
the jacket and the identification of it by Larabee and Brown to link 
Menzies to the crime. In reality, the jacket had minimal or no 
probative value since it was merely "similar" to the one seen at 
Storm Mountain. Furthermore, the witnesses acknowledged the 
"similarity" only after a highly suggestive and unreliable procedure 
was used. 
The trial court should not have admitted the parka or the 
students' identification of it. 
G. TROY DENTER'S CAR 
The procedures utilized by the officers to obtain an 
identification of the vehicle from Tim and Beth were as suggestive 
as the procedures involving the parka and rendered any 
identification unreliable and inadmissible. Officers led Tim to 
believe they had the car he had seen and took him to the circuit 
court parking lot. T. 1270-1, 1294-5. Tim told officers that he 
did not think the car "would be the same car I saw at Storm 
Mountain." T. 1271. However, no other large, light colored, older 
model vehicles were in the parking lot.42 
The car was a different color than Larabee originally 
42. Although Beth Brown thought she would recognize the car if she 
saw it again, she was unable to select Troy's car. T. 2256. 
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described to police (T. 1263, 1271), and, when shown a book of 
photographs of "all types of vehicles," Larabee selected a cream 
colored 1968 Buick Riviera (T. 1706), not a white 1974 Chevrolet 
Impala similar to the car owned by Troy Denter. He did not think 
that it was the same car he had seen at Storm Mountain and 
apparently based his selection on the condition of the vehicle—that 
it was beatup and dirty. T. 1271. 
Because of the suggestive procedure utilized in showing the 
Denter vehicle to Larabee and his inability to positively identify 
it, the trial court erred in admitting Exhibits 3, 4, 5, and 6 as 
photographs of the vehicle at Storm Mountain. 
H. HANDCUFFS, HANDCUFF BOX AND NICKED TREE THEORY 
The State admitted a pair of handcuffs found in Menzies' 
apartment over Defendant's objection (T. 1680-81).43 
Over Appellant's objection, the State demonstrated the 
ligature marks caused by handcuffs by placing handcuffs on a man 
approximately six foot five inches, 270 pounds for thirty seconds. 
T. 1387-8. Ms. Hunsaker was apparently approximately 130 pounds. 
43. Over defense objection, Detective Thompson testified in 
response to the prosecutor's leading question that the marks on 
Ms. Hunsaker7s wrists were consistent with marks made by handcuffs, 
and that while he was at the autopsy, he conducted experiments with 
wrist ligatures, including handcuffs, to determine what had caused 
the marks on Ms. Hunsaker7s wrists. T. 1323-8, 1385. Detective 
Thompson's report did not initially include handcuffs as items 
tested; "handcuffs" was later written on the typed report. T. 1362, 
1382. Dr. Sweeney could not remember any experiments done with 
wrist ligatures during the autopsy (T. 1668) , and Detective Thompson 
could not remember who was present during the experiments 
(T. 1390-1). Dr. Sweeney also testified that "quite a number of 
things besides handcuffs could have caused the ligature marks. 
T. 1618. 
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T. 1389. Over defense objections, the court also admitted an empty 
handcuff box found near the dumpster for Menzies' apartment. 
T. 1406. 
In addition, without foundation, corroborative evidence or 
any prior notice to Appellant that he had such a theory, 
Detective Beckstead presented his "nicked tree theory" that 
Ms. Hunsaker had been cuffed to the tree prior to her death. 
T. 1752.44 
No blood, hair or fibers were on the handcuffs taken from 
Menzies' apartment. T. 1977. The handcuffs and box had minimal, if 
any, relevance in this case,; nevertheless, the State introduced 
them in a highly prejudicial and inflammatory manner. The trial 
court erred in failing to exclude these items and erred in 
permitting the highly inflammatory in-court demonstration and 
presentation of the "nicked tree theory." Rules 402 and 403, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
POINT XIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
INTO EVIDENCE AN UNSIGNED SOCIAL SECURITY CARD 
BEARING THE NAME OF MAUREEN HUNSAKER. 
Although the police had thoroughly searched Mr. Menzies' 
apartment and several people including the police had access to the 
items in the apartment during the ensuing months, Nicole's new 
husband claimed to have found a Social Security card with Maureen 
44. Neither the nicks in the tree nor the theory were mentioned in 
any of Detective Beckstead's seven or eight reports. T. 1753. He 
claimed there were photographs of the nicks (T. 1754) but they were 
never introduced. The theory was never written in a report nor 
investigated further. T. 1756. 
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Hunsaker's name at least half visible, "right on top" of a 
bassinet. T. 1509, 1510, 1495, 1512, 1517. The card was not signed 
and looked brand new, without any wrinkles, folds or smudges. 
Exhibit 42, T. 1510. Mr. Duffy took the card to Janet Franks, who 
gave it to the police. T. 1510-11, 1483, 2263, 2265.45 
Over defense objection (T. 1499, 2577), the trial judge 
admitted the card. T. 1505, 2578.46 
A. THE SOCIAL SECURITY CARD WAS INADMISSIBLE 
HEARSAY. 
The card was hearsay in that it suggests "I am the card of 
Maureen Hunsaker" and the State introduced it to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted therein. Utah Rules of Evidence 801(c) and 802 
make such hearsay generally inadmissible. See generally Matter of 
Estate of Morrell. 687 P.2d 1319 (Colo. App. 1984). 
The trial court ruled that if the card were hearsay, it was 
admissible under the catchall exception of Rule 803(24). T. 1505. 
In State v. Nelson, 777 P.2d 479, 482 (Utah 1989), this 
Court determined that the hearsay did not fit within the catchall 
exception and pointed out that the provision "was intended for use 
in those rare cases where, although the out-of-court statement does 
45. The card was in police custody for the next eleven months 
before it was reported or given to the County Attorney's Office or 
defense counsel. T. 2265-6. The State did not establish the 
location of the card during the fourteen months prior to trial. See 
T. 2576-7. 
46. Although the card was unsigned and indistinguishable from other 
Social Security cards except that it bore the name and number of 
Maureen Hunsaker, Jim Hunsaker testified that it was his wife's 
card. T. 992. 
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not fit into a recognized exception, its admission is justified by 
the inherent reliability of the statement and the need for its 
admission." Id. at 482. 
In the present case, the card was not inherently reliable 
nor was there a need for its admission. Social Security cards are 
relatively easy to obtain. Any document which purports to establish 
the applicant's identity—including school report cards, marriage 
records, health insurance cards, church membership or confirmation 
records—is sufficient. 
The whereabouts of the card during the several months after 
Mr. Menzies was arrested until December 12, 1986 as well as the 
whereabouts for the fourteen months following December 12, 1986 are 
uncertain and raise question as to the card's reliability. 
In addition, the tenuous nature of the link between 
Mr. Menzies and the card establish that this card was not admissible 
under Utah Rule of Evidence 803(24). 
B. THE CARD WAS IRRELEVANT AND INCOMPETENT 
EVIDENCE. 
To establish that a piece of evidence is relevant, the 
proponent of the evidence must authenticate or identify it to a 
point "sufficient to support a finding that the matter is what the 
proponent claims." Utah Rule of Evidence 901(a) (1953); see also 
Federal Rule of Evidence Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 901. See 
Frias v. Valle, 698 P.2d 875, 877 (Nev. 1985) (thermograms not 
properly authenticated even though patient's name appeared on them); 
Mishler v. McNallev, 730 P.2d 432 (Nev. 1986) (investigative memo 
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from hospital not properly authenticated). 
In the present case, the State failed to authenticate the 
unsigned indistinguishable card as one carried by Ms. Hunsaker. The 
State introduced no evidence establishing that a Social Security 
card had actually been issued to Ms. Hunsaker or the date of 
issuance. The husband's conclusion that she carried the card was 
the only attempt made by the State to authenticate it. The card was 
unreliable unauthenticated evidence that should not have been 
admitted. 
C. THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF THE CARD 
SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED ANY MINIMAL PROBATIVE 
VALUE. 
In the present case, any link between Mr. Menzies and the 
Social Security card was tenuous. The State did not authenticate 
the card, it was found several months after the incident in a highly 
visible spot which had been searched and disturbed several times, 
and it was unaccounted for for fourteen months. 
While the card was of minimal, if any, relevance, the 
prejudicial impact was enormous. The sight of the bereaved husband 
identifying the card as something his wife carried affected the 
jurors7 emotions in an unacceptable manner. The trial court erred 
in admitting this evidence. 
POINT XIV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR WHEN IT ADMITTED HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF 
MAUREEN HUNSAKER. 
On February 23, 1987, at approximately 11:00 p.m, Maureen 
Hunsaker telephoned her home. R. 1155:1022. She spoke with her 
husband and Officer Gamble. Each person testified that she 
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responded affirmatively when asked whether she had been robbed. 
R. 1155:1046, 1047.47 Both the officer and Jim Hunsaker testified 
that she sounded nervous and upset and that "they" would let her go 
sometime that night. R. 1155:986, 1047. 
The trial judge denied Appellant's pretrial motion to 
suppress the statements. R. 360-70; R. 1163:129, 134, 129-45. 
A. HEARSAY STATEMENTS CONCERNING MAUREEN 
HUNSAKER'S STATE OF MIND WERE IMPROPERLY ADMITTED. 
The statements "I am fine" and "I just want to talk with my 
husband," along with the testimony of Jim Hunsaker and 
Officer Gamble that she appeared nervous and upset, were irrelevant 
and inadmissible. Although the State argued that the statements 
were admissible under the state of mind exception of Rule 803(3), 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Maureen Hunsaker's state of mind was not 
relevant to any issue in this case. 
In State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1977), this Court 
outlined "general rules on the admissibility of evidence of 
out-of-court statements made by a homicide victim who reports 
threats of death or serious bodily injury made by the defendant." 
State v. Auble. 754 P.2d 935, 937 (Utah 1988). While such evidence 
is generally inadmissible, it "may be admitted under the 
state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule if it is not used to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted and if certain other criteria 
47. Jim Hunsaker actually testified that in response to his 
question, "Have you been robbed?," Ms. Hunsaker stated, "[t]hey told 
me to tell you they robbed me and got me and that I am fine and they 
are going to let me go some time tonight." R. 1155:986. 
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are met[.]" 13. This Court reiterated the Wauneka criteria in 
Auble: 
(i) The evidence is probative of the decedent's 
state of mind at the time of the killing, and 
(ii) the decedent's state of mind has already 
been placed in issue by defense evidence or 
argument that the killing was (a) a suicide, 
(b) in self-defense, or (c) an accident to which 
the decedent contributed by acting as an 
aggressor. 
Id., citing State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Utah 1977). 
In the present case, Ms. Hunsaker's state of mind is not in 
issue in the case since Appellant did not claim that her death was 
caused by suicide, self-defense or accident.48 
B. HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF MAUREEN HUNSAKER 
CONCERNING PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSIONS WERE 
IMPROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL. 
The State also asserted that the statements suggesting a 
robbery or release could be admitted under the present sense 
exception of Utah Rule of Evidence 803(1). 
In Commonwealth v. Barnes. 456 A.2d 1037, 1039-41 (Pa. 
Super. 1983), the Court was "presented with the troublesome 
situation in which the excited utterance itself is being used to 
prove that an exciting event did, in fact, occur." Id. at 1040. 
The Court determined that "[w]here there is no independent evidence 
48. While both Wauneka and Auble suggest that state of mind 
evidence could conceivably go to the issue of the killer's identity 
(754 P.2d at 937; 560 P.2d at 1380), as the State acknowledged when 
arguing that the statements were not unduly prejudicial, the 
statements of Maureen Hunsaker do not identify anyone other than 
herself. R. 1163 at 139-40; see also R. 1155 at 986, 1046-7. 
Hence, the hearsay statements are not relevant to any issue in the 
case and, therefore, cannot be admissible under 803(3). 
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that a startling event has occurred, an alleged excited utterance 
cannot be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule," and 
reversed the defendant's convictions. Id. 
In the present case, the State presented little evidence 
that a robbery or kidnapping occurred. See discussion supra at 
113-20 Under such circumstances, the statements were inadmissible. 
C. THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF THE STATEMENTS 
OUTWEIGHED THEIR PROBATIVE VALUE. 
Assuming, arguendo, some or all of the statements made by 
Maureen Hunsaker are found to be relevant, they should not have been 
admitted, since they were unfairly prejudicial to Mr. Menzies under 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403. See Auble, 754 P.2d at 937; Wauneka, 560 
P.2d at 1380-1. Evidence 
is unfairly prejudicial if it "appeals to the 
jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, 
provokes its instinct to punish," or otherwise 
"may cause a jury to base its decision on 
something other than the established propositions 
in the case" [citations omitted]. 
Maurer, 770 P.2d at 984. The hearsay evidence of Ms. Hunsaker's 
statements, if admissible under 803(3), must be subject to the 
scrutiny of Rule 403 and its prohibition against unfairly 
prejudicial evidence. 
Because the jury knew that Ms. Hunsaker was not ultimately 
released and returned to her family, these statements were certain 
to appeal to the jury's sympathy, arouse its sense of horror, and 
provoke its instinct to punish. The jury was left with a horrifying 
and pathetic scenario in its mind after hearing this evidence of a 
husband and victim communicating hope during their last 
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conversation. These statements should have been excluded as 
impermissible hearsay and as being unfairly prejudicial and 
inflammatory. 
POINT XV. CUMULATIVE ERRORS OCCURRING IN THE 
GUILT/INNOCENCE PHASE OF THIS TRIAL DENIED 
MR. MENZIES HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO A FAIR 
TRIAL. 
If this Court fails to reverse the convictions of 
Mr. Menzies based on any of the individual errors claimed herein, he 
urges that the cumulative effect of the errors establishes prejudice 
sufficient to deny him his state and federal rights to a fair 
trial. Amendments V, VIII and XIV, Constitution of the United 
States; Article I, §§ 7, 9 and 12, Constitution of Utah. See 
Gooden v. State, 617 P.2d 248, 250 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980); State v. 
Ellis. 748 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1987); State v. Rammel. 721 P.2d 498, 
501-2 (Utah 1986). 
POINT XVI. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUSTAIN A VERDICT OF CAPITAL HOMICIDE. 
The jury convicted Appellant of an intentional homicide 
with two statutory aggravating circumstances: robbery and 
aggravated kidnapping. R. 898. In order to convict a defendant, 
the State must prove each element of the charges beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Jackson v. Virginia. 443 U.S. 307, 315-8 (1979) (citing 
In re Winshio. 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1) 
(1953 as amended). In reviewing a jury verdict, this Court will 
reverse 
for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, 
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
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defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted. [citations omitted] 
State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983) 
A. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE LINKING 
MR. MENZIES TO THE CRIME. 
The evidence placing Mr. Menzies at Storm Mountain was weak 
and circumstantial. Tim Larabee did not have a frontal view of the 
man, picked someone other than Appellant at the lineup, and did not 
make an in-court identification. See discussion supra at 38. The 
procedure for selecting the car and parka were unduly suggestive, 
thereby giving such evidence little or no probative value. 
The latent thumbprint inside Troy Denter's car was also 
circumstantial evidence. The car belonged to Mr. Denterf not 
Appellant, and the print demonstrated only that Ms. Hunsaker had 
been in the car at some point, not that she had been there in 
February 1986 or was under Appellant's control while there. 
Although officers found a lime green carpet fiber on 
Ms. Hunsaker's clothing, the State's fiber analyst could not offer 
any probability that the "similar" fiber found on the driver's side 
of the vehicle was from the same source or whether there had been a 
secondary transfer of the fiber. T. 1994-8. Furthermore, 
Mr. Denter's car was used to move items out of Mr. Menzies' 
apartment; fibers from the Menzies carpet could easily have gotten 
into the car during that process. T. 1404. 
Given the testimony of the fiber analyst that fiber 
analysis is an inexact process (T. 1994) and the wide range of 
explanations for the fiber analysis results, the weakness of this 
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evidence is apparent. Nevertheless, the State argued that the fiber 
analysis was "one of the most compelling pieces of evidence that 
[the State had] introduced in this case linking the defendant to the 
kidnapping of the victim . . . ." T. 2629. The State's reliance on 
this relatively meaningless evidence as one of its most compelling 
pieces of evidence points out the weakness of the State's case 
linking Mr. Menzies to this crime. 
The unsigned Social Security card could have been placed in 
Nicole's possessions any time by someone other than Appellant or 
Ms. Hunsaker. Likewise, the cards found at the jail were not 
directly tied to Appellant. 
The evidence introduced by the State in an attempt to link 
Mr. Menzies to this crime was circumstantial at best and, in some 
instances, without little, if any, probative force. 
B. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE EVERY ELEMENT OF ROBBERY 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
Robbery is defined as follows: 
Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of 
personal property in the possession of another 
from his person, or immediate presence, against 
his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1989 Supp.). The crime of Theft was 
presented to the jury as a lesser included offense. R. 892. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another 
with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-403 (1990).49 
For a robbery rather than a theft to occur, the property 
must be taken by means of force or fear. Compare Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-301 with § 76-6-403; see State v. Aldershof. 556 P.2d 371, 
373-4 (Kan. 1976) . 
The State's evidence that property had been taken consisted 
of (1) a cash drawer empty of bills at the Gas-A-Mat, (2) the audit 
results form the Gas-A-Mat, (3) money found at the Defendant's 
apartment, (4) an empty purse found at the Defendant's apartment, 
(5) several identification cards found at the jail, (6) the 
telephone call of February 23, 1986, and (7) a Social Security card 
that mysteriously appeared months after the homicide occurred. 
Although money appeared to be missing, the evidence 
established that if the booth door were left open, anyone could have 
taken the money. T. 1167. The two audits were fraught with error 
and came up with significantly different amounts as to what was 
missing. T. 1138, 1137, 1176, 1141. The second audit also showed 
231 packs of cigarettes missing, but an employee later determined 
that no cigarettes were missing. T. 1178-9, 1186. People could 
have pumped gas and left. T. 1031. 
Even if this inconclusive evidence were sufficient to show 
money was taken, it does not establish that it was taken by 
Appellant. There were no signs of struggle in the booth 
49. Theft is not an aggravating circumstance which elevates an 
intentional homicide to a capital homicide. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-202(1). 
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(T. 1041-42) and Appellant's fingerprints were not in the booth. 
T. 1887. 
The State claimed the money found in the umbrella in 
Appellant's apartment was "a figure very similar to the amount 
missing" and made the inflammatory claim that because Appellant was 
unemployed, the money must have been stolen. T. 2620-1.50 
Depending on which audit one believed, the cash may have been close 
to the amount; however, even if that were the case, it does not 
establish that the money came from the Gas-A-Mat or was gotten by 
force or fear. 
The empty purse which Jim Hunsaker identified as belonging 
to his wife did not prove a robbery. Jim Hunsaker was not sure that 
his wife had taken her purse to work (T. 1006), and there is no 
evidence that Ms. Hunsaker had the $20 her husband thought he had 
given her. Again, even if the State established that Ms. Hunsaker's 
money was missing, the evidence does not establish that it was taken 
by force or fear Nor do the cards found in the jail also do not 
establish that Appellant took them by use of force or fear.51 
50. This statement ignores the fact that Nicole received disability 
income. 
51. The stories of Mr. Menzies' made dash to the clothing room 
vary. One officer (the same one who admittedly misrepresented 
information in order to effect a warrantless search (T. 1540)) 
originally reported that during booking into the jail, Mr. Menzies 
"did not give me any problems or trouble and was very cooperative." 
T. 1543. That same officer, only after being told that Mr. Menzies 
was a homicide suspect (T. 1544), reported that during booking, 
Mr. Menzies straightened up, with a frightened wide-eyed look as 
though he were going to become aggressive, and ran "all out" down 
the jail hallway. T. 1521-1522, 1543, 1545. That officer also 
(continued) 
- 117 -
Nor does Ms. Hunsaker's telephone call establish that she 
was robbed. In response to a leading question, she stated, "They 
have told me to tell you I was robbed." T. 1025, 1702-3. This is 
distinct from indicating a robbery. In addition, the term "robbed" 
or "robbery" is often interchanged by lay persons with "theft" or 
"burglary." 
The evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable 
to the verdict, fails to establish that property was taken from 
Ms. Hunsaker by use of force or fear. 
(footnote 51 continued) 
testified that Mr. Menzies was alone in the clothing room somewhere 
from thirty to forty-five seconds to two to three minutes 
(T. 1523-1524) despite the fact that in his initial report, he made 
no mention of Mr. Menzies running down the corridor or being 
anything other than cooperative. T. 1543. Another officer 
testified that Mr. Menzies walked down the hallway and was out of 
sight for just five to eight seconds. T. 1548, 1550, 1554. 
Further, despite their capacity to video tape the area and the 
critical nature of this evidence to the State's case, no video tape 
of the incident was ever produced. T. 1557-1558. 
The clothing room was searched following Mr. Menzies' 
alleged trip there. T. 1533. His "dash" supposedly occurred 
somewhere between 6:40 p.m. (T. 1520) and 7:19 p.m. (T. 1554) or 
7:29 p.m. (T. 1889), according to police officers specially trained 
in the skills of observation and accurate reporting. Yet, the cards 
were allegedly found between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. (T. 1561). 
Further, the cards could have fallen out from any other bundle of 
clothes in the hamper. T. 1567, 1569. Once they were found, the 
cards were placed in an unlocked (T. 1574) desk drawer. 
T. 1562-1563. The cards were seen and/or handled by at least two 
other officers (T. 1572-1573, 1600) before they were given to the 
Sheriff (T. 1603) on an unknown day (T. 1602). Finally, the Sheriff 
never testified to complete the already questionable chain of 
custody. 
Mr. Menzies' hands were cuffed behind his back. T. 1551. 
He was out of sight for only five to eight seconds. T. 1550. He 
had some money (T. 1556, 1889) and other personal belongings 
(T. 1556) in his pocket after he returned from the clothing room. 
Yet, Mr. Menzies is supposed to have removed five or six inculpatory 
cards (T. 1573), buried them under other clothing (T. 1566), without 
mixing in any of his own property or money, all within five to eight 
seconds, with his hands restrained behind him. 
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C. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE EVERY NECESSARY ELEMENT OF 
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
Mr. Menzies was convicted of Aggravated Kidnapping, Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-302(1)(b), (c): 
A person commits aggravated kidnapping if the 
person intentionally or knowingly, without 
authority of law and against the will of the 
victim, by any means and in any manner, seizes, 
confines, detains, or transports the victim with 
intent: . . . ( b ) To facilitate the commission, 
attempted commission, or flight after commission 
or attempted commission of a felony; or (c) To 
inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the 
victim or another . . . . 
R. 899. 
If the taking or confinement of the victim is merely 
incidental to committing the aggravating acts or other criminal 
acts, an Aggravated Kidnapping conviction cannot stand. State v. 
Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981); see also People v. Daniels, 459 P.2d 
225 (Cal. 1969); Annotation, Seizure or Detention for the Purpose of 
Committing Rape, Robbery, or Similar Offense as Constituting 
Separate Crime of Kidnapping, 43 ALR3d 699 (and citations contained 
therein). 
In this case, the evidence was not sufficient to establish 
that a detention independent from that which was necessary to 
accomplish the homicide occurred. 
The only evidence that Ms. Hunsaker was restrained were the 
ligature marks around her neck and her wrists. T. 1609, 1615. The 
State medical examiner testified that the neck ligature was caused 
by whatever strangled the victim. T. 1610. He concluded the 
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strangulation either caused or occurred at the time of death. 
T. 1640-41. The doctor agreed with and then reiterated the 
conclusion that the wrist ligatures occurred at "about the same 
time" as the neck ligature; hence, they all occurred at or near the 
time she died. T. 1666-67. 
The evidence gathered at the Gas-A-Mat from which 
Ms. Hunsaker disappeared on February 23, 1987, shows, at most, that 
Ms. Hunsaker did in fact leave the Gas-A-Mat. 
Although Jim Hunsaker testified that Ms. Hunsaker left her 
coat, it was not a cold day and she was dressed warmly. T. 983, 
980, 1013-14. The cigarettes and lighter in the booth were not tied 
to Ms. Hunsaker or Appellant by brand or other details. T. 983. 
The saliva was consistent with that of 36% of the population, 
including Appellant and Ms. Hunsaker. T. 1992-3, 1998. 
No prints, indication that prints had been wiped away, or 
signs of a struggle were found in the booth. T. 1887, 1041, 1159-64. 
Britton's testimony, all of which could have been taken 
from news reports, likewise did not establish that an aggravated 
kidnapping occurred. 
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, fails to establish an aggravated kidnapping. 
PENALTY PHASE ARGUMENT 
POINT XVII. ADMISSION OF MR, MENZIES/ ENTIRE 
PRISON FILE VIOLATED THE HEARSAY RULE AND 
MR. MENZIES' RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AND DUE 
PROCESS UNDER THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. 
Over Defendant's numerous objections (T. 2839-40, 2843, 
2885, 2886, 3135, 2894, 2892-3, 3132-4), the trial judge admitted 
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during the penalty phase the entire file compiled by the prison on 
Mr. Menzies. T. 3183. See Addendum L for outline and index of 
items contained in file. 
State's Exhibit 8 consists of 333 pages compiled by 
numerous people at the Utah State Prison between 1976 and 1984.52 
The file contains old psychological evaluations which are replete 
with hearsay (e.g.. 104, 105, 108, 109, 110, 143); a social 
evaluation which relies on other reports (E8:5); approximately 
thirty incident reports, many of which deal with unadjudicated 
criminal conduct (e.g., 34, 35, 36 (bomb incident), 50, 51 
(interfering with an officer), 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64 (weapons 
violations), 67, 68, 69-73, 78, 79 (riot and firebomb incident)); 
"c" notes from unidentified sources, many of which discuss 
unadjudicated criminal conduct53 (e.g., 175 (act of violence or 
threat), 180 (allegations of rape, roughing up and hitting inmates), 
52. Pursuant to order of this Court, appellate counsel has numbered 
the loose pages in the file. The order of the loose pages remains 
as it was when received by the district court. Where several pages 
are stapled together, they are numbered as one page. Reference to 
the prison file will be as follows: E8:page number. 
53. The parties stipulated that: 
[A] "c note" is a chronological note of an 
officer's observations or what he hears from 
others. A "c note" involving alleged bad acts 
may result in a write-up or disciplinary hearing. 
A disciplinary hearing involves the 
presentation of evidence. The burden at the 
disciplinary hearing is the preponderance of the 
evidence. The further stipulation would be that 
contraband as it appears in that file includes 
any items not allowed to be possessed by 
prisoners according to prison rules, such as an 
excessive number of books, and may or may not 
involve alcohol or controlled substances. 
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181 (weapons)); a presentence report for the 1976 aggravated robbery 
conviction (E8:83); and disciplinary hearing results.54 See 
Addendum L. 
A. ADMISSION OF THE PRISON FILE VIOLATED THE 
RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
The trial judge in the present case incorrectly concluded 
that the Rules of Evidence do not apply in the penalty phase of a 
capital trial. T. 2885. Section 76-3-207(2) states in part: 
(2) . . . Any evidence the court deems to have 
probative value may be received regardless of its 
admissibility under the exclusionary rules of 
evidence . . . . 
In State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 269 (Utah 1980), this 
Court did not directly address whether the hearsay rule applies in 
the penalty phase of a capital trial, but pointed out that the 
statute, which calls for the "relaxation11 of the rules and which 
"does not necessarily require application of the exclusionary rules 
of evidence," is not "constitutionally infirm per se." 
In Laffertv, 749 P.2d at 1257, this Court applied Rule 403, 
Utah Rules of Evidence to the penalty phase of a capital trial. 
Hence, while there may be some "relaxation" of the rules of 
54. Many pages of the file are duplicates (e.g., E8:3-9 duplicates 
E8:l); some are illegible (e.g., E8:48, 68, 72, 232, 287); a report 
ends mid-sentence (E8:71); another report warns the reader that the 
report must be read in conjunction with other materials which 
apparently are not included in the file (E8:88). Many signatures on 
reports are illegible (E8:42, 49, 51, 53); rap sheets and other 
portions allege crimes and bad acts without providing factual 
details, source of information or whether a conviction occurred. 
The "c notes" in the file do not identify sources and may reflect a 
compilation of information from several people. In addition, at 
least one incident report does not involve Mr. Menzies even though 
it is contained in his file. E8:65-6. 
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evidence, they nevertheless apply to the penalty phase. 
Indeed, the State acknowledged in the present case that 
while the rules of evidence were relaxed in the penalty phase, they 
were "still in effect." T. 2886. Despite his ruling, the trial 
judge also applied the rules of evidence in other parts of the 
penalty phase, sustaining a hearsay objection. T. 2771. 
Mr. Menzies maintains that a complete disregard of the 
rules of evidence in the penalty phase violates the eighth amendment 
since the special need for reliability would not be met by allowing 
information unlimited by traditional rules of evidence to be 
introduced. 
In Brown, 607 P.2d at 271, this Court stated: 
Scrupulous care must be exercised by the 
State in capital cases in both the guilt-
determining and penalty phases in presentation of 
evidence and argument because of the acknowledged 
uniqueness of the death penalty . . . 
And that scrupulous care must particularly 
extend to evidence introduced by the State in the 
penalty phase where the evidence is probative but 
would not be admissible under the exclusionary 
rules of evidence in the guilt-determining 
phase. When the State offers this type of 
evidence in the penalty phase, it must be certain 
that it is not prejudicial to the defendant— 
prejudicial, of course, in the legal sense, 
[citation omitted]. 
In Brown, this Court determined that admission of a hearsay 
statement which quoted the defendant as saying "I just head-shot two 
f for messing with my brother" was prejudicial, warranting 
reversal. Id. at 269. 
In the present case, the file itself was inadmissible 
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hearsay pursuant to Rules 801 and 802, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1983). In addition, the file contained numerous reports which were 
hearsay and which were compiled based on the hearsay reports of 
others. See, e.g., E8:83, 104, 108, 109, 110. Although the State 
claimed that the file was admissible under Evidence Rule 803(8), the 
public records exception (T. 2842), neither exception applies. 
The "essential test" in determining whether papers fit 
within the business record exception "is the reliability of the 
document." State v. Bertul. 664 P.2d 1181, 1183 (Utah 1983). The 
required foundation for admission under this exception is: 
(1) the record must be made in the regular course 
of the business or entity which keeps the 
records; (2) the record must have been made at 
the time of, or in close proximity to, the 
occurrence of the act, condition or event 
recorded; (3) the evidence must support a 
conclusion that after recordation the document 
was kept under circumstances that would preserve 
its integrity; and (4) the sources of the 
information from which the entry was made and the 
circumstances of the preparation of the document 
were such as to indicate its trustworthiness. 
Id. 
In Bertul, this Court pointed out that "whether police 
records are admissible depends on the nature of the records and the 
purpose for which they are offered." Id. at 1184. Police reports 
which are prepared for purposes of prosecution and statements of 
witnesses to a crime lack the necessary indicia of reliability. Id. 
In addition, to be admissible under the business record 
exception, the document must be "identified by its entrant or one 
under whose supervision it is kept and shown to be an original or 
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first permanent entry . . .
 # by one having the duty to so record 
and personal knowledge of the transaction represented by the 
entry." State v. Edgman, 447 N.E.2d 1091 (Ind. App. 1983), quoting 
American United Life Ins. v. Pefflev, 301 N.E.2d 651, 656 (Ind. App. 
1973) . 
Many of the reports in the prison file, including all 
negative c notes and disciplinary matters, were prepared for prison 
discipline and/or security classification; the file also contains 
police reports. See, e.g., E8:34-5, 58-9, 78-9, 98-9. These 
reports contain secondhand information or "information as to which 
memory, perception, or motivation of the reporter may raise a 
serious question of reliability." Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1184; see 
also Layton City v. Peronek. 803 P.2d 1294 (Utah App. 1990). 
In Bertul, this Court also applied the "trustworthiness" 
requirement to the public records exception: 
As with business records, investigatory reports 
of government officials containing opinions not 
based on first-hand knowledge are not admissible 
under that exception. E.g., Emmett v. American 
Insurance Co., 265 A.2d 620 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970) 
(fire officials report); Dale v. Trent, 146 Ind. 
App. 412, 256 N.E.2d 402 (1970) (policeman's 
report); Middlesex Supply, Inc. v. Martin & Sons, 
Inc., 354 Mass. 373, 237 N.E.2d 692 (1968) (fire 
chief's report); Hall v. Boykin, 207 So.2d 645 
(Miss. 1968) (highway patrolman's accident 
report). 
Id.; see also Harrv v. Schwendiman, 740 P.2d 1344, 1346 (Utah App. 
1987); Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413 (Utah App. 1987). 
Because of the lack of reliability of the various entries 
in the file, neither the business records nor public records 
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exception applies; the prison file was inadmissible hearsay. 
B. ADMISSION OF THE ENTIRE PRISON FILE VIOLATED 
MR. MENZIES' RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AND DUE 
PROCESS UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
The sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States 
constitution provide an accused with the right to confrontation. 
In Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-9, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 
1076, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965), the Court stated: 
The primary object of the [confrontation clause] 
was to prevent depositions or ex parte 
affidavits . . . [from] being used against the 
prisoner in lieu of a personal examination of the 
witness and cross-examination in which the 
accused has an opportunity, not only of testing 
the recollection and sifting the conscience of 
the witness, but of compelling him to stand face 
to face with the jury in order that they may look 
at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand 
and the manner in which he gives his testimony 
whether he is worthy of belief. 
The right to confrontation is a fundamental aspect of due 
process which "has been placed on a par with the right to notice and 
an opportunity to be heard and the right to counsel." Proffitt v. 
Wainwriaht. 685 F.2d 1227, 1251 (modified. 706 F.2d 311 (11th 
Cir.)), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 1002, 104 S.Ct. 508, 78 L.Ed.2d 697 
(1983), citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-5, 93 
S.Ct. 1038, 1045, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). 
Although the United States Supreme Court has not directly 
held that the right to confrontation applies to the penalty phase of 
a capital trial, various other courts have acknowledged that the 
right to confrontation applies to the penalty phase. See, e.g., 
Walton v. State, 481 So.2d 1197, 1200 (Fla. 1986); Proffitt v. 
- 126 -
Wainwriaht. 685 F.2d 1227; Moore v, Zant, 885 F.2d 1497, 1511 (11th 
Cir. 1989); Lanier v. State. 533 So.2d 473, 488-9 (Miss. 1988); 
Beltran v. Texas, 728 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987).55 See 
also State v. Glenn. 504 N.E.2d 701, 710 (Ohio 1986). 
In Proffitt, the Court recognized that the eighth amendment 
requires greater substantive and procedural protection in sentencing 
than in noncapital contexts. 
The constitutional requirements governing capital 
sentencing, by contrast, have undergone 
substantial evolution in the wake of Furman v. 
Georgia. The thrust of Furman and its progeny is 
that the risk of arbitrary imposition of the 
death penalty inherent in sentencing 
determinations made without substantive and 
procedural standards conflicts with the eighth 
amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment. Because the death penalty, unlike 
other punishments, is permanent and irrevocable, 
the procedures by which the decision to impose a 
capital sentence is made bring into play 
constitutional limitations not present in other 
sentencing decisions. [citations omitted]. 
55. Decisions which have held that the right to confrontation was 
not violated by the introduction of reports or other hearsay 
materials during the penalty phase have relied on the defendant's 
opportunity to "rebut, deny or explain the information." See 
Creech v. Arave, 947 F.2d 873, 888 (9th Cir. 1991). In Creech, the 
Court pointed out, 
It is apparent, however, that Creech had the 
opportunity, other than through cross-
examination, to dispute the accuracy of the 
presentence report prior to and at his January, 
1982 sentencing hearing because his counsel was 
given the report prior to the sentencing hearing. 
Regardless of whether a discovery violation occurred in the present 
case as the result of the State's failure to provide the 
confidential prison file to Appellant prior to the sentencing 
hearing (see discussion infra at 139), the failure to provide the 
file resulted in a due process violation because Appellant did not 
have time or ability to track the numerous named and unnamed sources 
in the report, or to otherwise "rebut, deny or explain the 
information." 
- 127 -
In Moore. 885 F.2d at 1511, the Court held that the 
existence of the right to confrontation in the penalty phase of a 
capital trial was so apparent that failure to raise the 
confrontation claim earlier constituted an abuse of writ despite the 
fact that the earlier proceedings occurred before the decision in 
Proffitt. 
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has held that 
the penalty phase of a capital trial is a critical stage of the 
proceeding during which the accused is entitled to due process of 
law and effective assistance of counsel. Gardner v. Florida, 430 
U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977). 
Although the Gardner court did not explicitly address 
whether the right to confrontation applies in capital sentencing 
hearings, the conclusion in Gardner that "petitioner was denied due 
process of law when the death sentence was imposed, at least in 
part, on the basis of information which he had not opportunity to 
deny or explain" (Id. at 362) compels such a determination. The 
reasoning in Gardner, including its emphasis on importance of due 
process in the penalty phase, and its explanation of the transition 
in death penalty jurisprudence which followed the decision in 
Furman v. Georgia. 408 U.S. 238, demonstrates that the right to 
confrontation applies in the penalty phase of a capital trial. 
In Gardner, the Court distinguished the pre-Furman case of 
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Williams v. New York.56 337 U.S. 242, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed.2d 1337 
(1949), pointing out that: 
In 1949, when the Williams case was decided, no 
significant constitutional difference between the 
death penalty and lesser punishments had been 
expressly recognized by this Court. . . . In the 
intervening years there have been two 
constitutional developments which require us to 
scrutinize a State's capital-sentencing 
procedures more closely than was necessary in 
1949. 
First, five Members of the Court have now 
expressly recognized that death is a different 
kind of punishment from any other which may be 
imposed in this country. [citations omitted] 
Second, it is now clear that the sentencing 
process, as well as the trial itself, must 
satisfy the requirements of the Due Process 
Clause. 
Gardner, 430 U.S. at 357-8. See also Proffitt, 685 F.2d at 1252 
(pointing out that holding in Williams no longer applies in light of 
Furman and its progeny); Specht v. Patterson. 386 U.S. 605, 875 
S.Ct. 1209, 18 L.Ed.2d 326 (1967) (right to confrontation applies at 
sentencing hearing under Sex Offender Act). 
The fundamental importance of the right to confrontation 
coupled with the special need for reliability in sentencing in 
capital cases (see State v. Holland. 777 P.2d at 1026-7) mandates 
that the right to confrontation apply in the penalty phase of a 
capital trial. 
56. The 1949 decision in Williams affirmed the New York Court of 
Appeals opinion that due process was not violated by the inability 
of the appellant to confront the witnesses included in the 
presentence report. 
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The following test applies in determining whether the right 
to confrontation has been violated: 
The first requirement is that the witness must be 
unavailable; the second requirement is that the 
testimony must bear sufficient indicia of 
reliability to permit its introduction at trial. 
Brooks, 638 P.2d at 539, citing Ohio v. Roberts. 448 U.S. at 66. 
Evidence which is admissible under a hearsay exception may 
nevertheless violate the confrontation clause, and evidence which is 
inadmissible does not necessarily violate that clause. Webb, 779 
P.2d at 1111-2. "The critical inquiry is whether the values 
embodied in the confrontation clause are impinged upon by the 
admission of hearsay, and, if so, whether there are adequate 
safeguards to protect those values." Id. at 1112. 
The prosecution has the burden of establishing that the 
hearsay declarants in the prison file were unavailable. Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74-5. In Webb. 779 P.2d at 1113, this Court 
focused on the importance of this requirement in protecting the 
confrontation rights of an accused, and gave a "stringent 
construction" to the unavailability requirement. See discussion on 
"unavailability" supra at 53-7. 
Because the State made no showing that the declarants, many 
of whom were not identified in the file (see, e.g.. E8:180, 181, 
188, 222, 223, 224, 225), were unavailable, admission of the records 
violated the confrontation clause of Article I, § 12 of the Utah 
constitution. See Rule 804(a), Utah Rules of Evidence (defining 
unavailability); Chapman. 655 P.2d at 1122; Case. 752 P.2d at 356; 
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White, 671 P.2d at 193. 
Although failure to meet the unavailability prong requires 
reversal (see Webb, 779 P.2d at 1114), this Court should note that 
the second prong, the reliability requirement, was also not met in 
this case. This requirement focuses on whether there are "indicia 
of reliability" which "afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis 
for evaluating the truth of the prior statement." Mancusi v. 
Stubbs, 408 U.S. at 216. 
Although " [reliability can be inferred without more in a 
case where evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception," 
applicability of such an exception does not necessarily make hearsay 
reliable. See Webb, 779 P.2d at 1112. See discussion on 
"reliability" supra at 57-61. 
As set forth supra at 122-6, the prison file did not fit 
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Nor were there other 
indicia of reliability. In fact, the way in which the prison file 
was prepared and the purpose for which it was used indicate the 
opposite—that the information contained therein is unreliable, and 
the use of that information as aggravating evidence in support of 
the imposition of the death penalty violated Appellant's right to 
confront the witnesses against him, as guaranteed by the sixth and 
fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. 
C. ADMISSION OF THE PRISON FILE VIOLATED 
MR. MENZIES' RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION UNDER THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Regardless of whether a right to confrontation during the 
penalty phase exists under the federal constitution, Article I, § 12 
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of the Utah constitution guarantees such a right. 
In State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980), this Court 
held that because of the critical nature of a preliminary hearing in 
weeding out improvident prosecutions, the Utah constitutional right 
to confrontation applies at such proceedings. This Court stated: 
The adversarial nature of the preliminary hearing 
is conducive to the imposition of those 
procedural safeguards. The application of the 
right of cross-examination, and the exclusion of 
certain out of court statements at this stage of 
the criminal prosecution insures essential 
protection of the defendant's substantive rights. 
Id. at 785. 
In determining whether the right to confrontation applies 
to a particular proceeding, the Court must "examine the nature and 
purpose of that proceeding and determine if confrontation is 
necessary to insure the protection of any substantive rights of the 
accused." Id. at 782. 
The nature and purpose of a penalty phase proceeding in a 
capital case is to protect a defendant's substantive right to life 
by insuring that the imposition of the death penalty is limited to 
appropriate cases. State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 80-1 (Utah 1982). 
The "special need for reliability" in the sentencing phase of a 
capital trial requires that the fact finder determine not only that 
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances beyond a 
reasonable doubt, but also that "the death penalty was justified and 
appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 
at 1027. 
The unique nature of the death penalty and the special need 
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for reliability in the sentencing phase demonstrate that the need 
for confrontation in such a hearing is even greater than such need 
in a preliminary hearing. The penalty phase of a capital case "must 
satisfy the requirements of the Due Process clause." Gardner v. 
Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358. 
As outlined supra at 126-8, various courts have held that a 
right to confrontation exists during the penalty phase. See, e.g., 
Walton v. State. 481 So.2d at 1200; Proffitt v. Wainwricrht, 685 F.2d 
at 1256. Assuming, arguendo. that this Court does not follow the 
precedent of those cases in analyzing the role of the sixth 
amendment in the penalty phase, the rationale of such cases is 
nevertheless applicable to the state constitutional right to 
confrontation in the penalty phase. 
The importance of the right to confrontation in a criminal 
proceeding and the special need for reliability in the penalty phase 
of a capital trial require that the state constitutional right to 
confrontation apply in the penalty phase. 
D. THE ADMISSION OF THE PRISON FILE VIOLATED 
APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO NOTICE AND AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD. 
Many of the procedural protections which are vital in 
criminal prosecutions do not apply to disciplinary hearings in 
prisons. See Wolff v. McDonnell. 418 U.S. 539, 562-3, 94 S.Ct. 
2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (addressing and explaining the 
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disparity); Homer v. Morris. 684 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1984).57 
In Wolff v. McDonnell. 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Court 
determined the contours of due process applicable to disciplinary 
hearing allegations of serious misconduct which might result in loss 
of "good time" credits. The Court concluded that an inmate has a 
right to notice and at least twenty-four hours to prepare, and a 
"written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on 
and reasons" for disciplinary action. Id. at 564. 
However, an inmate does not have the right to call 
witnesses, present documentary evidence, or confront and 
cross-examine witnesses. Id. at 566-7. Although illiterate inmates 
or those involved in complex cases may seek assistance from a fellow 
inmate or staff member, they do not have a right to assistance of 
counsel. Id. at 567, 570. See also Baxter v. Palmicriano, 425 U.S. 
308, 322 (1976). 
A number of disciplinary hearing findings appear in the 
prison file (see, e.g.. E8:223, 219, 233, 236, 241, 244). The file 
also contains forms which indicate that nothing the inmate says at 
the hearing and none of the evidence from the hearing will be used 
in a criminal prosecution.58 E8:231, 221, 231, 245, 251. 
57. Many cases have noted that the lesser standards of due process 
which apply in prison administration are adequate because the prison 
records have no collateral effects outside the prison. See Duran v. 
Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1981); Meachum v. Fano. 427 U.S. 215, 
229 n.8 (1976). 
58. The file contains forms which outline an individual's rights in 
the prison disciplinary system. Those forms state: 
(continued) 
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Given the minimal protections afforded at a disciplinary 
hearing, admission of disciplinary decisions or information in the 
penalty phase of a capital trial (see, e.g., E8:222-225 
(disciplinary information and finding relating to alleged stabbing)) 
as aggravating evidence violates the eighth and fourteenth 
amendments to the federal constitution and Article I, §§ 7, 9 and 12 
of the Utah constitution. 
POINT XVIII. THE PRISON FILE CONTAINED 
UNADJUDICATED CRIMINAL ACTS WHICH THE STATE DID 
NOT PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, IN VIOLATION 
OF DUE PROCESS AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT. 
The prison file contains numerous allegations of 
unadjudicated criminal conduct. See Addendum L for list of 
unadjudicated acts and cites to page numbers in prison file. The 
"rap sheets," "c notes," staff reports, psychological evaluation 
report, and social investigation report contain allegations of 
unadjudicated conduct. Examples of such unadjudicated conduct are a 
hearsay report that Appellant stabbed another inmate (the trial 
judge did not mention this in his sentencing) (E8:222-5), 
allegations of threats to inmates and others (the trial judge relied 
(footnote 58 continued) 
(1) nothing you say at this hearing about 
the act with which you are charged can be used 
against you in any criminal prosecution for that 
act. 
(2) no evidence discovered by or at this 
hearing about the act with which you are charged 
can be used against you in any criminal 
prosecution for that act. 
Testimony during the penalty phase clarified that prison 
files contain allegations which are never resolved and that evidence 
from prison investigations is not saved. T. 3000. 
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on this as an aggravating circumstance) (E8:205-84; T. 3260), an 
allegation that Appellant was involved in AWOL plot (E8:104) 
(explicitly relied on by judge) (T. 3251), an allegation that 
Appellant helped a dangerous patient escape (explicitly relied on by 
judge) (T. 3263), and an allegation that Appellant had raped another 
inmate at knife point (E8:180) (the trial judge did not mention this 
in his ruling). 
In Laffertv. 749 P.2d at 1259-60, this Court allowed the 
introduction of unadjudicated violent crimes during the penalty 
phase but required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed such crimes. In State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 
1030, 1033 (Utah 1991), and State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1283 
(Utah 1989), this Court extended the Laffertv holding to include 
evidence of any unadjudicated crime, regardless of whether such 
crime was violent. 
Although this Court has allowed the introduction of 
unadjudicated crimes, it has acknowledged the potentially 
prejudicial impact of such evidence where the State fails to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that such crime occurred. 
If the State were permitted during the penalty 
phase to use as evidence in aggravation material 
that would be insufficiently probative to support 
a conviction for the other criminal activity, 
then there is a chance that this material might 
be used by the sentencing body as the basis for 
imposing death. Allowing the sentencer to be 
influenced by material relating to crimes which 
have not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
would appear to violate the Supreme Court's 
ruling in Gregg that evidence admitted during 
sentencing must not unfairly prejudice the 
accused. 
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Laffertv, 749 P.2d at 1259. 
In an effort to protect against such unfair prejudice which 
would violate due process and the eighth amendment, this Court 
outlined requirements to be followed where the State introduces 
unadjudicated criminal conduct during the penalty phase. Id. at 
1260. Where the sentence is determined by a judge, the judge must 
make specific written findings as to whether the unadjudicated crime 
was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. fn 16. This Court 
imposed this requirement of written findings 
to assure that on review this Court can 
adequately assess whether imposition of a death 
sentence has been improperly based on evidence of 
other crimes which have not been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Written findings will 
facilitate appellate review and reduce the 
likelihood of reversal. Although we do not reach 
the constitutional issues, we note that if 
evidence of other violent crimes was admitted, 
due process concerns could require vacating of a 
death sentence if we found the evidence 
insufficient to establish guilt and if the manner 
in which the verdict was reported did not enable 
us to be certain that the death sentence would 
have been imposed without that evidence, 
[citations omitted] 
Id. 
Although the trial court in the present case recognized its 
duty under Lafferty to make findings as to whether unadjudicated 
criminal conduct was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it failed to 
make the required written findings. T. 2757-8, 2900. 
In his ruling, the trial judge stated: 
Alleged bad acts have—this is character, 
background history, mental condition: alleged 
bad acts were unproven. 
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T. 3265. Despite this admittedly unclear ruling, the judge relied 
on unadjudicated conduct in reaching his decision that death should 
be imposed. Unadjudicated conduct explicitly referred to which was 
not previously mentioned included, "there was an extensive juvenile 
record" (T. 3250); "he went AWOL from the shelter" and "they could 
not work with him when he was involved in an AWOL plot" (T. 3251); 
extensive drug use (T. 3253); feigned seizure in order to escape 
(T. 3257) ; "created diversionary tactic helping dangerous patient to 
escape (T. 3263) ; referred for psychiatric evaluation "for pulling a 
knife and inflicting injury to girl who teased him and indicated he 
would 'cut her guts out/n (T. 3263); and "strong arm tactics, 
threats to inmates and guards" (T. 3260). This last category 
encompasses a number of unadjudicated acts found in the prison file, 
including the "c note" allegations of rape and knife incidents. 
Other than hearsay statements contained in the file, the State 
offered no evidence to prove that Mr. Menzies had in fact committed 
these crimes. 
The trial judge's failure to make written findings coupled 
with his apparent reliance on some of the unadjudicated acts despite 
a statement that alleged bad acts were not proven precludes this 
Court from being "certain that the death sentence would have been 
imposed without that evidence." Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1260. The 
introduction of this hearsay evidence in the prison file did not 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Menzies committed these 
crimes mentioned. The introduction of the unproven crimes violated 
due process and the eighth amendment. 
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POINT XIX. THE STATED FAILURE TO PROVIDE 
APPELLANT WITH THE PRISON FILE REQUIRES A NEW 
PENALTY HEARING. 
Appellant had filed guilt/innocence and penalty phase 
motions for discovery (see Addendum G), and the State had 
voluntarily complied by providing various reports and information to 
the defense. The State did not, however, provide defense counsel 
with the 333-page confidential prison file which was in its control 
and which it intended to introduce during the penalty phase. 
T. 2888-90. This failure violated Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, due process, and the eighth amendment. See 
State v. Lipsky. 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980) ("fundamental 
fairness requires that procedures . . . in the sentencing 
phase . . . be designed to insure that the decision-making process 
is based on accurate information"); Gardner v. Florida. 430 U.S. 349 
(due process and the eighth amendment require that defendant in 
capital case have "full access" to presentence report); State v. 
Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982). 
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the 
State to disclose upon request any "relevant written or recorded 
statements of the defendant." The prison file is replete with 
written statements of Mr. Menzies which the State intended to 
introduce. See E8:34, 35, 48-9, 69-73, 80-1, 104, 105, 180. The 
State had previously provided other statements of Appellant and had 
a continuing obligation to disclose this material. Knight, 734 P.2d 
at 916-7. 
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The prison file also contains some positive information 
about Mr. Menzies' conduct while in prison including the fact that 
he was a good worker who followed orders. See, e.g., E8:40, 135, 
141, 145-7, 150-2, 156, 157-8, 171, 177, 178.58 This information 
was mitigating evidence which the State was required to provide to 
defense counsel regardless of whether requested. The State's 
failure to provide defense counsel with this information violated 
Rule 16(a)(4), due process and the eighth amendment. See State v. 
Carter. 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985); Bradv v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 
87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (suppression by state of 
evidence favorable to accused violates due process); Gardner v. 
Florida. 430 U.S. 349. 
In addition, the file contained presentence reports and 
other reports analogous to presentence reports which the State was 
required to provide to Appellant before trial pursuant to due 
process and the sixth amendment. See, e.g., E8:83, 88, 104, 105, 
108, 109, 110. Lioskv. 608 P.2d at 1246-48; Gardner v. Florida. 430 
U.S. 349. 
Appellant's ability to adequately prepare for the penalty 
phase was severely undermined by the State's failure to provide the 
file to him. Had he had access to the file, he would have attempted 
to develop the mitigating information by investigating potential 
witnesses who had made favorable statements, and prepared to attack 
58. Although this mitigation evidence should have been conveyed to 
defense counsel, it did not balance out the overwhelmingly 
prejudicial effect of admitting the prison file. 
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and meet the remainder of the State's evidence. The failure to 
disclose was prejudicial to Appellant in light of its impact on his 
ability to adequately prepare for the penalty hearing. See United 
States v. Aaurs. 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 661-62 (Utah 1985). 
POINT XX. ADMISSION OF THE PRISON FILE WHICH 
CONTAINED IN-CUSTODY CLINICAL EVALUATIONS 
VIOLATED MR. MENZIES' RIGHTS AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION. 
The prison file is replete with reports which were made by 
examiners while Mr. Menzies was in custody and during which he was 
not informed of his right to remain silent or that the information 
would be used against him in court. E.g.. E8:83 (presentence 
report), 88 (social investigation on Stated motion to certify), 105 
(Boone evaluation as part of motion to certify), 108, 110 (Carlisle 
psychological evaluation and assessment), 104 (Hinckley evaluation 
as to whether Appellant was treatment candidate), 169 ("c notes" 
include statements made by Appellant). 
These reports rely on statements by Appellant to conclude 
that he is dangerous, anti-social personality and not a candidate 
for treatment. E.g., E8:104, 83, 88, 105, 108-9. 
The prison file also contains numerous statements made by 
Appellant to prison authorities as part of disciplinary actions, 
without Appellant being informed that such statements would be used 
against him in court. E.g., E8:31, 34, 36, 49. In fact, as part of 
the disciplinary hearing, he was given a disclaimer which explicitly 
stated that his statements would not be used against him in court. 
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E.g., E8:221, 231, 234. See footnote 58 supra at 134-5. 
In Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 
L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that the 
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination applies to the 
penalty phase of a capital trial, and that such right was violated 
where a psychiatrist who conducted a court-ordered competency review 
testified during the penalty phase as to the defendant's future 
dangerousness. The Court pointed out that: 
[b]ecause respondent did not voluntarily consent 
to the pretrial psychiatric examination after 
being informed of his right to remain silent and 
the possible use of his statements, the State 
could not rely on what he said to [the 
psychiatrist] to establish future dangerousness. 
Id. at 468. 
Although Appellant introduced evidence relating to his 
mental health in an effort to diffuse the impact of the various 
reports and psychological evaluations (T. 2956-83, 3019-3105), he 
did so after the State introduced the written psychological 
evaluations contained in the prison file and Exhibit 1-D. 
T. 2839-43, 2885-2894. Such an effort to diffuse the impact of the 
State's erroneously admitted evidence does not detract from the 
reversible nature of this error. See Estelle v. Smith at 465-6. 
Erroneous admission of the numerous statements and 
evaluations coupled with the trial court's explicit and implicit 
reliance on such evaluations requires reversal since aggravating 
evidence regarding Appellant's future dangerousness and criminal 
culpability in various crimes was admitted. See Johnson v. 
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Mississippi. 486 U.S. 578, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988); 
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235(1983). 
POINT XXI. ADMISSION OF "STALE11 UNADJUDICATED 
CRIMINAL CONDUCT IN THE PRISON FILE VIOLATED DUE 
PROCESS AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The prison file contained unadjudicated acts which dated 
back to Mr. Menzies' childhood. Exhibit 1-D consisted of three 
confidential 1976 and 1973 psychiatric evaluations, the last of 
which refers to several knife incidents, including an incident where 
Menzies allegedly threatened a girl with a knife. The State made no 
effort to prove any of these incidents had occurred. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302 outlines the statute of 
limitations applicable in Utah.59 This statute is "the primary 
safeguard against prejudice resulting from having to defend against 
stale criminal charges." State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 
1985). Allowing the State to "try" these charges well after the 
statutes of limitations had run left Appellant without a meaningful 
opportunity to defend against the allegations. This "unfairly 
prejudicial evidence" violates the eighth amendment and federal due 
process. See generally Gregg v. Georgia. 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 
2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Godfrey v. Georgia. 446 U.S. 420, 423 
(1980); People v. Phillips. 711 P.2d 423 (Cal. 1985). 
In Lafferty. this Court was not faced with the statute of 
limitations issue because the unadjudicated conduct had occurred 
while the defendant was in jail awaiting trial on the capital 
59. The statute of limitations for most felonies is four years; the 
statute of limitations for most misdemeanors is two years. 
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homicide case. 
In Taylor, 818 P.2d at 1032, where the State introduced 
unadjudicated conduct which had occurred fifteen years earlier, this 
Court acknowledged that the passage of time can raise due process 
concerns, but held that due process was not violated where all three 
of the alleged victims appeared and were subject to 
cross-examination. 
By contrast, in the present case, the State did not call 
witnesses. Instead, it relied on hearsay reports, some of which 
came from unidentified sources, to establish, among other things, 
that Mr. Menzies had participated in various unadjudicated violent 
acts. See, e.g.. E8:180, 181, 57, 59, 83, 88, 104, 105, 173, 175. 
Although the right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the 
Utah and federal constitutions generally does not attach until an 
individual is arrested (see Bailey. 712 P.2d at 283), allowing the 
trial of stale charges during the penalty phase raises serious due 
process and speedy trial concerns since the defendant is never 
technically arrested on the stale charge, yet faces trial. 
In State v. Smith. 699 P.2d 711, 713 (Utah 1985), this 
Court stated: 
[W]hen a prosecutor delays filing an indictment, 
the delay does not constitute a violation of due 
process unless there is a showing that the 
prosecutor's delay "violates those 'fundamental 
conceptions of justice which lie at the base of 
our civil and political institutions,' and which 
define 'the community's sense of fair play and 
decency.'" (citation omitted] . . . For 
preaccusation delay to constitute reversible 
error, the delay must cause actual prejudice to 
the defendant's case and result in tactical 
advantage for the prosecutor. 
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Id, at 713 (citations omitted). 
By allowing the State to introduce allegations of criminal 
acts dating back as much as twenty years without providing details 
or witnesses for confrontation, the delay in prosecution resulted in 
an unfair tactical advantage for the State which precluded Appellant 
from adequately defending such charges. 
The overwhelming impact of these unproven incidents, 
coupled with the trial judge's often explicit reliance thereon, 
requires a new penalty phase. 
POINT XXII. ADMISSION OF STATE'S EXHIBIT 1-D 
REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY PHASE. 
State's Penalty Phase Exhibit 1-D consists of three 
psychiatric evaluations which were done on March 1, 1976 (Troy 
Gill, M.D.), February 19, 1976 (Robert Strachan, Ph.D.) and 
February 15, 1973 (Peggy Ellis, psychiatric social worker). The 
first two evaluations contained in 1-D were made "for the purpose of 
determining whether or not [Mr. Menzies] should be certified as an 
adult for adjudication of the criminal charges which have been 
brought against him." 1-D:1. The last report was made in order to 
decide whether to let Mr. Menzies live with his father, or make some 
other disposition of his case. This report is marked "Confidential 
information. To be used for benefit of this patient only. Do not 
release!!!" 1-D:8. 
Exhibit 1-D is inadmissible for a number of reasons. 
First, it is not a self-authenticating document under Rule 902 and 
is not otherwise authenticated as required by Rule 903, Utah Rules 
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of Evidence. See Lamorie. 610 P.2d 342, 346 (Utah 1980). 
The evaluations are hearsay and do not fit within a hearsay 
exception. Rules 801, 802, 803, Utah Rules of Evidence; see 
discussion supra at 122-5. In addition, they contain hearsay 
statements of other individuals, some of whom are identified while 
others are not. See, e.g.. 1-D:3. 
Admission of the exhibit violated Mr. Menzies' right to 
confrontation under the state and federal constitutions. 
Proffitt v. Wainwriqht, 685 F.2d at 1251; Walton v. State, 481 So.2d 
at 1200. See discussion supra at 126-33. The State made no showing 
that the three declarants were unavailable, nor did it make any 
showing as to how or where the declarants had obtained the hearsay 
information contained in the reports. Nor did the State make any 
showing that the reports were reliable. They were made many years 
ago to decide whether to certify Mr. Menzies as an adult. Each 
evaluator apparently spent time with Mr. Menzies on only one day. 
The admission of this exhibit precluded Appellant from 
cross-examining the evaluators. 
Mr. Menzies' fifth amendment rights against 
self-incrimination were also violated by admission of the exhibit. 
The reports were made based on interviews with Mr. Menzies. The 
first two occurred while he was in custody at the juvenile detention 
center; it is not clear whether he was in custody for the third. 
See discussion supra at 141-3; Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454. 
Exhibit 1-D also contains unadjudicated acts which the 
State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See Lafferty, 749 
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P. 2d at 1259; discussion supra at 135-8. The exhibit mentions at 
least twice an incident where Mr. Menzies allegedly threatened a 
girl with a knife. 1-D:3, 9. The February 15, 1973 report also 
indicates that "[t]here have been several knife incidents since that 
time." 1-D:9. The source of this information, the facts of the 
incident, the name of the girl and/or other victims, or any further 
details are not supplied, and the State made no further effort to 
prove that these incidents occurred. Admission of this information 
violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments. The possibility that 
the trial judge relied on this information in sentencing requires a 
new trial. 
POINT XXIII. THE STATE VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND 
THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN CHANGING ITS 
PENALTY PHASE WITNESS LIST SHORTLY BEFORE THE 
HEARING AND FAILING TO PROVIDE PENALTY PHASE 
DISCOVERY. 
On March 5, 1986, defense counsel submitted a request for 
discovery. See Addendum G. R. 27-8. This request included, among 
other things, a request for all police reports and statements 
attributed to Appellant. 
Appellant filed a supplemental motion to discover (R. 628) 
and made a written and oral motion for disclosure of the 
prosecution's penalty phase witnesses. R. 772-3.60 The trial judge 
60. The record in this area is incomplete. The supplemental motion 
is not included in the district court file and although reference is 
made to a January 22, 1988 hearing, no minute entry appears for this 
date. A minute entry for January 25, 1998 indicates in part: 
This case comes on regularly before the court on 
defendant's motion in limine . . . The court 
hereby orders the defendant's argument has been 
(continued) 
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ordered the State to provide Appellant with a list of its penalty 
phase witnesses no later than January 28, 1988. R. 755. 
On February 3, 1988, the State submitted its list of 
penalty phase witnesses including Vi Lealeifalea, Carl McBrayer, 
Beverly Tischer, Ed Colbert, Charles Illsey, Bryon Stark, Myrna 
Shultz, David Yocum, and Greg Bown. R. 775. 
On March 11, 1988, the Friday before the Tuesday on which 
the penalty phase began, the State gave defense counsel a revised 
list of penalty phase witnesses. T. 2715; R. 774, 1090; see 
Addendum N containing both lists. This list omitted Byron Stark and 
Myrna Schultz and added nine new witnesses: Breck LeBegue, Morris 
Nelson, Denette Faretta, Cathy Olson, Bruce Bishop, Kurt Tanner, Jay 
Labrum, Tom Wayman, and Joe Gee. R. 1090. 
Defense counsel objected to testimony from witnesses on the 
(footnote 60 continued) 
persuasive and the court finds the motion in 
limine is well taken. In the event this case has 
a penalty phase the court orders a written motion 
and list of witnesses that will be used to be 
exchanged no later than Thursday, January 28, 
1988, at 5:00 p.m. 
R. 755. 
After repeated arguments and a suggestion by the State that 
a January 25, 1988 hearing had not occurred, Tauni Lee prepared a 
transcript of the January 25, 1988 hearing in January 1991. That 
transcript has apparently never been transmitted to this Court 
despite defense counsel's repeated efforts to locate it. The record 
that does exist demonstrates, however, that Appellant made repeated 
discovery requests and the State was ordered to provide Appellant 
with a witness list by January 28, 1988. R. 755. To the extent 
that this Court believes the record is incomplete on this issue, the 
missing transcript violates Appellant's eighth amendment and due 
process rights, requiring a new trial. See Appellant's opening 
brief on transcript issue; State v. Taylor. 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 
1983); Van White v. State, 752 P.2d 814 (Ok. Cr. 1988); Delap v. 
State. 350 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1977). 
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second list, pointing out that the revised list violated a court 
order and she had been unsuccessful in contacting at least some of 
the witnesses. T. 2715. In response, prosecutor Ernie Jones claimed 
Frankly, I think what the Court is going to find 
is that some of the additional witnesses we put 
on the list last Friday and provided to the 
defense had to go to foundational requirements in 
order to introduce documents, records of prior 
convictions, that type of thing.61 
T. 2716. 
Despite the existence of a court order that he produce his 
witness list no later than January 28, 1988 (R. 755), Mr. Jones 
argued, "I don't recall the court ever setting a deadline saying 
that, 'You have to have this list for the defense by a particular 
day, or otherwise you can't use the evidence.'11 T. 2716-7. 
The State called Officer Jay Labrum to testify concerning 
Appellant's arrest for the 1975 7-Eleven robberies. T. 2751. 
Despite the fact that the State was aware of Labrum's existence and 
role in the arrest, the State did not inform defense counsel until 
four days before the penalty phase began that it intended to use 
Officer Labrum as a penalty phase witness. T. 2716-7; R. 1090. 
Although Appellant had requested all police reports and statements 
attributed to Appellant (R. 27-8), the State did not supply defense 
61. None of the additional witnesses presented documentary evidence 
or provided foundation for the introduction of such evidence. See 
T. 2759-2785 (Officer Labrum); T. 2809-2823 (Bruce Bishop); 
T. 2823-2838 (Kurt Tanner); T. 2867-76 (Officer Wayman); 
T. 2876-2904 (Officer Gee). Officer Thompson, who appeared on 
neither list, presented foundational testimony for the introduction 
of photographs. T. 2833. 
Interestingly, this reference to foundational witnesses is 
similar to the information defense counsel claims to have received 
when asking about Beverly Tischler's testimony. See discussion 
regarding prison file supra at 139. 
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counsel with Labrum's report; nor did it inform defense counsel of 
the statements attributed to Appellant to which Labrum would 
testify. T. 2758. This failure to provide police reports and 
statements, despite a motion requesting such items and previous 
voluntary compliance, violated due process and the eighth 
amendment. See Knight, 734 P.2d at 916; Wood. 648 P.2d at 81; see 
discussion supra at 139, 40-9. 
During the intervening weekend and single working day after 
receiving the revised list, defense counsel was unable to reach the 
officer.62 T. 2749. 
Over Appellant's objection, the trial judge allowed Labrum 
to testify. T. 2748-9. Defense counsel was given a copy of 
Labrum's report at that time but did not have time to review and 
prepare for the testimony. T. 2758. 
Labrum used the report, a copy of which he obtained from 
the prosecutor's office, to testify as to various statements 
allegedly made by Appellant. T. 2777, 2759-75. Labrum's testimony 
included statements attributed to Appellant regarding the 1975 
7-Eleven robberies, car thefts, drug use, and criminal activity 
perpetrated after Appellant and Mark Iveson picked up a hitchhiker. 
T. 2759-75. 
Admission of Labrum's testimony violated Rule 16, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and due process. Appellant had 
62. The officer made only one attempt to return counsel's calls and 
reached the after-hours answering machine. T. 2776-7. He did not 
try to reach her at her home number. Id. 
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requested and the State had voluntarily provided police reports and 
statements of Appellant. Therefore, it had a continuing obligation 
to provide this material. See Knight. 734 P.2d at 916; Carter. 707 
P.2d at 662. 
Furthermore, the court had ordered the State to provide its 
list by January 28, 1988. R. 755. Defense counsel had relied on 
that list in preparing for the complex penalty phase. The State 
offered no good cause for failing to include Officer Labrum on the 
original list. The resulting last-minute scramble by defense 
counsel and the inability to obtain police reports and prepare for 
the penalty phase violated due process. 
Bruce Bishop and Kurt Tanner of the Utah State Hospital 
were called to testify regarding information found in Appellant's 
report concerning a screwdriver brought in by Nicole Arnold and a 
dust pan handle. T. 2810-28. Neither witness appeared on the first 
list. The trial judge relied on this testimony in sentencing 
Appellant. T. 3254. 
Officers Wayman and Gee, whose names appeared on the second 
list, testified regarding threats allegedly made by Appellant and 
security precautions taken at the jail. T. 2868. 
The last-minute listing of these witnesses precluded 
defense counsel from adequately preparing for trial and violated due 
process and the eighth amendment. 
In State v. Wood. 648 P.2d at 81, this Court recognized that 
to assure that substantive standards that govern 
imposition of the death penalty are fairly, 
evenhandedly, and properly applied, the basic 
procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment must be 
observed . . • Thusf it is a violation of that 
clause if a defendant is sentenced to 
death . . . when defense counsel was not given 
adequate time to review a complicated presentence 
report. State v. Phelps, N.D. 297 S.W.2d 769 
(1980). Death sentences have also been set aside 
because of . . . the prosecution's failure to 
disclose the name of a crucial witness so that 
the defendant was unable to respond. Smith v. 
Estelle, 602 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1979). 
The State's last-minute shuffle of witnesses it was aware 
of and for which it had reports violated Menzies' due process right 
to discovery and an adequate opportunity to prepare. This 
last-minute shuffle allowed the death penalty to be imposed in an 
arbitrary and capricious fashion, in violation of the eighth 
amendment. 
POINT XXIV. INTRODUCTION OF OTHER UNPROVEN BAD 
ACTS AND CROSS-EXAMINATION BY THE STATE REGARDING 
BAD ACTS THAT IT DID NOT OTHERWISE PROVE VIOLATED 
DUE PROCESS AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT. 
In addition to the unadjudicated acts contained in the 
prison record63, Exhibit 1-D, and the rap sheets, the State 
introduced testimony of Carl McBrayer regarding both 7-Eleven 
robberies (even though Appellant had been convicted of only one of 
those robberies) (T. 2729-2748); the alleged aggravated assault of 
the taxicab driver; the testimony of Kurt Tanner and Bruce Bishop 
regarding the screwdriver incident at the hospital (T. 2809-27); 
testimony of Jay Labrum regarding alleged automobile thefts, drug 
63. Other than the crimes involved in the instant case, Appellant 
has been convicted of five crimes as an adult. Those crimes are: 
two aggravated robberies (taxicab and 7-Eleven), one escape, two 
misdemeanor thefts. All other criminal conduct mentioned during the 
penalty phase must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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dealing and drug use in 1975 (T. 2762, 2764-5); testimony of 
Officer Illsey that Appellant allegedly gave false information 
(T. 2855-6); and testimony of Lieutenant Wayman and Captain Gee 
regarding alleged threats by Appellant and allegations that 
Appellant was involved in "some escape situation (T. 2873-5, 
2877-9). The State also introduced Exhibit 1-A, an order of 
certification which refers to allegations of aggravated kidnapping, 
aggravated robberies, and thefts of motor vehicles. 
In addition, on cross-examination of Jackie Rutherford, 
Appellant's sister, prosecutor Jones asked whether Ms. Rutherford 
was aware of several unadjudicated crimes that Appellant allegedly 
committed (T. 2940-6), including whether she was aware Appellant had 
helped someone escape from the State Hospital (T. 2944), whether he 
ever told her he planned to kill Carl McBrayer during the 7-Eleven 
robberies (T. 2945), and whether he ever told her he had used stolen 
vehicles to commit the 7-Eleven robberies (T. 2946). See Addendum M 
for transcript of relevant portions of cross-examination. 
The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Appellant had committed these acts. Introduction of this evidence 
violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments. See Lafferty, 749 
P.2d at 1259. 
In addition, the trial judge's failure to make the required 
written findings precludes this Court from being able to assess 
whether the death penalty was imposed on an improper basis, in 
violation of due process and the eighth amendment. Lafferty, 749 
P.2d at 1260. 
- 153 -
Finally, the prosecutor's questions of Ms. Rutherford 
regarding bad acts which the State did not prove was misconduct 
which violated due process and the eighth amendment. See State v. 
Emmett. 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 36 (Utah 1992) (error to ask a 
question which "implies the existence of a prejudicial fact unless 
the prosecution can prove the existence of that fact11) ; Lanier v. 
State. 533 So.2d 473, 486-90 (Miss. 1988) (death sentence overturned 
where prosecutor violated defendant's right to confrontation in 
penalty phase by presenting inadmissible evidence during 
cross-examination without providing an opportunity for the defendant 
to confront any witness concerning the subject matter of the 
cross-examination). 
In State v. Singleton. 182 P.2d 920, 930 (Ariz. 1947) 
(cited favorably by this Court in Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37), 
the Court stated: 
But when, as here, such questioning is raised and 
then dropped with no further attempt on the part 
of the State to prove its point, the 
aforementioned "fishing expedition" having 
failed, we believe it to be wholly improper and 
highly prejudicial. To allow this sort of 
examination would be to allow the imaginative and 
overzealous prosecutor to concoct a damaging line 
of examination which could leave with the jury 
the impression that defendant was anything that 
the questions, by innuendo, seemed to suggest. 
If the questions were persistent enough and 
cleverly enough framed, no amount of denial on 
the part of a defendant would be able to erase 
the impression in the mind of the jury that the 
prosecutor actually had such facts at hand and 
that probably there was some truth to the 
insinuations. 
See also State v. Peterson. 722 P.2d 768, 769-70 (Utah 1986) (error 
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to ask about unproven felonies where State does not introduce 
admissible extrinsic evidence to establish felonies). 
Questioning Ms. Rutherford about her knowledge of unproven 
crimes allegedly committed by Appellant, including vehicle thefts, 
aiding in an escape, and intent to kill, was error. Introduction of 
unproven bad acts referred to in this point violated due process and 
the eighth amendment. 
POINT XXV. INTRODUCTION OF UNADJUDICATED ACTS 
DURING THE PENALTY PHASE VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AND 
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT. 
Although this Court has previously decided in Lafferty. 
Taylor and Parsons that the State can introduce evidence of 
unadjudicated crimes during the penalty phase of a capital trial, 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reconsider that 
holding. See Lafferty. 749 P.2d at 1258-60, 1263 (Stewart, Assoc. 
Chief Justice, dissenting); Williams v. Lvnaucrh, 484 U.S. 935, 108 
S.Ct. 311, 98 L.Ed.2d 270 (1987) (Justices Brennan and Marshall 
dissenting from denial of petition for writ of certiorari); State v. 
McCormick, 397 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. 1979); State v. Bobo. 727 S.W.2d 
945, 952-3 (Tenn. 1987); People v. Jennings. 76 P.2d 475 (Cal. 
1988); State v. Bartholomew. 654 P.2d 1170, 1184 (Wash. 1982), 
vacated and remanded. 463 U.S. 1203, 103 S.Ct. 3530, 77 L.Ed.2d 1383 
(1983), aff'd. 101 Wash. 2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (Wash. 1984). 
Furthermore, since the United States Supreme Court has not yet 
finally decided this issue, Appellant asserts this issue and 
maintains that the introduction of evidence of prior unadjudicated 
crimes violates due process and the sixth and eighth amendments. 
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See generally Gregg, 428 U.S. 153 (introduction of unfairly 
prejudicial evidence during penalty phase violates eighth 
amendment); see also State v. McCormick, 397 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. 1979); 
Bobo. 727 S.W.2d at 954-3. 
Evidence of unadjudicated crimes during the penalty phase 
violates state and federal due process, cruel and unusual 
punishments prohibitions, and the eighth amendment reliability 
requirements and results in arbitrary and capricious imposition of 
the death penalty. See Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Gardner v. 
Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). 
The wholesale introduction of allegations of prior bad acts 
during the penalty phase in this case, regardless of whether they 
were violent, had been proven or sufficient evidence existed to 
prove them underscores the lack of advisability of allowing the 
introduction of unadjudicated acts during the penalty phase of a 
capital trial. 
POINT XXVI. THE EXCESSIVE REPETITION OF EVIDENCE 
OF PAST CRIMES VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND THE 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT. 
As previously indicated, Mr. Menzies has been convicted as 
an adult of five crimes other than the crimes involved in the 
instant case: (1) Escape, a second degree felony (July 6, 1978) 
(State's Exhibit 9), (2) Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony 
(taxi—July 17, 1978) (State's Exhibit 10), (3) Aggravated Robbery 
(7-Eleven—December 21, 1975) (State's Exhibit 12), (4) Theft, a 
misdemeanor, and (5) Theft, a misdemeanor. 
Despite the fact that the State introduced Exhibits 9, 10 
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and 12 during the penalty phase to establish the two aggravated 
robberies and escape, it introduced repetitious and cumulative 
evidence of these convictions. In addition to the juvenile and 
adult rap sheets (Exhibits 1-C, 15, 16) which suggest a far longer 
criminal history, the State introduced repeated evidence of the 
crimes in the prison file. See index of prison file in Addendum L. 
The judgment for the taxicab robbery appears three times in 
the file in addition to its introduction as Exhibit 10 (E8:19, 4, 
22). That robbery is referred to in the prison file in rap sheets, 
booking sheets, warrants, newspaper articles, and other documents at 
least an additional eleven times. E8:10, 11, 26, 17, 62, 85, 
111-112, 130-33, 139, 146, 151. 
The judgment for the other robbery appears three times in 
the file in addition to its introduction as Exhibit 12 (E8:1C, 7, 
21) and is referred to in the file at least an additional eighteen 
times. E8:10, 24, 62, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89-103, 107, 111-2, 124, 
129, 130-3, 139, 146, 151, 214. 
The judgment for the single escape appears three times (in 
addition to Exhibit 9) (E8:l(b), 5, 23) and is referred to at least 
twenty other times in the file (E8:10, 11, 28, 62, 80, 81, 85, 107, 
111-2, 130-3, 139, 146, 151, 188, 190, 195-204, 210, 252, 253) (see 
prison file index in Addendum L). 
The impact of this repetitious and cumulative evidence was 
to create the incorrect allusion that Mr. Menzies had a far more 
extensive record containing several escapes than he in fact had. 
The prosecutor then relied on this misconception, arguing "How many 
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times do we let someone escape? . . . ." T. 3194. The cumulative 
effect of the repetitious evidence was to emphasize and increase 
aggravating evidence, thereby leading to the arbitrary imposition of 
the death penalty, in violation of the eighth and fourteenth 
amendments. See Johnson v. Mississippi. 486 U.S. 578; Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153; State v. Wood. 648 P.2d 71. 
POINT XXVII. APPLICATION OF THE HEINOUSNESS 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN THE PRESENT CASE 
REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY PHASE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(q) sets forth the following 
aggravating circumstance: 
The homicide was committed in an especially 
heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally 
depraved manner, any of which must be 
demonstrated by physical torture, serious 
physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the 
victim before death. 
In State v. Tuttle. 780 P.2d 1203, 1216 (Utah 1989), this 
Court considered the application of subsection (q) and determined 
that the subsection cannot be interpreted literally and pass 
constitutional muster. Although the concept of heinousness is 
difficult to articulate, Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. at 428, and 
its progeny require that the language of the subsection be 
interpreted to "provide[] a meaningful distinction between capital 
and noncapital murders." Tuttle, 780 P.2d at 1217. 
Furthermore, where a state is a weighing state such as 
Utah, emphasis is given "to the requirement that aggravating factors 
be defined with some degree of precision." Stringer v. Black, 503 
U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1136, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992). 
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In Godfrey, the United States Supreme Court reversed a 
death sentence because an aggravating factor that the murder "was 
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman" failed to guide 
the sentencer since all murders could fit that description. 
In Tuttle, 780 P.2d at 1217, this Court pointed out that 
subsection (q) "is analogous to" the Georgia statute considered in 
Godfrey and relied on Godfrey, stating: 
Thus, the Supreme Court apparently requires not 
only serious physical abuse before death, but 
also that any such abuse evidence a mental state 
materially more depraved or culpable than that of 
most murderers. [citation omitted] Moreover, 
the physical abuse must be qualitatively and 
quantitatively more different and more culpable 
than that necessary to accomplish the murder. 
In other words, for subsection (q) to be applicable, there 
must be evidence of serious physical abuse or torture before death, 
and not just the physical abuse which caused the death, and a more 
depraved mental state than that which is evident in any homicide. 
In State v. Wood. 648 P.2d at 85-6, this Court had 
considered the trial judge's reliance on the "ruthlessness and 
brutality of the murder . . . " as an aggravating circumstance, and 
pointed out that: 
Under the rule established in Godfrey v. Georgia. 
446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 
(1980), there was error in the weighing process 
in this case because the trial court relied on an 
aggravating circumstance which, without some 
limitation, is improper. 
This Court explained further "that the sentencing process 
was flawed because the aggravating factor relied on was 
constitutionally impermissible . . . since it describes all murders" 
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and required that "'ruthlessness and brutality,' as an aggravating 
factor, must be limited to those murders involving an aggravated 
battery or torture." See also Carter. 116 P.2d at 895. 
After Wood, the legislature enacted the current 
subsection (q) "apparently to avoid [the] constitutional infirmity" 
of the Wood aggravating circumstance. The subsection explicitly 
requires that the heinousness "must be demonstrated by physical 
torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the 
victim before death." (emphasis added) Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-202(1)(h); Carter, 707 P.2d 656. 
The prosecutor's argument in the instant case that the 
homicide was brutal and the trial judge's finding that 
subsection (q) applied in the present case ignored the dictates of 
the statute, Wood and Godfrey. In the present case, there is no 
evidence that physical torture, serious physical abuse, or serious 
bodily injury occurred before death. 
The medical examiner testified that the cause of death was 
"strangulation with stab wounds to the neck contributing to the 
death." T. 1639. He clarified that the strangulation and stab 
wounds were both potentially fatal, that they occurred within a 
short proximity of each other, and that Ms. Hunsaker died quickly. 
T. 1640-1; 1619-21. The ligature marks on the wrists were 
contemporaneous with the stab wounds. T. 1666-7. 
As was the case in Tuttle, 780 P.2d at 1218, there is no 
evidence in this case that the murderer "intended to do or in fact 
did anything but kill his victim . . . ." Also similar to Tuttle. 
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although the method of killing "is gory and distasteful, there is 
absolutely no evidence that [he] had a quicker or less painful 
method available to him or that he was an expert at such matters and 
intentionally refrained from administering one wound that would have 
caused instantaneous death in favor of a number of wounds that would 
prolong the victim's life and suffering." Id. 
In addition, there is no evidence of mental depravity 
beyond that which is evident in any homicide. In People v. 
Davenport, 710 P.2d 861, 875 (Cal. 1985), the court stated: 
The very use of the term torture to describe the 
class of murders to which the subdivision applies 
necessarily imports into the statute a 
requirement that the perpetrator have the 
sadistic intent to cause the victim to suffer 
pain in addition to the pain of death, which 
intent is distinct from the intent to cause the 
victim's death. 
See also State v. Cornell, 741 P.2d 501 (Or. 1987); Jackson v. 
State, 451 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1984); Tuttle, 780 P.2d at 1217. The 
trial judge and prosecutor failed to limit the construction of 
subsection (q) as required by Wood and Godfrey, in violation of the 
eighth amendment. T. 3250, 3209. See Sochor v. Florida, 504 
U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2121, 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992). 
Cf. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 
(1990). 
The reliance on subsection (q) and/or the "brutality" of 
the homicide as an aggravating factor is eighth amendment error 
which requires vacating the death sentence. See Sochor, 112 S.Ct. 
at 2119. fl[I]n a state where the sentencer weighs aggravating and 
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mitigating circumstances, the weighing of an invalid aggravating 
circumstance violates the Eighth Amendment." Espinoza v. 
Florida. U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 2926, L.Ed.2d (1992), 
citing Sochor v. Florida. 504 U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2119, 119 
L.Ed.2d 326 (1992); Stringer v. Black. 503 U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 1130, 
1140, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992); Parker v. Dugger. 498 U.S. , 111 
S.Ct. 731, 738, 112 L.Ed.2d 812 (1991); Clemons v. Mississippi. 494 
U.S. 738, 752, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 1450, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990). 
The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that "close 
appellate scrutiny of the import and effect of invalid aggravating 
factors [is required] to implement the well-established Eighth 
Amendment requirement of individualized sentencing determinations in 
death penalty cases." Stringer. 112 S.Ct. at 1136. In Stringer, 
the Court compared an invalid aggravating circumstance to a "thumb 
on a scale" weighing in favor of death and acknowledged that such 
factors create the possibility of "randomness" and "bias in favor of 
the death penalty." Stringer. 112 S.Ct. at 1137, 1139. Therefore, 
in order not to violate the eighth amendment and to assure 
individualized sentencing, the effect of an invalid aggravating 
factor must be carefully assessed. 
In Carter. 776 P.2d at 895, this Court invalidated a death 
sentence based on the failure to instruct the jury that in order to 
find that subsection (q) applied, it must determine that "physical 
torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the 
victim [occurred] before death." Despite the existence of another 
aggravating circumstance, the uncertainty as to whether the jury 
- 162 -
would have imposed the death penalty had they been properly 
instructed required a new penalty hearing. The uncertainty in the 
present case likewise requires a new penalty hearing. 
POINT XXVIII. APPLICATION OF THE "PREVENTING A 
WITNESS FROM TESTIFYING" AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE 
REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY PHASE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(i) sets forth the following 
aggravating circumstance: 
(1) The homicide was committed for the purpose 
of: (i) preventing a witness from testifying; 
(ii) preventing a person from providing evidence 
or participating in any legal proceedings or 
official investigation; (iii) retaliating against 
a person for testifying, providing evidence, or 
participating in any legal proceedings or 
official investigation; or (iv) disrupting or 
hindering any lawful governmental function or 
enforcement of laws. 
The State argued this aggravating circumstance during the 
penalty phase, speculating that the homicide occurred to keep 
Ms. Hunsaker from testifying against Appellant at a trial of the 
robbery which the State claimed occurred as part of this case. 
T. 3202, 3209.64 The trial judge relied on this aggravating 
circumstance in imposing the death sentence. T. 3250. 
Application of subsection (i) to this case requires a new 
penalty hearing because (1) the interpretation given subsection (i) 
in the instant case could apply to almost any homicide and fails to 
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, and 
64. In closing, defense counsel stated, "Iflve eliminated any 
mention of torture or brutality or to eliminate a witness because, 
your honor, legally speaking, those are factors which this court 
cannot consider." T. 3222. 
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(2) the evidence does not support the determination. 
The language outlining aggravating circumstances must be 
interpreted in a sufficiently narrow manner so as to pass 
constitutional muster. See State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d at 1215-9; 
Wood, 648 P.2d at 85-6. The proper interpretation of this 
subsection requires that the decedent would have been a witness in a 
separate proceeding involving a crime which is distinct from the 
incident surrounding her own death. See Brown, 607 P.2d at 267 
(upholding application of this aggravating circumstance where 
decedent had been subpoenaed to testify against defendant in a trial 
for a distinct crime, and evidence showed defendant knew that 
decedent was to be a witness against him and had told others that he 
would kill decedent); State v. Griffin, 685 P.2d 546, 549 (Utah 
1984) (upholding jury verdict where evidence showed that defendant 
intended to kill woman to keep her from testifying in separate 
burglary trial). 
Other courts have interpreted similar statutory aggravating 
circumstances to require that there be a pending judicial proceeding 
involving circumstances distinct from the events surrounding the 
homicide in order for the aggravating circumstance to apply. See, 
e.g., State v. Williams, 652 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. banc 1983); 
Commonwealth v. Crawley, 526 A.2d 334 (Pa. 1987); Commonwealth v. 
Caldwell, 532 A.2d 813 (Pa. 1987); see also Ala. Code 
§ 13A-5-40(a)(14) (requiring separate proceeding be in place for 
aggravating circumstance to apply); Cal. Crim. Code § 190.2(10) 
(1989) (statute explicitly precludes application of aggravating 
- 164 -
circumstance to circumstances surrounding homicide itself); Idaho 
Code § 19-2525(g)(10) (Supp. 1989) (limits application of 
aggravating circumstances to situation where decedent was witness in 
separate judicial proceeding). 
In order to adequately channel and narrow the application 
of the death penalty, subsection (i) must be interpreted to require 
that legal proceedings or an official investigation separate from 
the events surrounding the homicide be pending. The application of 
this aggravating circumstance where no separate proceedings or 
investigation existed violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments 
since it could otherwise apply in almost any homicide where the 
defendant had committed other bad acts as part of the homicide. 
In addition, the State failed to introduce evidence 
demonstrating that the homicide occurred to keep Ms. Hunsaker from 
testifying. The State speculated, as can be done in any homicide 
where an underlying felony is involved, that Ms. Hunsaker was killed 
to prevent her from testifying in this case (T. 3209) but failed to 
introduce evidence supporting such speculation. 
The application of subsection (i) violates the eighth 
amendment. Since the judge relied on this aggravating circumstance, 
the sentence must be vacated. 
POINT XXIX. APPLICATION OF THE PECUNIARY GAIN 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY 
HEARING. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(f) provides: 
(f) The homicide was committed for pecuniary or 
other personal gain. 
- 165 -
Although the State neither charged subsection (f) nor urged its 
application, the trial judge sua sponte considered and relied on 
this aggravating circumstance in imposing sentence. 
The trial judge's reliance on this aggravating circumstance 
was improper since the aggravating circumstance duplicates the 
robbery aggravating circumstance. Unless the circumstance is 
interpreted to require something other than the robbery which had 
already been found, the circumstance is vague and fails to channel 
since it would allow the sentencer to take a single act—a 
robbery—and turn it into two aggravating circumstances in any 
homicide where a robbery occurred. See generally Furman, 408 U.S. 
328; Gregg, 428 U.S. 153. 
In cases in which this Court has applied the pecuniary gain 
aggravating circumstance, a pecuniary gain other than that which 
flows from the robbery was anticipated. For example, in State v. 
Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1226-7 (Utah 1986), this Court examined 
subsection (f) in the narrowed circumstance where "the defendant 
wanted her father murdered because [he] had cut defendant off 
financially, and she wanted to get her inheritance," and approved 
the subsection in that narrow context.65 
In State v. Valdez. 748 P.2d 1050, 1053 (Utah 1987), this 
Court found sufficient evidence to support the pecuniary gain 
aggravating circumstance where the decedent had filed a paternity 
65. In Shaffer, 725 P.2d at 1306 (Utah 1986), the defendant claimed 
that subsection (f) was vague, in violation of the eighth and 
fourteenth amendments and Article I, §§7 and 9 of the Utah 
constitution. This Court did not reach the merits of the claim. 
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action for support against the defendant. In Johnson, 774 P.2d 
1141, where the defendant held a life insurance policy on the 
decedent, this Court upheld the application of the aggravating 
circumstance. In each instance where the aggravating circumstance 
has been upheld, evidence separate from the elements of the crime 
has shown that the defendant stood to gain financially by the death. 
Because any robbery is committed for pecuniary gain, 
application of subsection f) violated the eighth and fourteenth 
amendments to the United States constitution. The application of 
the circumstance requires a new penalty phase because this Court 
cannot be certain, especially where the court sua sponte relied on 
the circumstance, that it did not affect the outcome. See 
discussion infra at 167. 
POINT XXX. RELIANCE ON UNCHARGED AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES DURING SENTENCING REQUIRES A NEW 
PENALTY PHASE. 
In the present case, the State charged three statutory 
aggravating circumstances in the Information: the homicide was 
committed during the course of a robbery or aggravated robbery 
(subsection (d)), the homicide was committed during the course of a 
kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping (subsection (d)), and the 
defendant had previously been convicted of two violent felonies 
(subsection (h)). R. 48.66 
The jury found both aggravating circumstances. T. 898. 
66. The trial judge ruled that subsection (h) was unconstitutional, 
so that aggravating circumstance was stricken. 
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During the penalty phase, the prosecutor argued two additional 
uncharged aggravating circumstances applied: (1) heinousness 
(T. 2721), and (2) preventing a witness from testifying (T. 2721-2, 
1724). The trial judge relied on these two uncharged aggravating 
circumstances and sua sponte relied on another uncharged aggravating 
circumstance, pecuniary gain, in passing sentence. T. 3249. 
"Notice of issues to be resolved by the adversary process 
is a fundamental characteristic of fair procedure." Lankford v. 
Idaho, 500 U.S. , 111 S.Ct. , 114 L.Ed.2d 173 (1991). 
There is no question that the Fourteenth 
Amendment encompasses the right to fair notice of 
criminal charges. The Supreme Court in 
In re Oliver. 333 U.S. 257, 273, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 
L.Ed.2d 682 (1948), in dealing with the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
stated that: 
A person's right to reasonable notice of a 
charge against him, and an opportunity to be 
heard in his defense—a right to his day in 
court—are basic to our system of jurisprudence. 
Watson v. Jacro. 558 F.2d 330, 338 (6th Cir. 1977). 
"The Utah Constitution contains at least two possible 
sources of a right to adequate notice of criminal charges: 
article I, section 7 and article I, section 12." State v. Fulton, 
742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987); Laffertv, 749 P.2d at 1261. Although 
this Court has not distinguished the scope of the two provisions, it 
has recognized that: 
The crux of both theories is that a criminal 
defendant must be sufficiently apprised of the 
particulars of the charge to be able to 
"adequately prepare his defense." State v. 
Burnett, 712 P.2d at 262; accord McNair v. 
Hayward, 666 P.2d at 326. 
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Fulton, 742 P.2d at 1214. 
In Andrews v. Morris. 607 P.2d 816, 823 (Utah 1980), this 
Court noted that the listing of eight aggravating circumstances in 
§ 76-5-202 puts a defendant on notice of "what the State must prove 
and thus [is] able to prepare his defense." 
By contrast, § 76-5-202 now contains seventeen aggravating 
circumstances, many of which contain subcategories. A capital 
defendant who is aware of the statute is nevertheless not "apprised 
of the particulars of the charge to be able to 'adequately prepare 
his defense.'11 Nor does Andrews address the state constitutional 
lack of notice claim. 
Mr. Menzies waived his right to a jury during the penalty 
phase without notice that these additional circumstances would be 
pursued. The lack of notice violated the fourteenth amendment and 
Article I, §§7 and 12 of the Utah constitution. See Hubbard, 500 
So.2d at 1215; Lankford v. Idaho, 114 L.Ed.2d 173 (1991). 
In addition, statutory aggravating circumstances (a) 
through (q) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 are elements of the crime 
of capital homicide. See generally State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 
556-7 (Utah 1989); Andrews v. Shulsen. 600 F.Supp. 408, 420-1 (D.C. 
1984). As elements of the substantive offense, they should be 
alleged and proven in the guilt/innocence phase. See Hubbard v. 
State, 500 So.2d 1204, 1215 (Ala. Crim. App.), aff'd. 500 So.2d 1231 
(Ala. 1986), cert, denied 480 U.S. 940 (1987). 
Allowing the State to raise additional statutory 
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circumstances during the penalty phase permits the State to 
"sandbag" an aggravating circumstance with evidentiary problems, 
then rely on such weak aggravating circumstance during the penalty 
phase, where evidentiary rules are relaxed. Furthermore, in light 
of the jury verdict, the ease of finding the additional 
circumstances is increased; had all been charged in the 
guilt/innocence phase, the presumption of innocence would have 
attached to all equally. See State v. Bartholomew, 683 P.2d 1079 
(Wash. 1984); Lafferty. 749 P.2d at 1262-3 (Stewart, J., dissenting 
and concurring). 
Relying on the uncharged statutory aggravating 
circumstances violated due process, the eighth amendment, and 
Article I, §§7 and 12 of the Utah constitution. 
POINT XXXI. ADMISSION OF THE ADULT AND JUVENILE 
RAP SHEETS DURING THE PENALTY PHASE WAS 
REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
The State introduced Exhibit 15, a rap sheet which 
contained a number of unadjudicated crimes. T. 2850. Although the 
trial judge suggested that crimes for which there were no 
convictions be blocked out and never formally admitted the exhibit, 
Exhibit 15 was apparently admitted and included in the exhibits in 
this case. (See exhibit box.) 
Exhibit 16, which was admitted (T. 2865) contains charges 
of burglary, automobile theft and one escape for which there is no 
conviction. 
In addition, the prison file contains various rap sheets 
with unadjudicated crimes. E8:10, 84, 85, 86, 87, 107. 
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The court also admitted a juvenile rap sheet which 
contained numerous entries for which there was no outcome and relied 
on the number of arrests in assessing sentence. Exhibit 1C; T. 2904. 
Admission of the rap sheets violated due process, the 
eighth amendment and the Utah Rules of Evidence. Charges of escape, 
automobile theft and burglary appeared on Exhibit 16 but were 
apparently dismissed, and the State made no attempt to prove them. 
Hence, the eighth amendment and due process requirements outlined in 
Lafferty. 749 P.2d at 1259, were not met. The State made no attempt 
to prove other crimes appearing on Exhibit 15, 16 or 1-C, including 
possession of a stolen vehicle, contributing, another burglary, and 
some thefts. Appellant has been convicted of two aggravated 
robberies, one escape and two thefts. Exhibits 9, 10 and 12. 
Introduction of the rap sheets without proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Appellant committed the other crimes violated due process 
and the eighth amendment. See Id.67 
In addition, admission of the rap sheets violated 
Appellant's right to confrontation during the penalty phase. See 
Beltran v. Texas, 728 S.W.2d 382, 386-88 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987); 
Lanier, 533 So.2d at 488-90; Balfour v. Mississippi. 598 So.2d 731 
67. The rap sheet was inadmissible hearsay. Rule 801, Utah Rules 
of Evidence; Beltran. 728 S.W.2d 382. Nor was the proper foundation 
laid for admission of State's Exhibit 15 and 16. It is not a 
self-authenticating document pursuant to Rule 902, Utah Rules of 
Evidence. The certificate does not contain a seal and therefore 
does not comply with paragraph (1), (2) or (3) of Rule 902, as 
required by paragraph (4) of that same rule. See generally State v. 
Lamorie, 610 P.2d at 346-8. Nor did Sgt. Illsey's testimony 
authenticate the document. 
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(Miss. 1992); Harris v. State. 1992 WL 136496 (Ala. Cr. App. 1992).68 
Although in Tavlor. 818 P.2d at 1034, this Court held that 
juvenile offenses are relevant to sentencing in a capital case,69 it 
required that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that such 
crimes occurred in order to comply with due process and the eighth 
amendment. 
The failure to prove unadjudicated crimes which appear on 
the rap sheets violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 
POINT XXXII. THE ADMISSION OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE 
CORPSE WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Over defendants objection, the trial judge admitted during 
the penalty phase two photographs of the corpse as State's Exhibits 
6 and 7. T. 2833-2838, 2882. In admitting the photographs, the 
trial judge reasoned that: 
those pictures would be helpful to the Court in 
observing what the scene was. Although it's been 
described, I think the pictures would give the 
Court a better picture. It doesn't appear to be 
gruesome as far as the Court is aware, that 
State's 6 and 7 depicts especially, essentially 
the scene. 
T. 2882-3. 
Contrary to the trial judge's ruling, neither exhibit shows 
68. In a noncapital case, the court recognized in Brothers v. 
Dowdle. 817 F.2d 1388, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987), that a "court may not 
impose a more severe punishment simply because the defendant in some 
way entangled with the police." 
69. Despite the holding in Taylor and for purposes of preserving 
this issue for further review, if necessary, Mr. Menzies notes that 
he maintains that juvenile offenses, and particularly unadjudicated 
offenses, should not be admissible in the penalty phase since the 
passage of time and lack of conviction make such entries unreliable, 
in violation of due process and the eighth amendment. 
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the crime scene. Exhibit 6 is a close-up of the mouth, chin and 
gaping neck wounds; Exhibit 7 shows the head and upper torso, 
focusing on neck wounds. The exhibits appear to have been taken as 
part of the autopsy. 
The photographs had no probative value and were therefore 
admitted in violation of Rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1983). Even if they had depicted the crime scene, admitting them 
in order to give the trial court an accurate impression of the scene 
for evaluation of the subsection (q) aggravating factor was 
improper.70 
In Tuttle. 780 P.2d at 1219 n.18 (Utah 1989), this Court 
pointed out, "[i]n Godfrey, the Court noted that the gruesomeness of 
the murder scene is entirely irrelevant to a determination of its 
heinousness. See Godfrey. 446 U.S. at 433 n.16, 100 S.Ct. at 1767 
n.16." 
In addition, the photographs did not accurately depict the 
wounds as they had been inflicted. During cross-examination in the 
guilt phase, Dr. Sweeney testified that the nature of skin 
elasticity makes cuts gape after incisions are made, making the 
resulting wounds shorter and wider than the original cut marks. 
T. 1644-1648. Dr. Sweeney also testified that as a result of the 
time lapse between death and the autopsy, the photographs showed 
dark patterns from settled blood which might have appeared to be 
70. The State incorrectly argued that the pictures were relevant to 
establish as an aggravating factor the brutal nature of the murder. 
T. 2834-5. 
- 173 -
injuries but were not. T. 1669. 
Furthermore, information regarding the wounds and crime 
scene was presented through the testimony of Detective Thompson 
(T. 1314-1329) and Dr. Sweeney (T. 1606-1681). Even if there were 
some probative value to the photographs, they were cumulative of 
other evidence. See Laffertv, 749 P.2d at 1257 ("An important 
consideration in assessing the probative value of a photograph is 
whether the facts shown by the photograph can be established by 
other means."). 
The photographs therefore had little or no probative value; 
the prejudicial effect of the photographs based on their 
gruesomeness made them inadmissible under the Rules of Evidence. 
See State v. Laffertv. 749 P.2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988), overruled on 
other grounds, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1992) (pointing out that 
gruesome photographs of a corpse fall in a special category of 
evidence which has "an unusually strong propensity to unfairly 
prejudice, inflame, or mislead" and requiring "a showing of unusual 
probative value" before such evidence is admissible under Rule 403); 
State v. Cloud. 722 P.2d 750, 752-3 (Utah 1986). 
The color photographs were taken two days after the death, 
were close-ups, did not prove disputed facts, and were gruesome. 
These factors also weigh against admission. See Lafferty, 749 P.2d 
at 1257. ("Other factors will also come into play in the balancing 
process. These may include whether the photographs are in color or 
black and white, when they were taken in relation to the crime, 
whether they are close-ups or enlargements, their degree of 
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gruesomeness, and the cumulative nature of the evidence, and whether 
facts shown are disputed by the defendant,") 
Admission of the photographs also violated Mr. Menzies' 
fourteenth amendment due process rights and eighth amendment right 
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. In State v. Laffertv. 
749 P.2d at 1259, this Court recognized that: 
under Gregg [v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-4 
(1976)], the federal constitutional right of the 
accused to due process and to be free from cruel 
and unusual punishment are violated by the 
admission of unfairly prejudicial evidence in the 
penalty phase. 
The trial judge's error in admitting the photographs 
requires reversal since the prosecutor relied on the photographs to 
establish the heinousness aggravating factor. T. 2834-5, 2721, 
2836, 3238.71 
In State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 477 (Utah 1988), this 
Court held that it was error to admit three photographs of the 
wounds of one of the victims. Two of the three photographs had no 
probative value in light of the medical examiner's testimony, and 
"[cumulatively and individually, the photographs had great 
potential for unfairly prejudicing defendant." Although "[tjhe 
photographs were inflammatory and had significant power to prejudice 
the jury unfairly," this Court determined that the error was 
71. Admitting this evidence during the penalty phase to the bench 
does not dissipate the prejudicial effect of the error. By 
admitting the photographs, Judge Uno relied on inadmissible evidence 
in reaching his decision. See Lafferty. 749 P.2d at 1256-7, 1258 
(addressing admissibility of photographs during penalty phase under 
rules of evidence); State v. Howard. 544 P.2d 466, 470 (Utah 1975); 
State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
- 175 -
harmless "in light of defendant's gruesome confession, detailing how 
he brutally murdered the victims . . . ." Id, 
By contrast, no confession existed in this case, and the 
State's case in chief was built on circumstantial evidence. The 
delicate weighing that occurs in the penalty phase and the need for 
reliability in imposing the death penalty require reversal of the 
death sentence based on this error. 
POINT XXXIII. THE PROSECUTOR'S ARGUMENT THAT THE 
DEATH PENALTY SHOULD BE IMPOSED BECAUSE OTHERWISE 
APPELLANT MIGHT BE PAROLED REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY 
PHASE. 
The prosecutor argued that the death penalty should be 
imposed because otherwise Appellant might be paroled. T. 3211. The 
judge relied on this argument in imposing death. T. 3254. 
The argument is not supported by the evidence. There is no 
evidence that an individual with Mr. Menzies' background would ever 
be paroled. In fact, Paul Sheffield testified that someone with 
such a background would probably never be paroled. T. 3119-20. Of 
the twenty-five capital homicide defendants serving life sentences 
who have appeared before the full-time Board, only eight have 
received parole dates. T. 3117, 3123. The average term for such 
"special" defendants who had presented sufficient mitigation or 
rehabilitation evidence is twenty years. T. 3123. That average 
includes the sentence of Frances Schreuder, an extraordinary 
defendant with a background as a socialite, no criminal history, and 
no further reason to kill. T. 3126. Six others had been given 
natural life, and the remaining eleven had rehearing dates. 
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T. 3122-3.72 
Nonetheless, even if the evidence did demonstrate that 
Mr. Menzies might be paroled, relying on such a factor for imposing 
a death sentence violates Article I, § 9 of the Utah constitution 
and the eighth and fourteenth amendments. See People v. Walker, 440 
N.E.2d 83 (111. 1982); People v. Szabo. 447 N.E.2d 193 (111. 1983). 
It is well established that the imposition of a death 
sentence must be "based on reason rather than caprice or emotion." 
Gardner. 430 U.S. at 358. Circumstances which are relevant to 
sentence include the character, background and record of the 
defendant and the circumstances surrounding the homicide. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-207; Woodson v. North Carolina. 428 U.S. 280, 304-5 
(1976). Mitigating evidence must be considered to insure that the 
"uniqueness of the individual" plays a vital role in the 
assessment. Lockett v. Ohio. 438 U.S. 556, 605 (1978). 
Speculation that an individual might be paroled if given 
life does not fit within the statutory or eighth amendment 
requirements for aggravating evidence. Such an argument is likely 
to invoke an arbitrary decision to impose death which is based on 
emotion rather than reason. See People v. Holman, 469 N.E.2d at 
134, 135 (111. 1984). 
The trial judge's reliance on this improper aggravating 
72. The prosecutor's argument that the average term for murderers 
was twenty years was a gross misstatement of the evidence. 
Prosecutorial misconduct occurs where argument is not supported by 
the evidence. See Holman, 469 N.E.2d at 134 ("Parties in closing 
argument may not go beyond the scope of the evidence presented and 
facts fairly inferable therefrom."). See also Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 36. 
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factor requires a new trial since this Court cannot be cerain that 
in the absence of concern that Appellant might be paroled, the trial 
judge would have imposed the death penalty. 
POINT XXXIV. THE LEGISLATIVE CHANGE IN THE DEATH 
PENALTY DEMONSTRATES THAT THE DEATH SENTENCE IN 
THIS CASE IS UNNECESSARILY RIGOROUS, IN VIOLATION 
OF ARTICLE I. SECTION 9 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
As previously outlined in Point 33 supra, the prosecutor 
improperly argued that Judge Uno should impose the death penalty 
because otherwise the Board of Pardons might parole Appellant and 
that the judge had a duty to protect the community from a Ralph 
Menzies who "could be put back on the street." T. 3211. 
The trial judge relied on the possibility of parole in 
imposing sentence. T. 3254. 
The recent legislative change which allows for life without 
possibility of parole (see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207.5 (1992)) 
precludes a decision to impose death based on the possibility of 
parole in all cases where the offender is sentenced on or after 
April 27, 1992. This change in the process by which the death 
sentence is imposed emphasizes the "unnecessary rigor" with which 
the death sentence is imposed where it is based on a fear that the 
person will eventually be paroled. See State v. Andrews, 191 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 30, 39 (Utah 1992) (Durham, J., dissenting). 
Imposition of a death sentence based on fear that the 
individual will be paroled is unnecessarily rigorous because 
"incapacitation . . . can be achieved through means less rigorous 
than death," and imposing a death sentence because it is "the only 
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way to incapacitate a defendant" is therefore unnecessarily 
rigorous. Id. 
In addition, the change in the law whereby the entire 
process or "calculus" for imposing a death sentence has changed so 
that no future capital defendant will be given a death sentence out 
of fear that he will be paroled demonstrates the fundamental 
unfairness and unnecessary rigor of allowing this sentence to stand 
where the prosecutor's argument relied strongly on the threat to 
society if Appellant were given a life sentence and the judge relied 
on such basis in imposing sentence. 
Finally, for the reasons outlined above, imposition of the 
death penalty based on the possibility that the defendant will be 
paroled violates the eighth amendment. It is cruel and unusual to 
punish a defendant with death where there are other means to 
"incapacitate" him and where no future defendants will be put to 
death for this reason. 
POINT XXXV. REVERSIBLE ERROR OCCURRED WHERE THE 
TRIAL JUDGE RELIED ON THE PROSECUTORS ARGUMENT 
THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF ESCAPE REQUIRED 
IMPOSITION OF A DEATH SENTENCE. 
During penalty phase closing, the prosecutor also argued 
that the trial judge should impose the death penalty because 
otherwise Appellant might escape. T. 3211. In reaching his 
decision to impose a death sentence, Judge Uno relied on the 
speculation that Appellant might escape if given a life sentence. 
T. 3254. 
The erroneous nature of this argument is similar to the 
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erroneous nature of the possibility of parole—it is speculation 
which appeals to the passions and emotions of the sentencer, 
resulting in an arbitrary sentence based on emotion rather than 
reason. See discussion in Point 33, supra at 176. 
In Holman. 469 N.E.2d at 133-5, the Court held that 
reversible error occurred where the prosecutor argued that 
imposition of the death penalty would preclude the defendant from 
having an opportunity to escape. The Court stated: 
Unsupported predictions as to the kind of crimes 
the defendant will commit if not executed are 
even more to be condemned than references to the 
possibility of parole, for they convey more 
directly to jurors the vivid, but misleading, 
message that the death penalty is the only way to 
protect society from the defendant and forestall 
his violence. (See People v. Murtishaw (1981), 
29 Cal. 3d 733, 773, 631 P.2d 446, 470, 175 Cal. 
Rptr. 738, 762, cert, denied (1982), 455 U.S. 
922, 102 S.Ct. 1280, 71 L.Ed.2d 464). The 
statements made here had no function other than 
to appeal to the passions and fears of the jury 
and increase the likelihood that the sentence it 
would recommend would be based on emotion rather 
than on reason. 
Id. at 135; Collier v. State. 705 P.2d 1126, 1130 (Nev. 1985) 
(remarks about possibility of escape improper. 
In addition, because there are means short of death to 
prevent an escape, as evidenced by the fact that Appellant and 
several other capital defendants have been successfully incarcerated 
at the Utah State Prison, imposition of death based on this 
consideration is unduly rigorous and results in cruel and unusual 
punishment. See discussion supra at 178 regarding legislative 
change. 
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The prosecutor's argument in the instant case improperly 
appealed to emotion and fear: 
Secondly, I think the court has to consider 
this question. How many people have to be 
injured, maimed, tortured, or murdered before we 
say this is enough.73 
Number three. How many times do we let 
someone escape from the Utah State Prison before 
we say "no more." 
T. 3194. The prosecutor also argued that Mr. Menzies might be 
released through parole or escape and that the judge had 
a duty to this city, this community, this state, 
and it is a duty to protect the citizens who live 
here against people like Ralph Menzies. 
T. 3211. See generally Collier v. State, 705 P.2d at 1130. The 
fact that Judge Uno relied on these appeals to emotion in sentencing 
underscores the unfairness of the sentencing proceeding in this case. 
POINT XXXVI. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT 
IN PENALTY PHASE CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
In determining whether prosecutorial misconduct requires a 
73. This argument appeals to the passions of the trial judge, 
mischaracterizes the evidence, and relies on the implication created 
by the repetitious material in the prison file and the evidence 
unadjudicated bad acts presented, but not proven, in the penalty 
phase that Mr. Menzies had been convicted of more than one escape. 
Mr. Menzies has been convicted on one escape which involved a 
walkaway from minimum security. 
In addition, the State failed to present any evidence 
suggesting that Mr. Menzies would be housed in a less secure area of 
the prison if he were given life rather than death. The Utah State 
Prison does not have a separate "Death Row" and persons serving life 
sentences are housed in the maximum security Uintah II along with 
Death Row inmates. 
Furthermore, the State presented no evidence that any 
inmate has ever escaped from Uintah II, the current maximum security 
facility. The prosecutor's argument was wholly speculative, 
appealing to passions and fear, and is not a reliable or appropriate 
basis for imposition of the death sentence. 
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new trial, a two-step test is applied. State v. Span. 819 P.2d at 
335; Troy. 688 P.2d at 486. The first step requires a determination 
of whether "the remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters 
which they would not be justified in considering in determining 
their verdict." Id. The second step involves an assessment of 
whether the remarks probably influenced the decision. Id. 
In the penalty phase, the prosecutor at least twice 
referred to Mr. Menzies as a psychopath (T. 3242, 3212), told the 
judge that he had "a duty to protect the citizens who live here 
against people like Ralph Menzies and his conduct" (T. 3211), then 
concluded by again labeling Mr. Menzies as a psychopath and reading 
from and relying on a book about psychopaths which was not in 
evidence (T. 3212-3). The prosecutor stated: 
ERNIE JONES: Your honor, in a book called "Over 
the Edge" by Jonathan Kellerman, he gives a 
description of a psychopath. That is the same 
conclusion that Judge Larson reached about the 
defendant in 1976, and I think Mr. Kellerman#s 
description of a psychopath fits this case 
perfectly. 
"The course of the psychopaths is as 
unpredictable as a flash fire in a windstorm. 
The first things psychopaths often attempt after 
being caught is to feign insanity. The Yorkshire 
Ripper had tried it. as did Charles Manson, and 
the Son of Sam. All had failed but not before 
fooling several experts." 
The author, Jonathan Kellerman, said this about 
the psychopaths. "He is the beast who walks 
upright. Meet him on the street and he seems 
normal, even charming. But he roams those 
streets parasitic and cold-eyed stocking his prey 
behind the veneer of civility. The rules and 
regulations that separate humans from savages 
don't concern him. 'Do unto others as you damned 
well please,' is his creed." 
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(emphasis added). T. 3213. The prosecutor quoted further from the 
book, again labeled Appellant a psychopath, then concluded by 
stating, "Your honor, there is no therapy for the evil inside Ralph 
Menzies." T. 3213. 
The only "evidence" that Appellant is a psychopath is a 
hearsay statement included in Exhibit 1-A made by Judge Larson as 
part of the certification proceedings in 1976, twelve years before 
the trial. Judge Larson is not a psychological expert, and his 
loose use of the term "psychopath" in a dated, hearsay report did 
not demonstrate that Appellant is a psychopath. None of the experts 
testifying in this case nor the other psychological reports label 
Appellant as a psychopath. Prosecutorial misconduct occurs where 
the prosecutor's argument is not supported by the evidence. See 
Collier v. State. 705 P.2d 1126, 1129 (Nev. 1985); Emmett, 184 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 36. 
In addition, the book was not in evidence, and dramatically 
reading from it stepped over the line of proper prosecutorial 
conduct. While "it may be proper for counsel to go beyond the 
evidence to discuss general theories of penology such as the merits 
of punishment, deterrence and the death penalty," "[i]n general, 
however, factual matters outside the record are irrelevant and not 
proper subjects for argument." Collier. 705 P.2d at 1129. 
Comparing Mr. Menzies to three notorious killers was also 
improper conduct. It is well established that such comparison 
serves to inflame and "divert the [fact finder's] attention from its 
proper purpose, which is the determination of the proper sentence 
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for the defendant before them, based upon his own past conduct." 
Collier. 705 P.2d at 1129; see also Trov. 688 P.2d at 486 
(prosecutorial misconduct to compare defendant to notorious 
criminals). 
By injecting his personal opinion that the description in 
the book fit Appellant, the prosecutor committed misconduct. 
Collier, 705 P.2d at 1130; Howard v. State. 800 P.2d 175, 178 (Nev. 
1990) . 
The improper argument was harmful and probably influenced 
Judge Uno's decision to impose the death penalty. See Troy, 688 
P.2d at 486-7. The judge indicated that his greatest concern was 
for "the innocent victim or the victims in the future" (T. 3269) and 
imposed the death penalty based in part on his desire to protect 
society from Appellant. T. 3269-70. The improper argument most 
certainly impacted on this concern. 
POINT XXXVII. THE ADMISSION OF VICTIM IMPACT 
EVIDENCE VIOLATED THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
During the guilt/innocence phase, the State introduced 
victim impact evidence regarding the effect of Ms. Hunsaker's death 
on her young children and unemployed husband. T. 975-6, 978-9, 982, 
988. During the penalty phase, even though Mr. Menzies had not been 
convicted of an aggravated assault on Valfua Lelaetafea, the State 
introduced evidence regarding the extent of the taxi driver's 
injuries and the resultant pain and suffering. T. 2795-6.74 
74. Over defense objection, Mr. Lelaetafea partially disrobed and 
showed the court his injury. Because the shooting was not 
(continued) 
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The State argued that Appellant's impact on his victims 
justified the death penalty. T. 3199, 3210.75 Despite a finding 
that the shooting of the taxi driver was unintentional, the trial 
judge relied on the extent of the injury in assessing sentence. 
T. 3265, 3254. He also relied on the victim impact evidence 
regarding Maureen Hunsaker and her family and the "scarring" of Carl 
McBrayer. T. 3254. 
At the time this case was tried, the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 
96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), that consideration of victim impact evidence 
during the penalty phase violates the eighth amendment was in 
place. In Booth, the victim impact evidence consisted of 
descriptions of "the personal characteristics of the victims and the 
emotional impact of the crimes on the family . . . [and] set forth 
the family members' opinions and characterizations of the crimes and 
the defendant." Id. at 520. 
The rationale for excluding victim impact evidence is that 
in order to avoid arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death 
penalty, the focus in capital sentencing must be on the facts of the 
crime and the character of the defendant. Id. at 502. The impact 
of the crime on the victim or his or her family is irrelevant. Id. 
(footnote 74 continued) 
intentional (T. 3265, 3251-2), this display was irrelevant. In 
addition, it was highly inflammatory and constituted victim impact 
evidence. The trial court erred in permitting this display. 
75. Although the prosecutor argued that "there is no question that 
[Mr. Menzies] has left his mark on Carl McBrayer" (T. 3210), there 
was no impact evidence admitted in support of this statement. 
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at 504. In addition, victim impact evidence is inflammatory and 
difficult to rebut. 
After the trial in the instant case, the Court issued its 
decision in South Carolina v. Gathers. 490 U.S. 805, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 
104 L.Ed.2d 876 (1989). Gathers upheld Booth and reversed a death 
sentence because the prosecutor's comments on the victim's character 
was "'unnecessary to an understanding of the circumstances of the 
crime' . . . and 'conveyed the suggestion appellant deserved a death 
sentence because the victim was a religious man and registered 
voter.'" Id. at 882. The Court reiterated that "a sentence of 
death must be related to the moral culpability of the defendant." 
Id. 
Despite the holding in Pavne v. Tennessee. 501 U.S. , 
111 S.Ct. , 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), reversing Booth and Gathers, 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court adhere to the 
rationale expressed in Booth and Gathers and adopted in Gardner, 789 
P.2d at 286, in deciding whether victim impact evidence offends 
Article I, § 9 of the Utah constitution. 
The two dissents in Payne outline the problems with the 
Pavne decision. Justice Stevens (joined by Justice Blackmun) 
pointed out that the Booth decision was consistent with historical 
practices and that the introduction of victim impact evidence is "of 
recent origin." 115 L.Ed.2d at 757. 
Victim impact evidence, as used in this case, has 
two flaws, both related to the Eighth Amendment's 
command that the punishment of death may not be 
meted out arbitrarily and capriciously. First, 
aspects of the character of the victim 
unforeseeable to the defendant at the time of his 
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crime are irrelevant to the defendant's "personal 
responsibility and moral guilt" and therefore 
cannot justify a death sentence. 
Second, the quantity and quality of victim impact 
evidence sufficient to turn a verdict of life in 
prison into death is not defined until after the 
crime has been committed and therefore cannot 
possibly be applied consistently in different 
cases. The sentencer's unguided consideration of 
victim impact evidence thus conflicts with the 
principle central to our capital punishment 
jurisprudence that, "where discretion is afforded 
a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the 
determination of whether a human life should be 
taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably 
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk 
of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." 
[citation omitted] Open-ended reliance by a 
capital sentencer on victim impact evidence 
simply does not provide a "principaled way to 
distinguish [cases], in which the death penalty 
[i]s imposed, from the many cases in which it 
[i]s not." [citation omitted] 
Id. at 759; see also Justice Marshall's dissent at 748; Defendant's 
Wrongs and Victim's Rights: Pavne v. Tennessee. Ill S.Ct. 2591 
(1991), 27 Harvard L.R. 219, 231-41 (1992) (addressing flaws in 
Payne decision). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 allows evidence regarding "the 
nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's character, 
background, history, [and] mental and physical condition." In 
Gardner, 789 P.2d at 286, this Court relied on Booth to exclude 
victim impact evidence which the defendant attempted to introduce in 
mitigation. This Court pointed out that "testimony offered 
regarding the opposition of the victim's associates to the death 
penalty was likewise properly excluded as irrelevant to the 
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character of the accused or the nature of the crime" (emphasis 
added). 
Despite the holding in Payne, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 and 
Article I, § 9 of the Utah constitution preclude the use of the 
victim impact evidence in this case. This Court should adhere to 
the rationale and holding in Booth, which was in place at the time 
of this trial, and find that reversible error occurred. 
POINT XXXVIII. THE ADMISSION OF THE TESTIMONY OF 
DR. PATRICIA SMITH VIOLATED THE RULES OF 
EVIDENCE, DUE PROCESS AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT. 
Dr. Smith never interviewed or met Appellant; instead, she 
reached her conclusions by reviewing portions of the prison file, 
including several hearsay evaluations, presentence reports, 
psychiatric evaluations, and Mr. Menzies' juvenile and adult 
criminal history, including verbal reports of that history from the 
prosecution. T. 3144-5, 3148. Her review left her with "no idea if 
this patient is learning, disabled, organic, or anything of this 
sort." T. 3151. 
Over Appellant's repeated objections, Dr. Smith testified 
that Appellant is aggressive (T. 3157), an anti-social personality 
(T. 3162-3), and not amenable to treatment.76 T. 3164. She 
reiterated portions of various reports, adopting the conclusions as 
her own, and testified, again borrowing from a hearsay report, that 
76. It is interesting to note that during cross-examination, when 
asked to read aloud a report in which a psychologist indicated that 
Mr. Menzies thought he needed to change and needed help doing so, 
Dr. Smith twice misread the report to say Appellant thought he did 
not need help. T. 3174. 
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Appellant had feigned psychosis. T. 3167, 3168. Although she had 
never talked to Appellant, she relied on what she characterized as 
Appellant's "noncommunicativeness. That is lack of spontaneous 
verbalization regarding why he committed certain acts . . . ." 
T. 3155, 3169. 
Utah law requires a determination of reliability before 
expert testimony can be admitted. State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 
(Utah 1989). Unreliable foundation for expert testimony warrants 
exclusion based on Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence and state and 
federal due process grounds. 
We remain wary of the potential of such evidence 
to distort the fact-finding process by reason of 
its superficial plausibility and its potential 
for inducing fact finders to accept expert's 
judgments on critical issues rather than making 
their own. 
Id. at 26. 
Mr. Menzies has previously outlined the unreliability of 
the reports relied upon by Dr. Smith and has claimed that the 
admission of such reports violated his right to due process, 
confrontation, and a reliable sentencing proceeding under the eighth 
amendment. See discussion supra at 120-35. Reiteration of these 
reports by Dr. Smith, and reliance thereon as a basis for her own 
opinion as to the lack of remorse by Mr. Menzies and his lack of 
amenability to treatment, violates Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence 
and further compounds the constitutional violations outlined above. 
The need for reliability in a sentencing proceeding in a 
capital case precludes admission of such unreliable testimony. 
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Article I, § 9, Utah constitution; eighth amendment, United States 
constitution; Woodson v. North Carolina. 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); 
Gardner, 430 U.S. at 359. 
Unlike Barefoot v. Estelle. 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983), the 
documents relied upon by Dr. Smith were wholly unreliable. 
Dr. Smith's testimony reintroduced evidence, some of which had been 
prepared by people who were not clinically trained, "with the 
inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist's words." Id. at 
916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
In closing, the prosecutor emphasized what he characterized 
as Appellant's lack of ability to change (T. 3205-6) and relied on 
Dr. Smith's testimony that Appellant had feigned psychosis. 
T. 3207, 3208. The lack of reliability in sentencing resulting from 
this improper testimony requires a new penalty phase. 
POINT XXXIX. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ERRORS 
DURING THE PENALTY PHASE REQUIRES A NEW 
SENTENCING HEARING. 
The doctrine of cumulative error allows a new hearing where 
errors combine to deprive a defendant of a fair trial or penalty 
hearing. See State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1987), citing 
State v. Rammel. 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah 1986), quoting State v. 
McKenzie. 608 P.2d 428, 448, cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1501, 101 S.Ct. 
626, 66 L.Ed.2d 507 (1980). 
In the present case, even if this Court believes that the 
errors standing alone do not require a new penalty phase, the 
cumulative effect of the errors in both the penalty and 
guilt/innocence phases was to create a penalty phase which was 
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fundamentally unfair and which allowed for the arbitrary imposition 
of the death penalty, in violation of the eighth and fourteenth 
amendments. 
POINT XXXX. MR. MENZIES' SENTENCE SHOULD BE 
REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY 
APPLIED THE WOOD STANDARD, 
State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83-4 (Utah 1981), established 
the formula for determining the sentence during the penalty phase of 
a capital homicide trial. 
The first step is to determine whether the 
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
second step is to determine whether the death 
penalty is appropriate under all the 
circumstances of the case and in light of the 
defendant's background and life as a whole. 
State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1027 (Utah 1989). 
In reviewing a decision made in a criminal case by the 
judge instead of a jury, this Court need not grant total deference 
to the decision making process followed by the trial court. 
Instead, the appellate court examines all of the evidence in the 
record and can overturn the trial judge's findings if they are 
clearly erroneous. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
A finding is clearly erroneous if it is "without adequate 
evidentiary support, or induced by an erroneous view of the law." 
Id. Even with some evidentiary support, a finding is clearly 
erroneous when the reviewing court looks at the whole record and "is 
left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed." Id. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
EVIDENCE IN AGGRAVATION OUTWEIGHED EVIDENCE IN 
MITIGATION BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
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In addition to the errors at the penalty phase outlined 
elsewhere in this brief, the trial judge improperly assessed whether 
aggravation outweighed mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt. 
It is not clear from the trial judge's transcribed oral 
findings how he applied the evidence under the first prong of 
Wood.77 T. 3248-68. The trial judge did not make written findings 
as required by Lafferty and made no determination that the prior bad 
act evidence had occurred beyond a reasonable doubt. While the 
trial court recited a number of factors (including erroneous 
aggravating circumstances and bad acts not proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt), it does not appear that the trial court weighed 
the substantiality or persuasiveness of the factors, as required by 
Wood, 648 P.2d at 83. Instead, it appears that the judge improperly 
listed and counted the evidence. 
Furthermore, Mr. Menzies' prior criminal record and the 
facts of this case did not outweigh the mitigating factors of his 
childhood, his conciliatory nature, his close relationship with his 
sister, and his ability to work well while in prison. 
The trial judge's determination that aggravation outweighed 
mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt was clearly erroneous. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEATH 
IS THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY. 
The second part of the Wood formula is 
critical. It is not repetitious of the first 
77. The penalty phase ruling is disjointed and appears not to be a 
verbatim transcript of what was said. The court reporter gave the 
notereader Judge Uno's handwritten notes to use in preparing this 
portion of the transcript. T. 50-51. 
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part, and it is not to be applied in a mechanical 
or unthinking fashion. "The fundamental respect 
for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment's 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 
gives rise to a special 'need for reliability in 
the determination that death is the appropriate 
punishment' in any capital case." [citations 
omitted] It is precisely this "special need for 
reliability that the second part of the Wood test 
is especially designed to serve. 
Holland, 777 P.2d at 1027. 
The trial judge inappropriately believed that "there is no 
presumption that one sentence is better than the other." T. 3270. 
The State's burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt both prongs 
of the Wood/Holland test and the need for reliability in imposing a 
death sentence establish a presumption for life. The judge's 
finding demonstrates that he improperly assessed the evidence. 
The circumstances of this case, the lack of other 
homicides, Appellant's background, intelligence, ability to be 
treated, and a myriad of other factors demonstrate that death is not 
an appropriate penalty in this case. 
POINT XXXXI. IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
THIS CASE IS DISPROPORTIONATE. 
"[T]his Court has indicated that it will review death 
sentences for proportionality." Holland, 777 P.2d at 1025. In 
Holland, this Court pointed out: 
In Wood, 648 P.2d at 77, we stated: "In the 
penalty phase, it is our duty to determine 
whether the sentence of death resulted from 
error, prejudice or arbitrariness, or was 
disproportionate." 
Our statement in Wood means that this Court 
will not allow sentencing authorities to impose 
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the death penalty in an invidious fashion against 
particular types of persons or groups of persons 
or in a fashion disproportionate to the 
culpability of a particular case. The statement 
also means that over time, as this Court becomes 
aware of a general pattern in the imposition of 
the death penalty in this state, the Court may 
set aside death sentences that fall outside the 
general pattern and thus reflect an anomaly in 
the imposition of the death penalty. 
In Holland. 777 P.2d at 1026, this Court went on to 
recognize a general pattern it has observed in death penalty cases 
in this state: 
With few exceptions, juries in this state have 
not opted for death penalties when a defendant 
has committed only a single murder; for the most 
part death penalties have been imposed when the 
defendant was involved in multiple murders, 
either at the time of the particular homicide 
charged or at some other time. 
Mr. Menzies has not been involved in multiple murders. 
In Gardner, 789 P.2d at 287, this Court stated: 
Determining whether the penalty is proportionate 
to the crime requires a careful and thoughtful 
consideration of the individual defendant and the 
circumstances surrounding the crime. 
Most of the evidence in this case is circumstantial, and it 
is impossible to ascertain the precise circumstances. Although 
Ms. Hunsaker disappeared from the Gas-A-Mat several hours before the 
homicide, what occurred during that period is not clear, and it is 
speculation to assume that she was treated in any particular way. 
The homicide itself occurred quickly without any evidence of torture. 
Mitigating evidence demonstrates that Mr. Menzies came from 
a financially and psychologically impoverished background. 
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T. 2907-11. He suffered extensive long-term abuse as a child, 
T. 2910-12. Nevertheless, he has a close relationship with his 
sister and other family members. T. 2948-9. His family loves him 
and was able to articulate the good in him. Notations in his prison 
file suggest that he can work well within the prison and is 
considered a hard worker, e.g.. E8:135-7. He was incident free for 
twenty-two months while in prison, an accomplishment that a prison 
social worker testified was rare. T. 3009. He suffers from three 
personality disorders but is susceptible to treatment. 
The circumstances surrounding the crime, a careful 
consideration of Mr. Menzies' background and the nonexistence of 
other homicides demonstrate that the death sentence is 
disproportionate and diverges from a general pattern of imposition 
of the death penalty which this Court has recognized, in violation 
of the eighth amendment. 
MISCELLANEOUS ARGUMENT 
POINT XXXXII. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED 
ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 7 AND 12 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION WHEN IT "DEATH QUALIFIED" THE JURY. 
Mr. Menzies filed a pretrial motion to preclude death 
qualification of his jury venire and supporting memorandum. 
R. 274-5, 276-95; see Addendum N. Despite the holding in 
Lockhart v. McCree. 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 
(1986), that the federal constitution does not preclude death 
qualification, Mr. Menzies maintains that the Utah constitution, 
Article I, §§ 7, 9, 10, 12, and 24, precludes such procedure because 
death qualified juries are more conviction-prone and are not a fair 
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representation of the community at large. See State v. Larocco, 794 
P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (this Court is free to independently interpret 
State constitution); Hovey v. SUP. Ct., 616 P.2d 1301, 1314-6 (Cal. 
1980); Lockhart v. McCree. 476 U.S. at 156-7 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. at 363 (1979). 
In State v. David Young. Case No. 890424, currently under 
advisement on direct appeal in this Court, the defendant/appellant 
raised this identical issue. Due to the page limitations imposed by 
this Court in the instant case, Mr. Menzies refers this Court to the 
death qualification issue in Case No. 890424, Point XXII at pages 
158-66, and hereby incorporates that argument by this reference 
thereto. 
POINT XXXXIII. THE UTAH STATUTORY DEATH PENALTY 
SCHEME FAILS TO ADEQUATELY CHANNEL THE CASES IN 
WHICH THE DEATH PENALTY IS APPLIED, IN VIOLATION 
OF BOTH THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. 
Mr. Menzies maintains that the Utah death penalty scheme 
violates the eighth amendment to the United States constitution and 
Article I, § 9 of the Utah constitution because (1) the lengthy list 
of aggravating factors in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 allows almost 
any homicide to result in a death penalty, thereby failing to narrow 
the class, (2) the unlimited aggravation language of § 76-3-207 
fails to channel the discretion of the sentencer, (3) the statute 
impermissibly creates a presumption of death in the penalty phase, 
(4) the Utah death penalty scheme unacceptably reduces evidentiary 
burdens in the penalty phase, and (5) the Utah death penalty scheme 
fails to provide for automatic review of federal constitutional 
issues. These same arguments were raised by the appellant in 
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State v. Young. Case No. 890424, appellant's opening brief at 
179-88. Due to page limitations imposed by this Court, Mr. Menzies 
adopts and incorporates such arguments and makes the following 
additions to the analysis contained in appellant's opening brief, 
State v. Young, Case No. 890424, at 179-88. 
In the instant case, the State argued and/or the judge 
relied on the following items which were not part of "the nature and 
circumstances of the crime" or "the defendant's character, 
background, history, [or] mental and physical condition." If 
relevant at all, such items fit only as "other facts in 
aggravation." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2). 
1. Victim impact testimony and evidence of fear 
and harm done to Carl McBrayer and Valfoa Suaniae 
Lelaetafea. T. 3196, 2785-2800, 2730-2759, 3199, 
3210, 3254. 
2. Claims that the death penalty was appropriate 
because the Utah State Prison could not 
effectively incarcerate Mr. Menzies and might 
parole him. T. 3194, 3200, 3210-11, 3254. 
3. The State's reliance on quotes from a book 
about psychopaths and comparison of Appellant to 
Charles Manson and Son of Sam, where there is no 
evidence that Appellant is a psychopath. 
T. 3212-3. 
Hence, the unlimited aggravation provision was applied in 
this case, unlike Tillman. 750 P.2d 546, 572 (Utah 1987). 
The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that where a 
state utilizes the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors, 
special emphasis is given "to the requirement that aggravating 
factors be defined with some degree of precision." Stringer v. 
Black, 112 S.Ct. at 1136. The "unlimited aggravation" section of 
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the Utah statute fails to define aggravating circumstances with 
precision, in violation of the eighth amendment. 
This Court has acknowledged that the additional 
"unnecessary rigor" language in Article I, § 9 might provide for 
greater protection than the eighth amendment. State v. Bishop. 717 
P.2d 261, 267 (Utah 1986); State v. Russell. 791 P.2d 188, 190-1 
(Utah 1990); State v. Andrews. 191 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39 (Durham, J., 
dissenting). 
In addition, this Court has acknowledged that the due 
process guarantees contained in Article I, § 7 of the Utah 
constitution provide greater protection for capital defendants. See 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774; Foote v. Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 
1991). 
Both the federal and Utah constitutions require that the 
class of murderers eligible for the death penalty be significantly 
narrowed. The current statutory scheme, with its seventeen 
statutory aggravating circumstances and allowance for almost 
unlimited aggravating evidence in the penalty phase, violates both 
constitutions. 
POINT XXXXIV. THE TRIAL JUDGE'S FAILURE TO 
ORALLY PRONOUNCE SENTENCE ON THE AGGRAVATING 
KIDNAPPING REQUIRES THAT SUCH SENTENCE BE 
STRICKEN. 
The trial judge orally pronounced only a sentence of death 
and did not otherwise sentence Appellant for the Aggravated 
Kidnapping conviction. T. 3270, 3248-9. The written Judgment 
contains a sentence of five years to life for the Aggravated 
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Kidnapping conviction. R. 1106. The trial judge's failure to 
orally pronounce sentence to Appellant violates the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and due process and requires that this sentence 
be stricken. See Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
State v. McClendon. 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980); State v. Janis. 
597 P.2d 873, 874 (Utah 1979); Benboe v. Alaska, 738 P.2d 356, 362 
(Alaska 1987). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial or, alternatively, 
for a new penalty phase. 
SUBMITTED this N'tl day of September, 1992. 
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